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PREFACE 
Since the resumption of the "troubles" - a euphemism for the 
re-emergence of physical force republicanism that began in the late 
1960s and continues to this day - historians, sociologists and 
political scientists have been predictably attracted to the Northern 
Ireland problem. As a consequence there has been a plethora of 
books, articles and other works produced on the subject. 
Nevertheless, although Gerry Fitt is often mentioned in general texts 
he has not been the subject of an in-depth study. This is surprising 
in view of the extremely high profile he held for over twenty five 
years in Irish politics. Indeed it would be no exaggeration to say 
that he has been a major protagonist in this turbulent phase in the 
history of Anglo-Irish relations. The primary purpose of this 
dissertation, therefore, is to provide an account of the political 
career of Gerry Fitt. 
If the breaking of new ground were all, this work would be of 
sufficient interest. It is my contention, however, that Fitt's 
political career constitutes a seemingly remarkable volte-face from 
Socialist Republican to Peer of the Realm. Accordingly, the second 
purpose of this dissertation is to analyse this intriguing paradox. 
Given this work's biographical nature the approach I shall adopt 
will be largely chronological. It will consist of nine sections: An 
introduction, seven chapters and a conclusion. The introduction will 
comprise, for the benefit of those unfamiliar with the historical 
background, a sketch of modern Irish history from the late eighteenth 
century until partition in 1921. In addition, it will attempt to 
ascertain Fitt's political orientation, if not philosophy, by 
identifying important factors in his early life which helped shape 
i i i 
his subsequent career. 
Chapter I discusses the transformation in Catholic politics from 
the late 1950s to the mid 1960s. Against this, Chapter II traces 
Fitt's political development during the very same period. Fitt's 
machinations during, and his relationship with the Civil Rights 
Movement of the late 1960s, form the substance of Chapter III. 
Chapter IV investigates the formation of the Social Democratic 
and Labour Party (S.D.L.P.) of which Fitt was a founder member and 
first leader. The basis of Chapter Vis an analysis of the role 
played by Fitt and the S.D.L.P. in the attempts to find a solution to 
the political breakdown that took place in the mid 1970s. Fitt's 
increasing isolation within the S.D.L.P. and his subsequent 
disenchantment with the party in the late 1970s provide the framework 
for Chapter VI, the penultimate chapter. 
The final chapter traces the events which led to the loss of 
Fitt's Westminster seat (after seventeen years) to Gerry Adams, head 
of Sinn Fein, the political wing of the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army (P.I.R.A.) and Fitt's subsequent elevation to the House of 
Lords. The conclusion assesses Fitt's place in Irish history. There 
will follow a tabulation of electoral results relevant to Fitt's 
political career. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Historical Background 
In 1798 Wolfe Tone and his fellow United Irishmen attempted an 
insurrection designed to subvert British rule in Ireland and to 
assert Irish independence. Ironically, the most significant 
consequence was the Act of Union of 1800 which directly linked 
Ireland to the British parliament at Westminster. The forced 
amalgamation provoked hostility and led to opposition movements 
committed to its undoing. 
Throughout the nineteenth century this opposition came in two 
forms. First, political revolutionaries, such as Robert Emmet who 
attempted a rebellion in 1803, the Young Irelanders of 1848 and the 
Fenians of the 1860s, all championed the use of physical force to 
overthrow British rule in Ireland. Second, the parliamentary 
constitutionalists who sought repeal of the Union and Home Rule for 
Ireland through non-violent methods. Foremost amongst these were 
Daniel O'Connell in the 1840s, Isaac Butt in the 1860s and Charles 
Stewart Parnell in the 1880s. Towards the end of the nineteenth 
century, 
because 
constitutional nationalism gained the ascendency primarily 
of Parnell's leadership. A demand for the re-establishment 
of an Irish parliament to control Irish affairs became an 
increasingly urgent request that the British found hard to ignore 
because of the success of the Irish Parliamentary Party. 
The situation was complicated by the attitude of the Protestant 
settlers concentrated in the north-east of Ireland in the province of 
Ulster. They viewed the development of the Home Rule movement with a 
great deal of anxiety. Unlike the rest of Ireland, Ulster had 
benefited from the union with Britain. This was due to the fact that 
1 
2 
in economic terms Ulster was largely industrial whereas the rest of 
Ireland was predominantly agricultural. Shipbuilding, engineering 
and the linen industry generated prosperity and caused the north-east 
of Ireland to develop differently politically and socially from the 
rest of the island. In an effort to preserve this condition, 
Ulster's Protestant unionists were determined to resist any move 
towards Home Rule. Tension was further generated by Protestants 
equating Home Rule with Rome Rule. 
Accordingly, in 1912, 400,000 Ulster Protestants, under Edward 
Carson, signed the Solemn League and Covenant, pledging to use all 
means necessary to defeat Home Rule. In 1913 the Ulster Volunteer 
Force (U.V.F.) was formed and 100,000 volunteers threatened to revolt 
against the Home Rule proposal and establish a provisional government 
in Ulster should Ireland be given its own legislature. Furthermore, 
in 1914, the U.V.F. landed 25,000 rifles and two and a half million 
rounds of ammunition at Larne in County Antrim. 
In contrast to unionist cohesion, nationalists were divided. 
Occasionally the constitutional and revolutionary strands had 
coalesced but it was more usual for them to operate as distinct and 
antagonistic entities. The leader of the Constitutional Nationalist 
Party, John Redmond, had witnessed the formation of a large army of 
Irish volunteers pledged to fight for Home Rule and he feared that 
widespread violence might result from the existence of two private 
armies. To prevent such an outcome Redmond took command of the Irish 
Volunteers. When Prime Minister Asquith proposed that the Ulster 
counties be allowed to opt out of the Irish parliament for a period 
of six years, Redmond agreed although he insisted that there be 
Plebiscites in each of the counties and in Londonderry. Carson, 
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however, rejected the compromise. He wanted all of Ireland to remain 
linked to Britain. Thus, by 1914 confrontation seemed inevitable and 
was only averted by the outbreak of the First World War. Redmond had 
great faith in the British parliament and was convinced that Britain 
would be more responsive to the Home Rule cause if Irishmen aided 
Britain's war effort. He, therefore, supported the British Empire 
and urged Irish volunteers to join the British army. Eighty thousand 
heeded his call. 
Revolutionary republicans took a decidedly different view of 
events in Europe. They argued that Britain's difficulty was 
Ireland's opportunity. In April 1916, James Connolly, the socialist 
leader, allied himself and his citizens army to the revolutionary 
nationalists led by Patrick Pearse. Together they organized the 
Easter rebellion and signed the proclamation establishing an Irish 
republic. The rising was poorly planned and collapsed after a week. 
For the most part the Irish people were apathetic or even hostile 
towards the rebels. This hostility changed radically, however, when 
Britain decided to execute the leaders. Their deaths marked a 
watershed in Irish history and Redmond's brand of parliamentary 
gradualism was discredited. Sinn Fein, founded in 1907, became the 
main voice of mass militant republicanism and, in the four 
by-elections held in 1917, was successful in all. Limited 
self-government was no longer their goal, now they demanded a full 
republic. 
After sweeping gains in the general election of 1918 (outside 
Ulster), Sinn Fein decided to ignore the British parliament. Sinn 
Fein subsequently formed the Dail Eireann declaring itself the 
legitimate governing body of Ireland. This declaration to secede 
4 
from the United Kingdom resulted in the Anglo-Irish war in which the 
new provisional government used its own volunteer army, now ~alled 
the Irish Republican Army (I.R.A.), in a guerilla campaign against 
the British army. 
In an attempt to end the conflict, Britain proposed the 
Government of Ireland Act (1920). This offered limited Home Rule for 
Ireland with two separate parliaments in Belfast and Dublin. The 
unionists of the north-east now reluctantly agreed to division but 
opted only for six of the nine Ulster counties creating an area with 
a built in Protestant majority. Partition coupled with the 
relationship of the new state with the United Kingdom was totally 
unacceptable to Sinn Fein, and the Anglo-Irish war continued. 
In 1921 elections took place for both the new Home Rule 
parliaments. In the south, Sinn Fein used the election as a 
referendum on national independence and won 124 of the 128 seats, 
while, in the north, the unionists won 40 of the 52 seats. After the 
elections, the British again tried to end the conflict. They offered 
a new treaty which afforded the south dominion status within the 
Commonwealth and a large degree of self-government. However, 
partition was still a thorny problem. Britain declared that the 1920 
Act was non-negotiable, but offered a boundary commission to 
determine the final borders between north and south. 
The southern Irish delegation to the talks with the British 
government reluctantly accepted the treaty on behalf of the new 
state. On the delegation's return, however, a bloody civil war broke 
out which those in favour of the treaty eventually won in 1923. 
Partition had become a reality. In the north the unionists took 
control in the knowledge that their border contained a substantial 
5 
and resentful Catholic minority deprived of the right to be part of 
an overall majority in a larger state. The south, on the other hand, 
developed into a homogeneous Catholic state that finally achieved the 
status of a republic in 1948. 
GERRY FITT - FORMATIVE INFLUENCES 
Gerry Fitt is a Catholic and was raised in the working class 
area of Dock in Belfast. That seemingly innocuous sentence condenses 
information that is extremely significant and needs to be appreciated 
in order to gain a full understanding of Fitt's political career. I 
will deal with each element in turn. 
First, as a Catholic, Fitt was a member of a permanent minority 
within Northern Ireland, which was governed by the unionist majority 
(Fitt was born in 1926, six years after partition). Through their 
hankerings to be part of a majority in a single state comprising the 
whole of the island, Catholics were regarded by many unionists as 
subversives intent on undermining the link with Britain. This 
suspicion was regularly invoked to justify discriminatory practices 
in places of work which were, by and large, staffed and owned by 
members of the Protestant community. In other words, major sources 
of employment, such as heavy industry (shipbuilding etc) and 
administration, were closed to Catholics. They were, therefore, 
confined to work of an unskilled or temporary nature. 
Catholics often emigrated. 
Indeed 
Second, coming from the working classes would not have enhanced 
a Catholic's life-choices. Prior to the creation of the welfare 
state in the United Kingdom in the late 1940s which was to prove so 
influential in the development of nationalist politics, and will be 
considered in later chapters, access to the normal means of 
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self-improvement, education, was strictly limited. The cost of 
secondary education, the vehicle of social mobility, would have. been 
too great a burden for most families. 
Finally, Belfast is a predominantly Protestant city. The 
Protestant community outnumbers the Catholic by approximately three 
to one. The Marquis of Donegall, the landowner who created Belfast 
built on land where no prior settlement existed, unlike the provinces 
second city of Londonderry. Protestant inhabitants tolerated, even 
welcomed Catholics, so much that they made substantial donations of 
land and money for the building of Catholic churches. However, 
successive waves of Catholic migrants to the city in search of 
employment, together with the militant revival of both the Catholic 
and Protestant churches from the mid-nineteenth century on led to a 
worsening of relations between the two communities. Conflict 
manifested 
frequency 
Catholics 
insecurity. 
itself in sectarian riots which increased in savagery and 
throughout the rest of the century. 1 Consequently, 
in Belfast have suffered from a certain sense of 
In contrast, their counterparts in Londonderry, by 
virtue of their numerical superiority and history, are relatively 
confident of their nationalist identity. This may appear to be an 
unjustifiable generalization, but it is often supported by the fact 
that the sectarianism which has characterized the political violence 
in Belfast has not been evident in Londonderry. In short, Belfast 
Catholics differ in disposition to their co-religionists in 
Londonderry and the rest of the province. 
As will be revealed, Fitt's early years are by no means 
untypical of his class, generation and community. However, an 
interest in politics would ensure that Fitt's life would not remain 
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orthodox. 
Fitt's father died when he was eight years old, leaving his 
mother with six children. His family would not have been the only 
working class household in Belfast to endure poverty, but the death 
of the breadwinner could only have aggravated its plight. He left 
school in 1940 at age fourteen. He had obtained the primary school 
leaving certificate which would have enabled him to go to the local 
grammar school. Since education was considered a luxury rather than 
a right, he, like most working-class males, sought paid employment 
instead. He worked at various jobs between the ages of fourteen and 
fifteen, including a position as a soap boy in a barber's shop. At 
fifteen, he joined the Merchant Navy, two years younger than the 
legal age to enlist. He remained at sea until 1952, and, during the 
war, saw service in the North and Baltic seas in ships conveying 
goods to Russia. Fitt met his wife, Ann, a native of Castlederg, 
County Tyrone, in London where she was working as a telephone 
operator. In 1947 the Fitts' moved to Belfast. 
After leaving the Merchant Navy in 1952, Fitt held a number of 
interim jobs, ranging from insurance agent, encyclopedia salesman and 
clerk. However, much of his time was taken up with politics. In 
view of his subsequent political career, it seems that Fitt was 
imbued with the same sense of resentment against the unionist state 
as his co-religionists. While at sea, Fitt had become a disciple of 
the Irish Marxist, James Connolly, who had been so instrumental in 
organizing the 1916 rebellion. Connolly argued that the subjection 
of the Irish working classes was a result of the unresolved national 
question. He saw British domination of Ireland as a continuation of 
neo-colonialism and an obstruction to the establishment of politics 
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based upon class loyalties. 2 Fitt now maintains that the 
writings of Connolly have been his main political inspiration. His 
own poverty and the poverty he witnessed while at sea prompted his 
initial interest in Connolly. 3 Fitt has never put his 
political thoughts to paper and we must assume therefore that his 
allegiance is more emotional than intellectual. 
While on leave from the Merchant Navy in 1951, Fitt took part in 
his first election campaign. Fitt's goal, like Connolly's, was to 
unite the Catholic and Protestant working classes. He supported Jack 
Beattie, a Presbyterian, who stood on an Irish Labour ticket and was 
thus opposed to partition. Beattie won the Westminster West Belfast 
seat from the unionists by twenty-five votes after five recounts. 
The drama of the close election ensured that Fitt's concern with 
politics was now a commitment rather than an interest. In 1957 he 
stood as a candidate for the Belfast Corporation (the local 
government) and in 1958, for the Northern Ireland parliament. Fitt 
lost on both occasions, but his political profile was sufficiently 
raised for him to be elected in his second attempt to the Belfast 
Corporation. So began Fitt's uninterrupted twenty-five year period 
of electoral success. 
NOTES 
1. See I. Budge and C. O'Leary, Belfast, Approach to Crisis: 
study of Belfast Politics 1613-1970 (London: Macmillan, 1973). 
2. 
(London: 
See C.D. Greaves, 
Macmillan, 1973). 
The Life and Times of James Connolly 
3. Lord Fitt, interview by author, 19 December 1988, House of 
Lords, London. 
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CHAPTER I 
CATHOLIC POLITICS IN TRANSITION 
It is often argued that we never accepted the state. That is true 
for most of us. But we had little choice. We were the 
unfortunate baggage of a partitionist arrangement. We were the 
human flotsam floating about in the political limbo of an 
unfinished struggle. 1 
This is Gerry Adams's, the President of Sinn Fein, synopsis of 
the plight of the Catholic/nationalist population after partition in 
1921. The historians, Lord Longford and Ann McHardy, concluded that 
the workings of the Northern Ireland state contained "serious genetic 
defects:" 2 The most blatant being that a substantial 
Catholic/nationalist minority was deprived of the right to be part of 
an overall majority in a larger state. 
As a result of their opposition to Home Rule and the well known 
British tendency to compromise, unionists found themselves with their 
own Home Rule of sorts. In order to preserve the Northern state from 
what unionists perceived to be the enemy within there was 
considerable discrimination in housing, votes, policing, local 
employment and government, education and welfare spending. The 
results of such machinations were twofold. First, Protestants of all 
denominations and classes coalesced under an oligarchy; second, they 
reinforced the alienation of the Catholic population who were already 
unwilling to accept the legitimacy of the state and its 
institutions. The Northern parliament at Stormont Castle was totally 
dominated by the Unionist Party. Nationalist resentment was further 
fuelled by security measures designed to protect the state, namely 
the establishment of an exclusively Protestant Ulster Special 
Constabulary (the B Specials) and the Special Powers Act which 
10 
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allowed for a total suspension of civil liberties in so called 
emergency situations. Although discrimination was in many in~tances 
intentional, its workings were considerably aided by the 
unco-operative attitude of the defeated Catholic minority. Michael 
Farrell, in his Marxist critique of the history of Northern Ireland, 
The orange State, describes the consequences: 
Devlin and his colleagues3 were treated with contempt and 
forced into abstentionism, and the frustration of the minority 
eventually erupted into an abortive campaign by the I.R.A. This 
was the first of several cycles of parliamentary agitation 
followed by rebuff and abstentionism, then by a military 
campaign. All strategies proving equally unsuccessful and only 
confirming the total alienation of the minority from the 
state. 4 
This pattern continued until the late 1950s when a change of 
attitude could be perceived - on both sides of the border Catholic 
politics were in transition. Signs indicated that Catholics were 
willing to participate in the workings of the Northern Ireland 
state. They evidently had recognized the futility of the armed 
struggle. 
The failure of the I.R.A. border campaign of 1956 - 1962 had 
discredited the tradition of physical force. Goaded into a more 
co-operative and conciliatory position, the Nationalist Party 
accepted the role of official opposition. New groups emerged such as 
National Unity, the National Democratic Party (N.D.P.), and the 
Campaign for Social Justice (C.S.J.), content to improve the lot of 
northern Catholics within the system with minimal reference to the 
border. In Britain, the Campaign for Democracy in Ulster (C.D.U.) 
emerged which reflected a growing awareness and sympathy for the 
Plight of British Catholics in Northern Ireland. Perhaps the most 
positive sign was the fact that in 1965, Sean Lemass, prime minister 
12 
of the Republic and his northern counterpart Terence O'Neill, had 
enjoyed a convivial summit in Belfast, it seemed to reduce the 
importance of the border. In short, in the mid-1960s, the future 
would see less emphasis on the issue of partition and more on social 
reform of the Northern Ireland state. The Dublin based current 
affairs publication Hibernia remarked in November 1965: 
The little, bitter, closed in world of Ulster is everywhere being 
penetrated by the greater problems of human progress and human 
survival. The people are less satisfied in seeing themselves as 
either outposts of the British Empire or defenders of the ideal 
Republic. They belong to Ireland and the modern world. They 
desire for their children prosperity, peace and progress. They 
want an ending to the tyranny of upholding ancient old 
quarrels. 5 
As Paul Bew and Henry Patterson note, events" ... seemed to 
indicate that the Irish question as traditionally posed was no longer 
pertinent." 6 
At this juncture Gerry Fitt, the Catholic Republican Socialist, 
was elected to Westminster. To fully place his election in context, 
and in an attempt to gain a greater understanding of Catholic 
politics in the period, the rest of the chapter will be devoted to 
analysing the developments mentioned above. 
THE I.R.A. BORDER CAMPAIGN 1956 - 1962 
Nationalist claims for Irish unity were based upon the 
republican creed. Republicanism interpets the relationship between 
Britain and Ireland as little more than a morganatic marriage. 
Consequently, military insurrections designed to sever this union and 
establish an independent Ireland have punctuated Irish history. We 
have seen that after the establishment of the Northern state, the 
political history of the six counties was likewise characterised by 
intermittent military campaigns. 
physical force reaction has endured: 
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J. Bowyer Bell explains why this 
For a few, generation after generation, what Pearse and Connolly 
began in the name of Tone on April 24, 1916, is an unfinished 
legacy - but a clearly defined responsibility. As long as the 
British border cuts across the Republic of 1916, as long as 
Ireland and its people are neither free of exploitation nor Gaelic 
in tongue and heart, then men will turn to the task as defined by 
Tone no matter how bleak the prospects: to do less would be to 
betray the past and deny the future. 7 
One such commitment to the "clearly defined responsibility" 
began with the I.R.A's adoption of Sean Cronin's "Operation 
Harvest." 8 Cronin's plan for the extirpation of the six county 
state was implemented in 1956. The strategy envisioned a guerilla 
campaign intent on the wholesale destruction of political, 
administrative, and economic centers. Such destruction, it was 
assumed, would paralyse the infrastructure of the state and thus 
bring about its demise. The strategy contained one major 
contradiction - Belfast, which was the main political, administrative 
and economic center was not attacked because of the fear of reprisals 
against the unprotected nationalist enclaves within the city. 9 
This incongruity was one of the major inadequacies of the campaign 
which ultimately led to its failure in 1962. 
Nevertheless, the taking up of arms once again aroused 
patriotism in the Irish Republic. In the elections to the Dail in 
1957, Sinn Fein candidates polled 66,000 votes and four of them 
gained parliamentary seats. 10 Such patriotism, however, was 
short lived. The ineffective military strategy was compounded by a 
general lack of discipline throughout the movement. However, there 
were a number of fatalities in border areas and the campaign was 
significant enough for the governments of both Belfast and Dublin to 
14 
take stringent security measures. 
The republic re-introduced internment in 1957, a policy which 
had always been a major component in the weaponry of Stormont. 
Despite some spectacular exploits at the beginning of 1958, 
internment severely weakened the I.R.A. Towards the end of 1958, 
when 187 men were interned south of the border, not only was military 
escalation greatly hindered through lack of man power, but the 
command structure lost any cohesiveness it had established. 11 
The performance of the political wing reflected the decline of 
I.R.A. fortunes. In the 1959 Northern Ireland Westminster elections 
the Nationalist Party, in what had become standard policy, stood 
aside in order not to split the Catholic vote. Sinn Fein contested 
all twelve seats but managed to poll only 73,415 votes. 12 This 
was less than half the number they received in the 1955 election and 
the vote was clearly indicative of declining support. 
This pattern of Sinn Fein decline was repeated in the Republic -
in the 1961 Dail election the votes polled were likewise less than 
half received previously and no republicans were elected. Thus, on 
both sides of the border popular support for the campaign had been 
greatly reduced. Tim Pat Coogan in his sympathetic history of the 
I.R.A. explains the attitudes to which that fall may be attributed: 
In the North the nationalists refer to the campaign to day as "the 
incidents" because this is in fact what it was, a series of 
incidents along the border, impinging very little on Belfast and 
annoying rather than terrifying the Northern administration ... But 
once it became obvious that the campaign could have no effect on 
the permanency of the Northern regime public interest diminished. 
As regards the sentiment in the South, Coogan concludes: 
At no time did this interest ever betoken any hostility to England 
or indeed towards the North. Most people in the Republic were 
rather puzzled by the whole thing and were inclined to write the 
whole thing off as the "I.R.A. at it again", without any clear 
15 
appreciation of why it should have been at it again. 13 
The I.R.A then became increasingly isolated. The organization 
finally ended the struggle in February 1962. Its statement read: 
The decision to end the resistance campaign has been taken in view 
of the general situation. Foremost among the factors motivating 
this course of action has been the attitude of the general public 
whose minds have been deliberately distracted from the supreme 
issue facing the Irish people - the unity and freedom of 
Ireland. 14 
The declaration contained no self criticism, no recognition of 
inherent strategy inadequacies. Instead, the I.R.A. blamed the 
people. The campaign had resulted in fifteen deaths, damage 
estimated at a million pounds, and increased security in the six 
counties was estimated at ten million pounds. 15 
In retrospect, it is apparent that the I.R.A. in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s did not really reflect the aspirations of 
nationalists. In the North, the Irish News (the Catholic daily 
newspaper) editorialized that the physical force tradition was no 
longer enough: 
Unionists in commenting on the I.R.A. decision to abandon their 
campaign of violence against the North describe it as an admission 
of defeat. It is forgotten that the I.R.A. were from the start 
doomed to defeat without the support of the Irish people and that 
they did not receive. 16 
Elsewhere, the physical force tradition was seen as no more than 
an historical relic. In the United States the New York Times argued: 
Partition is resented but the present generation knows that if 
partition is ever to be ended it must be by peaceful arrangements. 
The few young thugs who make up the tiny remnant that now lays 
down its arms used a grand and famous name for their organization, 
but the Irish Republican Army belongs to history, and it belongs 
to better men in times that are gone. So does the Sinn Fein. Let 
us put a wreath of roses on their grave and move on. 17 
Above all things, the failure of the border campaign showed 
that political and social conditions within Northern Ireland were not 
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conducive to the creation of a mass movement striving for a united 
Ireland through physical force. The collapse of this campaign 
represented a crisis for militant physical force republicanism, and 
the response was the re-emergence of social republicanism. A more 
grass-roots movement replaced the elitism of physical force 
republicanism. Policy was transformed from a rigid refusal to 
recognise the status quo to an involvement in left wing politics, 
combined with a resolve to bring down the system from within. 
Quintessential physical force republicanism was apparently a thing of 
the past. 
Accordingly, the New Nation magazine in Northern Ireland argued 
in 1964: 
As nationalists our first concern is with all those who wished to 
see the ultimate unity of Ireland brought about by peaceful 
means. In this statement we do not wish to deny that there have 
been times when Irishmen were justified in using other means and 
that such times may come again, but we do maintain that at the 
present time there is no justification whatever for 
violence. 18 
Apart from the odd symbolic gesture of defiance, the most 
spectacular being the destruction of Nelson's Pillar in Dublin on 
March 7, 1966, physical force republicanism in the mid 1960s kept a 
very low profile. In the words of J. Bowyer Bell: 
Physical force as a means to break the connection with Britain had 
never seemed more irrelevant. Ireland in the sixties seemed more 
concerned with the fruits of the good life than the bootless 
ambitions of the romantic past. All the wild dreams were dead and 
gone, the roads were clogged with traffic and the pubs with 
whiskey drinkers. 19 
THE NATIONALIST PARTY 
Any difference between Sinn Fein and the constitutional strand 
of Irish nationalism as represented by the Nationalist Party - the 
direct descendant of John Redmond's party-concerned only what method 
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to use to obtain a united Ireland. Both were essentially Catholic 
conservative organizations, with anti-partition and abstention 
policies. The word "party" as a collective noun for the 
constitutional nationalists of the North was something of a misnomer, 
for they did not resemble a modern political party in structure or 
organization. From the inception of the state, the nationalists 
denied its legitimacy. It was only after 1945 that they attended the 
Northern parliament with some regularity. Prior to that time their 
refusal to acknowledge the existence of Northern Ireland was 
reflected in frequent abstention. Ian McAllister presents the 
unenviable dilemma of the nationalists and their response to it: 
They had no incentive to participate in the normal political 
activity of the state because they could never hope to influence, 
let alone become, the government, yet they were committed to 
parliamentary politics. 
In the event, the nationalists overcame the dilemma by a half 
hearted commitment to constitutional politics. They failed to 
organise and restricted their activities to enclaves where they 
possessed a numerical majority moreover they frequently abstained 
from parliament and continued to emphasise partition to the 
exclusion of other social issues affecting the welfare of their 
supporters. 20 
These social issues included matters of housing, employment and 
welfare spending. To the Nationalist Party, all social problems were 
summed up in the word "discrimination" and this position was 
maintained from 1921 to the 1960s. Thus, to the constitutional 
nationalist, 
grievances. 
a united Ireland was the panacea for all social 
Nationalists, then, made no real attempts to work within the 
system. Their efforts probably would have been ineffectual but the 
failure even to articulate measures of reform outside the national 
question, which would have benefited the people they represented, led 
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in turn to disillusionment and general apathy within that community. 
The Nationalist Party, with the exception of the partition issue was 
thus highly conservative. Its close clerical links only strengthened 
this characteristic. The stagnant nature of its profile was 
reflected in the only legislation that it saw through Stormont, the 
politically unimportant "Wild Birds Act" of 1931. 21 It is 
little wonder that Bernadette Devlin (now McAliskey) would come to 
refer to them as the "Green Tories of Ireland." 22 
Eddie McAteer, a Derry Catholic, and the 1960s leader of the 
Nationalist Party, articulated its passivity when he said: "Our 
policy is a realistic one. Broadly speaking we realise that 
partition is a matter between Dublin and London. On that issue ours 
must be a passive role. We oppose partition as a great evil, but we 
ourselves cannot change the partition situation." 23 
There were, as we shall see, groups on both sides of the border 
who were no longer convinced of the validity of this "passive role." 
They challenged what they perceived as the futile indulgence of 
isolation and non-co-operation. During the 1960s, the Nationalist 
Party came under increasing pressure to improve its performance and 
profile. 
One of the party's most vociferous critics south of the border 
was the Dublin-based current affairs review Hibernia. It was 
particularly critical of the party's lack of structure. In 1961 
Hibernia complained: "The nationalists of course have no 
organization whatever. The party is not a party in any political 
sense but rather in an Alice in Wonderland sense." 24 Later in 
1963 it argued: 
In order to hold and improve its standing in the 'Province' to the 
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point where it can be considered as an alternative to the Unionist 
government, the Nationalist Party must become a more purposeful, 
vigorous and progressive looking organization. 
It must organise in every constituency in Northern Ireland and not 
as heretofore in safe constituencies only. 
It must 
policies 
Northern 
challenge 
plan and produce for the electorate vigorous progressive 
covering all aspects of economic and social endeavours in 
Ireland, policies which could become a real and dangerous 
to the unionists policy of step by step with Britain. 
Most important of all: the future policies of the Nationalist 
Party, even allowing for the ideal of a united country, must 
appeal to all sections of the community and not at present, to one 
section only. 25 
Throughout the early 1960s Hibernia was consistently critical of 
the irredentist profile of the Nationalist Party. The narrowness of 
its nationalism was envisaged not only as an obstacle to 
reunification but actually a bulwark of partition and a main 
condition of its continuance. 
North of the border, criticism of the "Green Tories" was equally 
strong. The leader of the Ulster Liberal Association, Albert 
McElroy, when asked in 1962 what he thought of the Nationalist Party 
in Stormont replied: "Politically speaking, it is the other side of 
the unionist penny. Most of its members, had they been born 
Protestants instead of Catholics, would find themselves quite at home 
on a Twelfth of July Platform." 26 
However, the nationalists would have been most sensitive to the 
criticism which came from within their own community. In 1964, John 
Hume, a Derry school teacher, who later became a civil rights 
activist and leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party 
{S.D.L.P.), chastised the Nationalist Party in an Irish Times 
article. While rebuking the Unionist administration for the plight 
of Northern nationalists, Hume also blamed the Nationalist Party for 
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the situation: 
Good government depends as much on the opposition as on the party 
in power. Weak opposition leads to corrupt government. 
Nationalists in opposition have been in no way constructive. They 
have quite rightly been loud in their demands for rights, but they 
have remained silent and inactive about their duties. In forty 
years of opposition they have not produced one constructive 
contribution on either the social or economic plane to the 
development of Northern Ireland which is, after all, a substantial 
part of the united Ireland for which they strive. Leadership has 
been the comfortable leadership of flags and slogans. Easy no 
doubt but irresponsible. 
With regard to the Nationalist Party's ambiguous attitude toward 
the Westminster parliament, Hume expressed an opinion which but a few 
years previously would have been construed as virtual heresy. He 
argued that acceptance of the constitutional position could be 
reconciled with the aspiration of a united Ireland 
There is nothing inconsistent with such acceptance and a belief 
that a thirty-two county republic is best for Ireland. In fact, 
if we are to pursue a policy of non-recognition, the only logical 
policy is that of Sinn Fein. If one wishes to create a united 
Ireland by constitutional means, then one must accept the 
constitutional position. 27 
The Nationalist Party could not ignore such criticism which was 
becoming more and more vocal. In November 1964, under pressure from 
converging forces, it published a thirty nine-point policy statement 
which pledged it to work within the system. The party also declared 
a commitment to become a modern political organization. In addition, 
the statement demanded an end to discrimination and gerrymandering, 
and made reference to economic considerations. 28 
In January 1965, the premier of the Republic of Ireland, Sean 
Lemass, visited his counterpart in the North, Terence O'Neill. This 
meeting, the first of its kind, was correctly considered a major 
watershed in the relationship between the two states. 
One immediate tangible result of this summit was that the 
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Nationalist Party, prompted by Lemass, decided for the first time in 
;ts history to form the official opposition. 
Eddie McAteer made the following statement: 
The Nationalist Party has reviewed the whole political landscape 
and has reached the following conclusions. Stormont must be seen 
as a federated or regional Irish parliament to continue in 
existence until fears of an all Ireland parliament are finally 
resolved. There must be co-operation to ensure that the Stormont 
parliament makes good or better laws for the benefit of all the 
people thus promoting better harmony. 29 
The nationalists had ended a negative policy which had endured 
for over forty years and had finally accepted the status of Northern 
Ireland. They had committed themselves to co-operate within the 
system wherever their principles would permit, and superficially at 
least, Northern Ireland appeared to be entering into a period of 
conciliation. 
NATIONAL UNITY AND THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 
The questioning of traditional beliefs and the resultant 
criticism of the Nationalist Party stemmed from a new generation of 
Northern Catholics, more concerned with social and economic 
conditions than with the ideal of a united Ireland. 
John Hume's Irish Times article was indicative of a growing 
change in attitude. Now there really was a Catholic nationalist 
desire to pursue a reasonable political dialogue as regards the 
constitution and government of Ireland. Hume and others were 
activated by a sense of frustration with their position in public 
life and an exhaustion with the seemingly endless cycles of 
violence. Catholic grievances over discrimination continued, but 
there was a willingness to adopt a fresh approach to old grievances. 
Much of the impetus for improving the status of Catholics within the 
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existing political framework sprang from a new middle class which was 
no longer prepared to tolerate discrimination. 
In November 1959, the Catholic organization National Unity was 
formed. It was largely composed of University graduates who had 
benefited from higher education opportunities resulting from the 1947 
Education Acts. 
Initially, members of National Unity saw themselves as an 
integral part of the Nationalist Party, a reform body that would push 
it towards more progressive socio-economic positions. 30 The 
concept of National Unity suggested that a united opposition to 
unionism was now an attainable goal. Hibernia commented in 1961: 
"At the moment, there is no Nationalist Party to join, a circumstance 
which has brought into existence a group, National Unity, which aims 
to unite the nationalist people with a solid blow." 31 
Middle class National Unity saw itself as providing (for the 
Northern nationalist community) an intellectual and moral leadership 
which had been lacking within the Nationalist Party. Its aim was to 
instill confidence in members of the minority community so that they 
would play a part in political life and influence the course of 
nationalist politics. In short, National Unity hoped to provide a 
rallying point for a new brand of nationalism. 
Towards the end of 1963 it had become apparent to National Unity 
that the Nationalist Party was irreformable - its profile had 
remained stagnant for so long that any change at all in policy verged 
on the revolutionary. Thus, the party's conservative nature 
militated against any worthwhile adaptation to the changing times. 
In January 1964 National Unity published the first issue of an 
independent quarterly journal for social, cultural and political 
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comment on Irish affairs. This magazine was New Nation, and, as Ian 
McAllister points out, its title was intended to "invoke 
parallels"32 with the newspaper of the Young Irelanders founded 
in 1842. 33 The growing rift between the group and the 
Nationalist Party was made clear in the April 1964 edition. 
It was one of the minor ironies of history that the Parnellite 
line of succession from the first Irish party should be maintained 
to this day in the persons of the Nationalist parliamentary 
representatives in Stormont. The irony is contained in the fact 
that the Irish party was the first example of an organized 
political party in these islands while the present nationalist 
representation is the very antithesis of party organization. 
For the academic historian such a reversal provides a lengthy 
footnote to a political history of Ireland. For the nationalist 
electorate on the other hand it implies a state of confusion, 
frustration and bewilderment. 34 
A major effort to establish some uniformity in nationalist 
policy was attempted when National Unity called a convention of 
anti-partition groups in Maghery, County Armagh in April, 1964. This 
convention was attended by nationalist elected representatives. 
Other delegates included Republican, Labour and Independent senators 
and M.P's as well as many members of the professions which composed 
National Unity itself - doctors, teachers, solicitors and a number of 
university students. They discussed a previously circulated motion 
calling for the creation of a united democratic political party to 
represent all components of the nationalist movement and fulfil its 
aspiration for a united Ireland. The outcome of the meeting was the 
formation of a new political unit - The National Political Front. 
Afterwards McAteer said that "The keynote was unity of national 
forces and the end of weakening divisions." Thus, the resolution 
contained the following: 
In conjunction with the Nationalist parliamentary representatives 
and with other M.P's, who support the national ideal to take 
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immediate steps to create such a national political front with all 
the machinery of a normal political party in such areas where 
these do not already exist. 35 
An Irish News editorial welcomed this outcome. 
Any political movement .... that works for the unity of national 
groups deserves encouragement and support. Wise counsel and 
single hearted purpose can repair past errors and mend broken 
friendships. Force has proved a failure. But there should be no 
other failure in fresh and determined efforts to heal the wound 
that has weakened the country and to end the friction that has 
kept so many unity workers in rival camps. 36 
It seemed, therefore, as if a start had been made on the 
creation of a united political party. The political domination of 
the Nationalist Party was certainly drawing to a close. 37 
However, it still retained sufficient prestige to ensure the 
fragmentation of the nascent "National Political Front." 
In September 1964, the N.P.F. condemned the Nationalist Party 
via a resolution censuring its decision not to contest the 
Fermanagh/South Tyrone seat at the forthcoming Westminster election. 
This decision was consistent with the party's policy of standing 
aside at imperial elections and allowing Sinn Fein a straight fight 
with the unionists. The resolution also declared: "That the present 
situation has developed due to the failure of the Nationalist 
Parliamentary Party to co-operate within the National Political Front 
in the creation of a normal democratic political party." 
Commenting on the Resolution, McAteer said: 
This has placed the future of the front in grave jeopardy. In my 
opinion it has crumbled and will require rebuilding from the 
foundation .... 
I am disappointed that it has not been found possible to build a 
~ew organisation. In my judgement the materials were 
incompatible. Certainly the high hopes of the Maghery Convention 
are a long way from fulfilment but I am hopeful that a new phoenix 
may arise from the ashes. 38 
Unfortunately for McAteer and his fellow Nationalist M.P's, what 
r 
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did emerge from the ashes was a new political party which would 
further fragment Catholic politics. The Nationalist Party's _thirty 
nine point plan in November of 1964 was too little and too late. 
Finally in 1965, National Unity created the National Democratic 
Party (N.D.P.). Its open membership was designed to attract the best 
talent from the total nationalist community. N.D.P. made little 
impression upon the electorate despite its secular and progressive 
profile, and had little success in uniting the anti-partition 
forces. McAllister explains the failure of the party strategy: 
The overall aim of the strategy was to form a radical and viable 
alternative to unionism and to appear as a responsible and 
constructive opposition in the British tradition. In a province 
with a permanent opposition and an equally permanent one-party 
government this was a forlorn hope. The failure to achieve a 
credible parliamentary representation had lasting consequences in 
shortening the life of the N.D.P. 39 
In the mid 1960s, unionism thus seemed as secure as ever and 
nationalists had deemed it necessary to work within the system - yet 
their ability to do just that was hindered by continued fragmentation 
and disunity. 
THE "CAMPAIGN FOR DEMOCRACY IN ULSTER" AND THE "CAMPAIGN FOR 
SOCIAL JUSTICE." 
National Unity and the N.D.P. were not the only organizations to 
evolve from Catholic frustration in the 1960s. Two other groups, 
which were to make a great political impact on both unionism and 
indeed the history of Ireland also emerged, the Campaign for 
Democracy in Ulster (C.D.U.) and the Campaign for Social Justice 
(C.S.J.). 
Ed Moloney and Andy Pollack, in their biography of Ian Paisley 
correctly consider July 1960 as a watershed in Northern nationalist 
politics. 40 In that month, Orangemen were given permission to 
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march through the Catholic village of Dungiven by the Home Affairs 
Ministry; "Paisley's pressure had established the right of Loyalists 
to parade their triumphalism through Catholic districts." 41 
Frustration with the attitude of Stormont led nationalists to seek a 
meeting with a British Home Office Minister to vent their anger, and 
Dennis Vosper, a Parliamentary Secretary, agreed to see them. The 
meeting did little to pacify the nationalists; Vosper refused to 
stray from unionist policy. The importance of that meeting, however, 
lies in the fact that it was the first time a British Minister had 
listened to Catholic grievances and therefore encouraged a 
significant change in nationalist tactics. Thereafter, nationalists 
would begin to strive for justice in Northern Ireland via 
Westminster. 42 
This change in tactics came to fruition in June 1965, when a 
group of backbench Labour M.P's set up the Campaign for Democracy in 
Ulster their aim being an enquiry into the affairs of Northern 
Ireland. This group had been founded as a result of the House of 
Commons' refusal to change the Convention whereby Ulster's affairs 
could not be discussed at Westminster. The C.D.U. based its demand 
on Section 75 of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920. This stated 
that supreme authority over Northern Ireland remained at 
Westminster. One of the most prominent members of the reform group 
was the M.P. for Blakeley, Manchester, Paul Rose. He argued: 
What riles us above all is that when we question injustices in the 
six counties we are accused of interfering, yet there is no 
question of any Constitutional limit on the voting powers of the 
unionist members in the House .... 
He insisted that the border was not a concern of the new group. 
It is not 
campaign. 
for us to raise the issue of the border in this 
We are intent on drawing attention to injustices over 
27 
which the House of Commons has direct or indirect control. The 
Irish people themselves will solve the border problem in 
time. 43 
As we will see, the C.O.U. gained considerable impetus when 
Gerry Fitt was elected M.P. for West Belfast in March 1966. 
The struggle against discrimination in Northern Ireland took 
another step forward in January 1964 when the Campaign for Social 
Justice was inaugurated in Belfast. This non-political body had 
sprung from the Homeless Citizens league which had been established 
in Dungannon, County Tyrone, by Doctor Con Mccloskey and his wife 
Patricia. The league was a protest organization against housing 
discrimination in the county. Reflecting the new civil rights 
consciousness in the Catholic community, the League evolved into the 
C.S.J. This movement, like National Unity and later the N.O.P. was 
composed largely of middle class, professional Catholics and declared 
its immediate aims: 
The first objective was a fact finding investigation of injustices 
against people of all creeds and political opinions .... 
The government of Northern Ireland's policies of apartheid and 
discrimination have continued to be implemented at all levels with 
such zeal that we have banded ourselves together to oppose 
them. 44 
The campaign endeavoured to rise above political parties by 
striving to end injustice for any group or individual Protestant or 
Catholic with the question of the border being incidental. The 
C.S.J. was the start of what was to become the Civil Rights Movement. 
THE WELFARE STATE 
The question that now begs an answer is why in the 1960s did a 
significant number of Catholics abandon their passivity and demand 
first class citizenship in Northern Ireland? 
28 
The establishment of the British welfare state seems to provide 
an answer. Social policy in Northern Ireland underwent radical 
changes in the 1940s. 45 Considerable improvements were made in 
areas of public transport, health and social services, housing and 
education. These measures compared favourably with the static 
situation south of the border. Northern Ireland appeared materially 
superior in comfort to the Republic. 
Perhaps the most significant of all the welfare state advances 
to the Northern Catholic was the 1947 Education Act, based on the 
1944 British Act. This facilitated free post-primary education, 
which enabled children of working class parents to continue at school 
until the age of fifteen. Improvements in the University grants 
system also created the opportunity of further education. Michael 
Farrell believed that in the late 1950s and early 1960s: 
The first generation to go through University on scholarships 
under the post-war education scheme emerged. They had no 
experience of the previous defeats and were not demoralised. They 
chafed at their own second class status and began to articulate 
the grievances of their community. 46 
Thus, National Unity and the C.S.J. can be construed as examples 
of the changing social structure. A Northern Irish Catholic middle-
class emerged. It started to become involved in the public life of 
Northern Ireland without endangering the ultimate aspiration of a 
united Ireland. In fact, since the Republic seemed to compare so 
poorly with the Northern state, those people were in no particular 
rush for immediate unity - which again contributed to their 
Willingness to participate in the existing political framework. To 
borrow Professor J.A. Murphy's phrase: "Thus, the Education Act of 
l947 sowed Dragons Teeth." 47 
historian, Kevin Kelley, also suggests: 
The American journalist and 
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seemingly tangential events like the election of President John F 
Kennedy and the installation of Pope John XXIII were in fact key 
morale boosters for nationalists in the North. A dashing young 
u.s. President of Irish C~tholic desce~t and a Pope committed to 
social justice and ecumenism had their effect on the Northern 
minority's self esteem and its own sense of potential. 48 
In retrospect then, there are grounds to suggest that the 
emergence of a new minority attitude in the 1960s was a direct result 
of the establishment of the welfare state and international changes 
in the status and focus of Catholicism. A new Catholic 
intelligentsia became dissatisfield with the moribund nationalist 
politics of the previous forty years. It reacted angrily to the 
I.R.A. border campaign and thus initiated a new less militant brand 
of nationalism prompted in part by the liberalising tendencies of 
Vatican II on Catholic politics. 
THE O'NEILL/LEMASS SUMMIT 
Another important factor in the transformation of Catholic 
politics within Northern Ireland, was the significant change in the 
politics of the Republic. Northern nationalists had traditionally 
looked South for the impetus to end partition. However, in the late 
1950s and early 1960s, politicians in the Republic began to realise 
that partition would not be ended by dramatic gestures, but rather by 
a slow process of atrophy. This change of perception, combined with 
a conversion in the mentality of certain elements in the unionist 
ranks, would it was believed ensure the end of the political 
petrification which had characterised the history of Northern 
Ireland. 
In the mid 1950s, the Republic was in the throes of an economic 
depression. Unemployment and inflation were rising, resulting in 
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living standards for its citizens and large scale emigration. poor 
furthermore, the economic indicators did not suggest any improvement 
in the foreseeable future. A new brand of politicans and economists 
argued that the traditional policy of protectionism had become 
redundant by the late 1950s. They maintained that economic expansion 
required the establishment of free trade relations with the rest of 
the world. 
In 1958, the new Fianna Fail government accepted the validity of 
this argument. They abandoned the old Sinn Fein economics of high 
tariff barriers to develop Irish industry and agricultural self 
sufficiency in favour of an economic expansion programme designed to 
inject foreign capital into the country through tax and plant 
incentives. Accordingly in 1961, the Republic's government announced 
its intention to join the European Economic Community (E.E.C.), and 
to participate in free trade with Britain and the rest of Europe. 
Bew and Patterson point to the significance of the twenty year period 
after World War II for the Republic, and, in particular, the 
watershed of the late 1950s and early 1960s: 
... the significance of the period analysed in the study (1945-65) 
lies in the fact that we can see the emergence of a quite novel 
attitude. We are no longer dealing with a formal programme of 
agrarian radicalism and a nationalist industrialisation drive 
which only a few really believe in but which is also never 
rejected outright. In this epoch - by the late 1950s and early 
1960s at any rate - the dominance of grassland production, foreign 
capital and economic liberalisation is openly recognised and 
avowed. 49 
Much of the impetus for this policy change can be attributed to 
Sean Lemass, who replaced DeValera as Taoiseach (prime minister) in 
1959. On becoming leader of Fianna Fail, his rhetoric suggested that 
co-operation between North and South made economic sense, without 
threatening the aspiration of Irish unity. 
and 
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We desire to see our people and country reunited. Our method is, 
nd we are making clear - to try and abolish memory of past 
~issensions and to strengthen contacts and promote co-operation 
between the two areas into which the country is now 
divided.so 
The fact that we have that hope of eventual unity is not a reason 
why people in the North should refuse to consider even now 
possibilities of converting activities for the practical economic 
advantages that may result.SI 
These overtures, made to the North in 1959, were ignored by the 
then prime minister, Lord Brookeborough. Nevertheless, the 
nationalism of Lemass was to become sufficiently diluted as to 
eventually undermine the traditional antagonisms between Britain and 
Ireland that had perpetuated partition. Furthermore, the new 
political philosophy dramatically improved the living standards of 
those south of the border thus reducing the importance of partition. 
This modernising trend in the Republic was paralleled in the 
North. It also featured a new style politician, in this instance, 
one intent on regenerating unionism. When Captain Terence O'Neill 
succeeded Brookeborough in 1963, the machinations that for over forty 
years had kept the heterogeneous unionist bloc together were dropped 
in favour of a policy ostensibly designed to woo the Catholics. 
O'Neill was more moderate than his predecessors at least in tone 
and was the first prime minister of Northern Ireland to visit a 
Catholic school and be photographed with members of the Catholic 
clergy. His seemingly non-sectarian style was part of an attempt to 
modernise the Northern economy. Like the politicians of the 
Republic, he realised that in order for Northern Ireland to survive, 
foreign capital would be required to stimulate expansion. O'Neill 
intended to attract potential investors by selling Northern Ireland 
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as a state of religious concordance. 
The extent to which O'Neill had distanced from the traditional 
tenets of unionism was no more radically manifested than in his 
invitation to Lemass in 1965 to meet in Belfast. 
This meeting was perhaps the most sensational event in Irish 
politics since the establishment of the border some forty five years 
earlier, and was a direct result of both states adopting free trade 
policies. They could now expect considerable profits through 
increased trade and other forms of economic co-operation. The 
politics of pragmatism had, it seemed, triumphed. Lemass had not 
gone as far as to recognise Stormont, yet it looked as if the 
traditional antagonisms between unionism and republicanism had begun 
to wane. 
Both premiers feared the political risks involved from the 
militants in their respective camps as a consequence of this summit -
yet these fears proved groundless. 52 On the unionist side, 
O'Neill went to the electorate in October 1965 to seek public 
endorsement for co-operation between North and South. He swept the 
country and then asked "where was the backlash against my invitation 
to Mr Lemass? 
extremists .... 1153 
It did not exist except in the minds of the 
In the Republic, Hibernia commented: 
A reassessment of Captain Terence O'Neill is necessary. His 
meeting with Mr Lemass was not only an act of courage the whole 
manoeuvre was carried off with greater political skill than his 
past record would have promised. The Northern premier begins to 
fulfil the hopes of those who welcomed his accession as the 
beginning of a new era in the six counties. 54 
The response from Northern Catholics was also favourable. The 
New Nation reported: 
r 
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Men and women of every political allegiance, of every 
denomination, and of all classes welcomed the meeting between 
captain O'Neill and Mr Lemass, and in their almost universal 
welcome revealed the fanatics for what they were - a divided and 
meaningless rabble of inconsequential men whose apparent power was 
founded only upon the silence of the majority, a silence that too 
often was taken as approval. 55 
The Irish News editorial also fully endorsed the historic 
meeting: 
If this and further meetings are fruitful it is the whole people, 
and especially the working population in Ireland, who will benefit 
from this co-operation and harmony in high political quarters. 
The two Premiers need have no misgivings. They and the majority 
of the Irish people know that they are doing the right 
thing. 56 
The healthier atmosphere in relations between North and South 
seemed to bode well for the future and there was a feeling that 
perhaps at last the old Orange and Green cliches were losing their 
appeal. Optimism that ancient hatreds were abating grew in Belfast, 
Dublin and London. 
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CHAPTER II 
FROM DOCK TO WESTMINSTER 
GERRY FITT 1958 - 1966 
From the late 1950s to the mid 1960s Catholic politics had 
changed from stagnation to a greater involvement in Northern Ireland 
politics. In the same period, Gerry Fitt was building his own 
political career. Electoral success in Northern Ireland was followed 
in April 1966 by election to the Westminster parliament as M.P. for 
west Belfast. 
far: 
Hibernia commented on this his greatest triumph thus 
The most melodramatic event was, of course, Gerry Fitt's elevation 
to the Palace of Westminster as the simultaneous holder of the 
offices of city councillor, Stormont M.P. and Member of Parliament 
in London. This is quite some attainment for a working class boy 
who left to become a seaman and entered political life while being 
an unemployed man on the dole. He has become something of a myth 
in Belfast. He has already made his mark in Irish history. It is 
bound to deepen with time. 1 
The aim of this chapter is to clarify Fitt's politics in the 
period. It will demonstrate that his republicanism was 
opportunistic. It will further demonstrate that he was very much a 
nationalist politician who held strong views on the reunification of 
Ireland. The following pages will also prove that his socialism was 
not doctrinaire. It was based on bread and butter issues rather than 
a strict adherence to a Marxist creed. Although he used the rhetoric 
of James Connolly, we will see that the two men were completely 
different. 
socialist. 
Fitt was a moderate reformer, Connolly a revolutionary 
Fitt, unlike Connolly, believed in change through 
parliamentary tactics; Connolly, on the other hand, believed in 
change through working class militancy. We will also see that Fitt 
had to cope with the sectarian complexion of life in Northern 
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1 nd Therefore, he had to expand much of his undoubted energy Ire a · 
redressing discrimination at both local and national gove_rnment 
government levels. 
This chapter makes two further assertions. First, it will prove 
that Fitt's 1966 election victory was not symptomatic of the 
metamorphosis in Catholic politics outlined in chapter 1. Although 
Fitt was possibly aided by the increased hankering for representation 
and attendance, he was essentially a "lone operator" uninterested in 
large parties and fundamental re-organization. This contrast would 
have important ramifications in Fitt's later political career. 
second, it will show that there is some substance to Fitt's claim 
that he obtained Protestant support in his early career which enabled 
him to win West Belfast in 1966. 2 His contention has important 
implications due to the fact that political analysts at the time 
claimed that the religious divide in the constituency was about 
equal. 3 Considering the sectarian nature of Northern Irish 
politics, this was a considerable achievement. For Fitt had not only 
to contend with sectarian politics but had also to compete with the 
new aggressive Catholic middle class who wished to lead nationalist 
politics. 
Middle class strength should not be over estimated, however. 
For the rank and file of the nationalist community was overwhelmingly 
working class. Also the dichtomy between classes was not the only 
division in nationalist politics. E. Rumpf and A.C. Hepburn discern 
a geographic factor: "One of the clearest characteristics of 
anti-partitionist politics between 1945 and 1969 was the total rift 
between Belfast and the rest of the Province." 4 
The strained relationship between the rural and city 
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nationalists was a product of the conflicting interests of the 
societies which they represented. 
would benefit the farmer as regards 
Fundamentally, policies which 
the price of agricultural 
commodities would be, by necessity, to the detriment of urban 
dwellers wishing to see food prices kept low. There were antagonisms 
within the Unionist Party for the same reasons. 
In Belfast, nationalists used socialist rhetoric which alarmed 
their conservative colleagues in the countryside, particularly west 
of the River Bann, where rural constituencies predominated. The 
conservative characteristics of nationalist politics in these areas 
were reinforced, if not produced, through clerical influence. 
Outside Belfast, the Catholic church paid for the services of a full 
time Registration Agent whose function was to compile a register of 
the eligible Catholic voters. The agent was the Nationalist Party's 
only constituency organization and, therefore, quantified the 
Catholic rural community vote. That vote was employed to support the 
Church's opinion on how society should be run, as directed from the 
pulpit. Furthermore, in most instances the local parish priest was 
chairman of the convention called to select a candidate. As Eamon 
Mccann says "Nationalist candidates were not elected, they were 
anointed." 5 
Rural politics contrasted with the more secular inclinations of 
Belfast anti-partition politics. Attitudes prevailing in rural areas 
found it difficult to thrive in a large industrial urban setting, 
e.g. Catholic doctrine as regards family planning and mixed marriages 
did not receive quite so easy an acceptance. Therefore, in Belfast, 
national identity gradually became separated from its religious base. 
By 1952 the Nationalist Party was no longer an electoral force in the 
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capital. 
Belfast anti-partition politics were not however, devoid of 
division. Schism and fragmentation were common. This can be 
explained by the failure of local Belfast nationalists to agree on a 
united political party to replace the discredited Nationalist Party 
and the Northern Ireland Labour Party (N.I.L.P.) that in 1949 
formally acknowledged that it was pro-partition. 
Belfast working class Catholics, no longer content to listen to 
traditional nationalist and Catholic rhetoric, became more concerned 
with the social problems of housing and unemployment. They could 
choose between a multiplicity of Labour parties - one was pro-border, 
more were anti-border, and some based on individual personalities. 
Of the anti-border groups Rumpf and Hepburn note: 
The various groups all had in common a radical stance on social 
questions and an ability to bring the socialist republican 
arguments of James Connolly into play when necessary, but they 
relied far more for support on their own efforts and individual 
popularity than on any formal Trade Union backing, while their 
socialism, unlike Connolly's would scarcell have alarmed the most 
moderate member of the British Labour Party. 
One can assume that the Belfast working class had little 
knowledge of socialist theory, yet it was the recipient of the 
tangible benefits of post war parity policies implemented by the 
British Labour government. The creation of the welfare state gave 
the term "labour" positive connotations, particularly in an urban 
area where there was a great deal of deprivation. The deprivation 
being somewhat reduced by socialist policies. 
Gerry Fitt was an anti-unionist, but astute enough to realise 
that in order to have electoral success in Belfast, he needed to have 
the term "labour" on his ticket. 
Although Belfast is predominantly Protestant and unionist, there 
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were three Stormont seats within the city that were potentially 
nationalist Falls, Central and Dock. The latter was unique 
because it had never successively elected the same party or 
politician; 
labour. 
always alternating between unionist and some form of 
Unlike Falls and Central which had large Catholic 
majorities, Dock had a small Protestant majority. 
Gerry Fitt became part of a fairly sophisticated political 
machine in this waterfront area. He became a member of the Dock 
Irish Labour Party, financed in part by Catholic publicans and turf 
accountants, Dock Irish Labour's stated intention was to unite the 
working class and break down unionism. Fitt became one of the 
group's most prominent operators in the 1950s; so much so, that in 
March 1958 he was chosen to contest the Stormont election for Dock 
Labour in a straight fight with the unionists. 
From its establishment in 1921, unionists dominated Stormont. 
The Northern parliament served merely as a rubber stamp for policies 
that shored up sectarianism. Elections were invariably fought on the 
issue of partition, rather than social and economic questions. Focus 
on the border ensured that voting would be conducted on factional 
lines - Protestants, turning out in favour of maintenance of the 
border; Catholics, for the restoration of the territorial unity of 
Ireland. The 1958 election was no exception. 
In Dock, like every other constituency, orange and green 
arguments prevailed over social and economic problems. The Belfast 
News Letter (the Protestant daily newspaper) sketched the character 
of electioneering in the area with particular reference to Fitt: 
The Unionist Party in Dock have no difficulty persuading the 
electorate of the paramount importance of the constitutional 
position. It is placed there, priority number 1, by the Eire 
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Labour candidate (sic) who is opposing Alderman William Oliver 
Wl'th the aid of a van flying the flag by O'Casey in "The Plough St " 7 and the ars . 
At the time of the 1958 election, Fitt was employed as a clerk 
and his opponent, William Oliver, a shopkeeper, was also a member of 
Belfast Corporation, working as chairman of the Housing and 
Redevelopment Committee. The see-saw nature of the seat made for its 
close observation by the press. 
In 1949, Alderman T.L. Cole had won this Dock seat for the 
unionists by 284 votes, but lost it to Murtagh Morgan (unofficial 
Eire Labour) by 179 votes in 1953 - the smallest majority in that 
election. Given the margin of success and failure in the past, party 
workers were of the opinion that whichever coterie could get closest 
to a 100% turnout would win the day. 
Oliver's appeal to his supporters lay primarily in stressing the 
benefits of social services in Northern Ireland compared with those 
available outside the United Kingdom. 8 On the other hand Fitt 
and the Dock Irish Labour Party employed non-sectarian rhetoric, but 
their instincts and tendencies were always in line with Irish 
nationalism. Fitt proclaimed "James Connolly came into this historic 
division forty-five years ago to ask for your vote and we come to you 
under his flag." 9 Michael Ferran, chairman of the party, 
declared that it was "fighting the same enemies, under the same 
banner and for the same ideals for which Connolly fought and 
died. "10 To supporters of the union the name of Connolly was 
synonymous with the concept of a united Ireland. Although Fitt's 
words were couched in terms of labourite solidarity, it was quite 
clear to which section of the community he was directing his appeal. 
He argued: 
"There was no fear of losing the contest if the people 
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rallied to the cause of Labour. It was the duty of the nationalist 
minded electors to cast their vote as he was not only fighting a 
unionist opponent but the full weight of Glengall Street." 11 
Conforming to the nationalist ideal that it was the panacea for 
the country's economic problems, Fitt made no attempt to hide his 
wish to see a united Ireland: "Ulster's economic problems will never 
be solved by the Unionist Party. The only way it could be would be 
t bl • "12 through a 32 coun y repu 1c. 
Fitt was clearly anti-unionist and hence anti-Stormont. Yet he 
made an appeal to the Protestant workers. Jack Brady of the Irish 
Transport & General Workers Union ( I.T.G.W.U.) assured the people of 
Dock "that if elected Gerry Fitt would prove a worthy representative 
and serve the people of all classes, irrespective of 
religion. "13 This aspect of Fitt's political philosophy would 
later become very important when he did take public office, but in 
this election he tended to seek redress for the traditional Catholic 
grievance of discrimination in the face of Protestant privilege. 
In an attempt to swing the election in favour of the unionists, 
Prime Minister Brookeborough announced a proposed visit to the 
constituency. Fitt fulminated that he would: "Personally conduct 
the provincial Lord on a tour of the working class area. Perhaps he 
would see the misery which had resulted from the Unionist Party 
policy and their mismanagement of affairs for the past 40 
years. "14 
F1'tt endeavoured to focus attention on the rich-poor divide 
regardless of religion. These "Parliamentary Marionettes ... had no 
interest whatsoever in the well being of the common people. "15 
He also stated: "I am determined to fight the Unionist Party and if 
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elected will show unrelenting opposition to the vicious policy of 
discrimination being practised by our opponents." 16 
Nationalist politicians had always asserted that discrimination 
in housing had been one of the mechanisms which had kept the 
heterogeneous unionist bloc together. The argument ran that 
protestants were granted advantages in housing allocation in an 
effort to ensure their loyalty to the state. Another reason for the 
charge of housing discrimination was that the restricted local 
government franchise (a person could only vote in local government 
elections if he or she was a property owner) meant that the 
allocation of local authority houses in effect also meant the 
allocation of votes. Therefore, constituencies and wards could be 
gerrymandered. 
Fitt's 1958 campaign was very much concerned with housing. He 
claimed the Housing and Redevelopment Committee of Belfast 
Corporation had shown a consistent policy of discrimination in siting 
new estates. As for his own area he declared: "This division has 
already been cruelly gerrymandered and with the erection of flats in 
Victoria Barracks which would be handed to Unionist supporters the 
nationally minded majority would be wiped out." 17 
Oliver 
discrimination: 
contemptuously dismissed Fitt' s charges of 
Mr what-do-you-call-him this man talks about discrimination. 
Roman Catholics know what treatment they are getting from the 
Ulster Government. Instead of the 50% grants they get towards 
their schools in Great Britain, here they get 80 or 90%. Yet this 
man talks about discrimination. 18 
As polling day drew closer, the unionists became confident of 
Victory - it was after all their turn. Brian Faulkner, then chief 
whip of the Unionist Party and later prime minister of Northern 
, . . 
' 
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Ireland, speculated: "We have a really good chance of winning this 
seat because our candidate has been active in housing and social work 
and is well known in the constituency. Dock is always a see-saw seat 
but our chances were never better." 19 
Faulkner's conjecture proved correct. On March 20, 1958, it was 
the Protestant community that turned out in greater numbers. Oliver 
polled 3,156 votes to Fitt's 2,900. The unionists had established a 
majority of 256 with a swing of 500 votes. However, Oliver's poll 
was below that of Cole's who lost the seat in 1953, and, in the not 
so distant future, Oliver would recall the name of his opponent a 
little more readily. 
In May 1958 elections for the Belfast local government took 
place. 20 The Dock Irish Labour Party forwarded two candidates, 
namely: Fitt and James O'Kane, a spirit merchant. 
In the Dock ward, Fitt and O'Kane campaigned against three 
unionists and one independent unionist, and although this was an 
election for local government, the issues were essentially the same 
as the Stormont election two months earlier. Fitt again focused on 
what he considered a sustained policy of discrimination in the 
allocation of houses. He alleged that unionists' "ultimate aim was 
to denude Dock ward entirely of the nationally minded 
voters." 21 
On the eve of the poll, Fitt again made no attempt to hide his 
nationalist sentiment and brought the issue of partition to the 
forefront. He claimed: 
The Unionist Party would throw everything into this fight and only 
the good will of the working class people of the area could 
prevent Dock from once again being handed over to the unionist 
reactionaries. If he was successful in this election his policy 
would be based on the ideals of the labour movement in Ireland - a 
' 
' 
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policy that will lead the working class people of not only the six 
counties, but all Ireland to an Irish socialist working class 
bl · 22 repu 1 c. 
In a recent interview with the author, Fitt claimed he was 
always more of a socialist than a nationalist: 
In the context of Ireland I am a socialist. Unhesitatingly 
socialist. I would like to see Ireland united in the belief that 
in a united Ireland you would have Protestant Labour supporters and 
catholic Labour supporters, you would have the class division that 
you would have say in London and elsewhere. But put to the crunch 
I would say I was many more miles a socialist than a 
. l . t 23 nat,ona 1s . 
At the risk of being churlish, it certainly seems that in 1958 
the relationship between Fitt's nationalism and socialism was at best 
ambivalent and at worst opportunistic. Nevertheless, Dock Irish 
Labour was very successful in the election. Its two representatives 
ousted the returning unionist members with Fitt leading the poll. 
Fitt's success can be attributed to the fact that it was a local 
government election, and, although the constitutional issue was again 
used as an election tool, the electorate would have considered it a 
secondary issue as regards community politics. 
If Fitt's and O'Kane's non-sectarian, socialist rhetoric somewhat 
blurred the sectarian nature of elections in Dock, their party's 
victory parade clearly showed the divide in the district. The Irish 
News reported: 
The parade which was headed by the Wolfe Tone Pipe Band, was large 
and a number of people carried green flags, the tricolour having 
been banned by a police order. The two successful Dock Irish 
Labour Councillors travelled in a brake on which the Plough and the 
Stars, flag of the Labour movement, was carried in addition to a 
number of green flags. 
During the parade, unionist supporters - a number of them teenagers 
- ~ssembled around bonfires on blitz ground adjacent to Earl Street 
waving Union Jacks and singing orange songs. Police had to patrol 
the area to keep the parties apart. 
In the aftermath of his victory, Fitt showed that he was quite 
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capable of playing the nationalist card. He commented that on 
polling day the electors had dealt the Unionist Party one of the most 
telling defeats in the whole history of the Municipal battles in the 
six counties. During the election campaign he claimed that they had 
been faced with all sorts of handicaps and were not permitted to fly 
the National Flag in the Ward. 24 
Other indications of the sectarian characteristic of Dock were 
two questions tabled for answer at Stormont after the election. 
After defeating Fitt in March, Oliver, the unionist member for Dock, 
asked the minister for Home Affairs, Mr. W. Topping: "Whether his 
attention has been drawn to the fact that on the declaration of the 
result of the municipal elections in Dock Ward a Union Jack was 
snatched from a person and trampled on the ground, and whether the 
police have made an arrest?" 
Topping was aware of this incident but answered that no arrests 
had been made. Oliver then suggested that a riot could have resulted 
but for the timely intervention of the police. Cahal Healey, the 
Nationalist Party member for South Fermanagh, then asked: 
Does the Right hon. and Learned Gentleman not think that the time 
has come when the party opposite (Unionist) should cease carrying 
the Union Jack as a party flag in order to incite their 
opponents? Does the Minister not know that Councillor Fitt was 
assaulted in Belfast City Hall in the presence of the police by a 
lady carrying the Union Jack with a very robust stick attached to 
it? He merely threw the stick back and it fell to the 
ground. 25 
It is clear that religious and hence political allegiances in 
Dock were quite evident at all elections. Although Fitt mostly used 
non-sectarian rhetoric, it was obvious that the vast bulk of his 
supporters came from what he himself termed the "nationally minded" 
population - the Catholics. Fitt had achieved public office and it 
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a Belfast city councillor that he would endeavour to make Dock 
was as 
Polarized constituency. a non-
Fitt now maintains that the three most important years in his 
political career were between 1958 and 1961 because it was during 
this period that he established himself as a working class 
representative who helped both Protestant and Catholics in a very 
underpriviledged area. 26 He did indeed make himself available 
to all sections of the community both at home and at the window 
ledges of Belfast City Hall. His hard work and warm personality 
quickly overcame the reservations of many Protestants. However, it 
was also at this point that Fitt began a campaign against unionist 
discrimination in housing, votes and jobs. His maiden speech at the 
Belfast Corporation indicated the dual purpose of his politics - to 
represent the working class and focus attention on Catholic 
inequality. 
Fitt claimed that his attitude in the council would be one of an 
open mind and any criticism he had to offer would be done with 
honesty and sincerity. Yet he also asserted that if he saw something 
taking place in the council which was worthy of commendation, or 
beneficial to the working class he would not hesitate to commend 
1t.27 
In August 1958, the Dock Irish Labour Party held its quarterly 
lleeting. Michael Ferran, chairman of the group, referred to the work 
of both F1'tt and 0'Kane in local government. He said "that in the 
three months they had been members of the Council they have 
interviewed over 300 people of all d d l · cree s an c asses concerning 
houses and other matters." Many of these other matters pertained to 
unemployment benefit, then called National Assistance. At the time 
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entitlements to National Assistance were somewhat vague. More often 
than not people were not receiving their full allowance. Fitt 
familiarised himself with the features of the National Insurance 
Acts, and represented both Protestants and Catholics who had been 
previously rejected at local tribunals. For fighting for his 
constituents, he acquired the name Perry Mason, after the aggressive 
American television lawyer. If Fitt secured Protestant support, much 
of it stemmed from his concern for their interests. Nevertheless, 
Ferran also drew attention to the main composition of the party of 
which Fitt was now vice chairman: "The membership at present was a 
record, and it proved that the nationally minded people of the area 
were behind the party." 28 
Fitt neglected socialist theory, replacing it with short-term 
remedies based on welfare improvements designed to assist the working 
class. Housing was one of his prime concerns - resisting evictions 
and generally safeguarding working class interests. 
In August 1959, Fitt made one of his strongest attacks against 
discrimination against Catholics in housing. Belfast Corporation 
allocated houses on a points system which allowed none for more than 
three children. As Catholics tended to have larger families than 
Protestants, this policy worked against them. He also argued that 
the Estates Superintendent should not be allowed the discretionary 
powers which enabled him to accept or reject a family's suitability 
to be rehoused, regardless of how many points they had. Fitt argued 
that this denial of justice to Catholics was a violation of the 
Government of Ireland Act, which explicitly said that there should be 
no discrimination against the minority. While Catholic families of 
nine and ten were being refused houses, Protestant married couples 
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with only one child were being given three bedroomed houses. He 
claimed that was an outrageous state of affairs crying out for 
amendment. He knew a Catholic family where the father had to sleep 
in the armchair at night because there was no room, and yet although 
registered for years this family were refused a house. 29 
fitt's motion describing the system as unsatisfactory, and calling 
for a review and appropriate amendments, was defeated by 28 votes to 
a. such defeats prompted indignation and action in Catholic circles. 
As we have seen in Chapter I, National Unity was formed in 
November 1959 to press the Nationalist Party to organise and thus be 
better equipped to contest such discrimination. Fitt's reaction to 
it at the time is not on record but he now says they were completely 
sectarian: "National Unity was a misnomer. National Unity meant 
Catholic nationalist against Protestant unionist." If Fitt's opinion 
at the time was similar it demonstrates that he was not part of the 
transformation in Catholic politics inspired by the new middle class. 
As for the Nationalist Party, he says: 
They got the Catholic vote. A Catholic Registration Officer meant 
that they got Catholic votes and the Protestants had to look after 
themselves. It was totally tribal. I would have agreed with the 
nationalists in their opposition to the unionist treatment of 
Catholics that was about all. 30 
In 1960, Fitt continued to champion causes for the working 
class, challenging proposed increased rate charges from local 
government, objecting to salary increases for the heads of major 
departments and their deputies in the Corporation, and exhibiting a 
tendency to push for Belfast jobs for Belfast people. 31 
In December 1960, 
discrimination in voting. 
Fitt began his campaign to highlight 
He lodged an objection to two limited 
companies holding local government votes in the Dock Ward and 
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considered 
rejected. 
them test cases. 32 In the event, Fitt's case was 
However, it would not be long before the principle of "One 
Man One Vote" in local government elections would become a basic 
demand from the Catholic community. 
In 1961, Fitt had to defend his local government seat. The 
election tested his success in attracting the Protestant working 
class vote. As the election drew near the dichotomy in the community 
was further highlighted by Fitt's objection to the re-siting of a 
polling station, in, as he said a, "hostile area." He maintained 
that positioning the new station in the heart of a unionist area 
would reduce the anti-unionist vote considerably. 33 The 
complaint was rejected. Yet the fact it was made at all further 
confirms the polarization at election times in Dock. 
The election was in May. Fitt said the coming months would be 
very trying for the ordinary people of Belfast. He claimed the city 
was entering a period of recession comparable with the "hungry 
thirties." He argued that the working class needed a strong 
representative 
Stormont M.P. 
to speak on their behalf. 34 Harry Diamond, the 
for Falls, who would later form the Republican Labour 
Party with Fitt, spoke in favour of his future party colleague. He 
said that he had known Fitt for many years especially as a member of 
the City Council and he felt that he had proved in the last three 
years that he was a capable and authentic representative of the 
interests of the working class people of Dock. In fact, as a 
constant attendee at the City Hall, Councillor Fitt had made himself 
available to everyone - regardless of creed, politics or where they 
resided - who needed his assistance. 35 
Fitt was confident of victory. Again referring to the moving of 
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the polling station to a "hostile area", he declared that "knowing 
the people of this area where I have been born and reared, I feel 
that they would travel to Sandy Row (an ultra-Protestant and Loyalist 
area in Belfast) to record their vote for me in this 
• H36 elect1on. Evidently, he was still aware that his main 
support base lay within the Catholic community and his optimism 
proved accurate when he again topped the poll. 
At the enthusiastic Dock victory parade, Fitt declared: 
I attribute my magnificent majority to the fact that I received 
support from all sections of the community in Dock Ward, 
irrespective of creed, in this election. This indeed has been a 
vindication of the policy which I have carried out during the past 
three years and I solemnly pledge to the electors that I will 
continue with that policy, should any man or woman in Dock Ward be 
in need of a friend at any time, I will be at their 
service. 37 
It would not be unreasonable to conclude that Fitt's growing 
reputation for hard exertion as a public representative for the 
working class, provided him with a stick to break, partially at 
least, the barrier of religious politics. 
Fitt's commitment to the working class was further illustrated 
in October 1961. In the previous August, he had voiced querulous 
opposition to rent increases in the Ward. At that time the Lord 
Mayor warned that as Fitt was himself a tenant, he would be open to 
the accusation of self interest. 
advice and face the consequences. 38 
Fitt decided to disregard the 
They turned out to be a 
Corporation enquiry in which Fitt was named for an alleged breach of 
the statute in "voting or taking part on a matter in which he had a 
pecuniary interest." He represented himself, did not deny the facts, 
but questioned their interpretation, saying that when he decided to 
speak it was not on his own behalf. He argued that he was not a man 
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of affluence and had a similar financial position to his tenants and 
concluded: "I regard myself as a working class representative, and I 
will fight tooth and nail against anyone who attempts to take away my 
right to usurp my functions." 39 The Corportion inquiry found 
that Fitt took his stance from conscientious motives. 
1962 was an election year for the Northern parliament, and in 
March Fitt was unanimously selected as the Dock Irish Labour Party's 
candidate. This nomination came as no surprise. He had been 
narrowly defeated by Oliver in 1958, and since then had topped the 
poll at two successive Corporation elections. Ferran declared: "I 
feel there can be no doubt about the outcome of this election as the 
working class people in the area of all creeds have found Councillor 
Fitt a sincere friend and a valuable representative." 
In accepting the nomination, Fitt exhibited his blend of 
nationalism and working class solidarity. He said that he: "Felt 
proud and honoured to be asked once again to carry the banner of 
Connolly into the contest against the traditional enemy of the 
working classes in Dock. 1140 
Whatever rhetoric Fitt may have used, and however he was 
perceived by the Protestant electorate in Dock itself, it is noted by 
Moloney and Pollack that the "Ulster Protestant Action" organization 
(U.P.A. was an association formed by Paisley in 1959 ostensibly to 
encourage the employment of Protestants in industry) was aware of "a 
Republican Labour Councillor called Gerry Fitt, who was making his 
mark as an aggressive exponent of the nationalist cause." 41 
Evidently not all strands of Protestant opinion were impressed with 
Fitt's non-sectarian oratory. 
As usual, the 1962 election was characterised by accusations of 
, 
sectarianism. Fitt challenged Oliver to 
economic situation in the six counties: 
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an open debate on the 
"But I know it will be a 
challenge which will not be accepted. My information is that my 
unionist opponents, far from meeting me on the economic issue, are 
endeavouring to make the forthcoming election a sectarian 
l n42 wrang e. 
Fitt endeavoured to focus on economic and social issues. He 
challenged Oliver to deny "that the constituency has suffered a 
greater degree of unemployment and poor housing than any other in 
Belfast."~ He also argued that Lord Brookeborough was afraid 
to enter Dock to put his record to the working class people. 44 
He castigated the Unionist Party record in the Ward: 
They are a party that has shown no conception of the industrial 
problems as they affect the working class in 1962. It has always 
been the unionist boast that the constitutional position has 
safeguarded the employment in the shipyards. What is their answer 
now? When the ships are lying empty and thousands of workers are 
walking the streets of the city?45 
Fitt's election address also was overwhelmingly concerned with 
social and economic issues: 
When I contested the last parliamentary election a slogan was 
written on a wall in North Qeeen Street drawing attention to the 
fact that there were 40,000 people unemployed. Today that slogan 
has faded a little but the terrible scourge and heart break of 
unemployment is still with us, more poignant than ever. 
He emphasized his connection to the ward: 
Unlike my opponent I was born and reared, and I still reside, in 
the area which I seek to represent at Stormont. I am married with 
a family of four little girls of school age and it is my humble 
opinion that I am more in touch with the everyday needs of the 
working classes than any representative of the reactionary Tory 
Unionist Party. 
Fitt presented himself as a man of the people regardless of 
their religious faith and relied on his record as a councillor: 
I have now represented this area on the City Council for over four 
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years and during this time I have endeavoured at all times to give 
of my utmost for the poor and underpriviledged, irrespective of 
creed. My horn: ha~ been my Advice Centre and no one seeking my 
help has done so 1n va1n. 
The only hint of republicanism was his conclusion: "Under the 
banner of Connolly I go forward with confidence. "46 
In contrast to Fitt's, Oliver's campaign emphasized the 
partition issue. "I intend to keep unionism in Dock, the only way to 
• t H47 prospen Y • In 1958 Oliver's majority was only 256, and in 
a seat which regularly changed hands, Fitt predicted a "working class 
revolt with an Irish Labour victory." 48 Even the avidly 
pro-unionist Belfast News Letter suggested "It is Eire Labour's (sic) 
turn to win. They have a 256 unionist majority to upset, not a 
Herculean task." 50 A prophecy that proved correct. Fitt polled 
3,288 votes to Oliver's 2,781. 
Fitt's victory was the only unionist defeat in the city, and the 
swing to Dock Irish Labour was 6.4%. After the results were in, Fitt 
declared in what was fast becoming a hackneyed, although necessary 
sentiment: "I regard it as a signal honour. I now feel I am the 
spokesman for the working class and I will continue to serve the 
working class in Dock irrespective of their creed."~ 
Fitt now says that he won both the 1961 local government 
election and the 1962 Stormont election with the help of the 
Protestant community. "I was breaking through to the Protestant 
unionist where no other nationalist had." 51 The election 
figures support his claim, although his remark also reveals that Fitt 
was indeed a nationalist. 
Paddy Devlin, then a member of the N.I.L.P., and thus very 
involved in Belfast politics, makes the interesting observation that 
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Fitt's victories are due in part to Oliver's unionist patronage 
working against him, thereby making the Dock Irish Labour Party's 
success more pronounced. As we have noted, Oliver was chairman of 
the Housing and Redevelopment Committee of the Belfast Corporation. 
Devlin suggests that by rehousing his own supporters, for services 
rendered in elections, Oliver effectively transported his political 
machine out of Dock. Devlin does, however, acknowledge that 
Protestants voted for Fitt because of his work on the Corporation and 
the Tribunals. 52 Devlin's account reinforces the image of 
Belfast politicians' dependence on brokerage. 
All in all, it seems that despite the sectarian nature of the 
Dock seat, Fitt's victory was, to some extent, a tribute to his 
popularity in the area, and an appreciation of the service which he 
had provided since entering local government. The Protestant vote is 
hard to quantify, yet it seems the triumphs could not have been won 
without some cross community support. Charles Stewart, M.P. for 
Queen's University at Stormont, commented on Fitt's greatest victory 
to date: "In the see-saw constituency of Dock, Mr. Fitt won a 
comfortable victory. The result was not exactly a surprise and was 
due to the great work done by him in the Corporation and to a well 
planned campaign."~ 
The fusion of Protestant and Catholic working class under Gerry 
Fitt should not be exaggerated. After the election result it was 
unionist losers who received the oration outside the Ulster Hall, and 
Fitt deemed it judicious to leave by the side door following the 
announcement that he was the victor. 54 Furthermore, the police 
presence at the victory parade is evidence that the authorities had 
expected communal strife. The Irish News reported: 
57 
Belfast's Dock Ward showed its support for Councillor Gerry Fitt 
last night when 2,000 people turned out for a victory parade. 
The parade started in the New Lodge and wound its way around the 
entire constituency. At times the victory wagon carrying 
councillor Fitt and his supporters was almost stopped by the 
enthusiastic constituents. Throughout the parade, the entire 
constituency was circled by a water tight contingent of police. 
At every strategic point the police were noticeably in force 
with vans, land rovers, walkie-talkies and man force. 55 
Fitt now had a larger platform to express his views. His maiden 
speech at Stormont contained the same components of the oratory that 
put him there. He began by explicitly attacking the entity of 
Northern Ireland. He described the Queen's Speech as an "innocuous 
and insignificant document" relating to an artificially composed 
artifice which could not exist if it had to rely on its own 
resources. Fitt argued that the situation would remain the same 
until Ireland was reunited: 
This Government, this puppet Government in Northern Ireland, this 
artificial Government has been bolstered up and subsidised by the 
Lancashire lassies and the boys from the Chiltern Hills. They may 
be ignorant of that fact, but it remains that it is purely and 
simply from the subsidies of the English working-classes that this 
Government exists at all. The Government could never exist on 
their own economic foundations and will never exist until the 
industrial north is joined to the agricultural south and Ireland 
is once more united. 
Housing was again one of Fitt's main topics of concern. Again 
he did not exhibit doctrinaire socialist theory but reacted against 
injustice. 56 
As noted in the first chapter, the I.R.A. border campaign was 
called off at the end of February, 1962. During that campaign Fitt 
had represented the Dock Irish Labour Party at the annual 1916 Easter 
Rising commemoration ceremony held at the republican plot in Milltown 
Cemetery, Belfast. 57 In retrospect, Fitt maintains that he saw 
the I.R.A. offensive "as a completely sectarian fight."~ 
Evidence suggests that his attitude at the time was a little more 
r 
equivocal. 
the release 
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Again, in his maiden speech, he made a strong appeal for 
of over twenty men who were still in prison as a result 
of the campaign. Fitt argued for compassion, claiming the prisoners 
were only guilty of adherance to a widely held maxim: 
After all, these men had a principle and they had the courage to 
go out and try to put that principle into practice. They may have 
acted wrongly. Perhaps they did act wrongly, but in the state of 
affairs that exists in our community the Minister would be doing 
nothing wrong in releasing those men. 
Fitt's sympathy for the plight of the republican prisoners could 
well stem from the notion that the physical force tradition was now 
superfluous to contemporary politics. He did not envisage a 
resumption of political violence and made it clear that he was 
committed to constitutional reunification. "I rel and within my 
lifetime will be united constitutionally and it is my ideal to see 
Ireland united under the terms of Connolly who founded my party and 
that it will eventually finish as an Irish workers republic."~ 
The wrangle over the republican captives persisted throughout the 
year. In October 1962, Fitt, Republican Labour M.P., Diamond, and 
Independent Labour M.P., Hanna, tabled a motion calling for the 
release of all those imprisoned for actions arising from political 
activity during 1956 and 1961. In December the debate began. Brian 
Faulkner, then Minister of Home Affairs, refused to accept the 
motion, insisting that the government could not act on the assumption 
that the I.R.A. was finished. Fitt again was dismayed by what he 
felt was a lack of compassion from the administration. He also 
bestowed a measure of political credibility upon the I.R.A. "If the 
government had one spark of humanity or christian charity they would 
have relented over the past months. But they were still activated by 
an implacable hatred towards their political opponents. 1160 
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The prisoners' debate was concluded on December 18 when a 
government amendment asking for approval of the status quo was 
passed. Fitt said of the prisoners' condition: 
If he was incarcerated he would not get down on his bended knees 
and ask for forgiveness and seek the prerogative of mercy from the 
Minister. As these young men did not recognise the court he could 
not see how they could be expected to ask for the prerogative of 
61 mercy. 
It would be fair to say that Fitt's attitude to the I.R.A. at 
this point of his career was at least supportive. He was shrewd 
enough to realise that an attentive concern for the predicament of 
the prisoners would strike a chord with those of his supporters who 
had a republican inclination. In short, he used the situation for 
his advantage. As we will see, Fitt's relationship with the 
re-emerged I.R.A. in the 197Os was not so accommodating. 
In March 1963, Terence O'Neill became leader of the Unionist 
Party and prime minister, heralding, many hoped, the beginning of a 
new era. In hindsight, Fitt says that he believes that O'Neill did 
try to reform the Unionist Party: 
But he was like Botha trying to reform South Africa and they have 
exactly the same mentality, the unionists in Northern Ireland and 
the whites in South Africa. It was an impossible task. 
Consequently, he fell between two stools, the unionists regarded 
him as some sort of a traitor and the Catholics as some sort of a 
liar that could not deliver. 62 
Throughout the rest of 1963 at Stormont, Fitt continued in his 
capacity as a working class representative, attacking the Unionist 
Party's handling of the economy, highlighting discrimination in 
housing and employment, and frequently denouncing the machinations of 
the Orange Order.~ 
Towards the end of the year his political profile was seemingly 
altered when, with Harry Diamond, he formed the Republican Labour 
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party. The coalition was anti-partitionist and comprised former 
members of the Dublin-based Labour Party. Thus, there was now an 
Irish Labour Party with local leaders, which despite its republican 
label, was committed to participate within the system. Fergus Pyle 
of the Irish Times recently asked Fitt about the formation of that 
party and reported: 
Looking back on nearly 40 years in local and national politics, 
Fitt says that he was never interested in nationalism and that the 
Republican Labour tag that he took to form a two-man party with 
the veteran M.P. for Falls, Harry Diamond in the 1960s was purely 
tactical. A Journalist launched the idea and he found himself 
swept along. 64 
Fitt's recollection that he was never interested in nationalism 
is not reflected in his political rhetoric at the time. On the other 
hand the term "Republican" is misleading for it conjures up different 
images for different people. In the recent sequence of violence it 
has taken on pejorative connotations largely due to the methods of 
the I.R.A. In the 1960s, a republican in Northern Ireland was simply 
someone who wished to see the restoration of the territorial unity of 
Ireland in the form of a republic. The term was respected throughout 
the nationalist community. Nevertheless, Fitt, working in a marginal 
constituency, was taking more of a gamble than Diamond, who was from 
the predominantly Catholic Falls area. When asked "How republican 
was Republican Labour?" Fitt replied: 
It was not republican as such. Harry Diamond had the term 
Republican Labour before I had it. He could afford to have it in 
the Falls Road where the Protestant vote did not count. In Dock 
it was totally different, so I took a calculated chance in 
bringing Republican Labour into Dock and succeeded in winning 
election after election even with that term. I won them not 
because they were voting Republican Labour; I won them because 
they were voting for Gerry Fitt. 65 
Paddy Devlin also concurs that "Republican Labour" was only a 
label . 66 Fitt made the name decision without consulting his 
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colleagues in the Dock Irish Labour Party. Although he managed to 
persuade them to come with him, it is an episode which reflects an 
individualistic and opportunist streak, a trait repeated during his 
political career. The amalgamation was well received in nationalist 
circles. New Nation commented: 
The recent news of the formation of the Republican Labour Party 
following the merger of the Dock and Falls groups is heartening 
news, especially in view of the forthcoming Westminster elections, 
in which the party will be contesting West Belfast. By their 
action this group has given a lead to all the other political 
groupings on the National Front throughout the six counties, and 
one would hope that there would be further mergers before the 
election comes round. 67 
Hibernia remarked: 
The coming together of Mr. Harry Diamond and Mr. G Fitt to form 
the Irish Republican Labour Party could be of real significance if 
they can create a genuine Irish socialist group which would take 
up where James Connolly left off and bring some passion and 
intelligence to the solution of economic problems, especially in 
relation to the unemployment crisis. 68 
The two politicians frequently proposed motions aimed at 
government reform. For example at Stormont in April 1964, they 
called for a reform in parliamentary and local government elections, 
urging that legislation be introduced to provide the right for all 
persons over eighteen to vote in such elections and asked for removal 
of restrictions in the local government franchise. 69 This 
motion was pedictably defeated by 20 votes to 14 and a major Catholic 
grievance remained intact. 
The local elections with which Diamond and Fitt were concerned 
were held in May 1964, and constituted the first indication of 
whether or not the "Republican" tag had adversely affected Fitt's 
non-sectarian credibility. He argued that they would be the most 
crucial elections which had ever taken place in Dock and suggested 
that the result would decide if the Ward was to exist as a 
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residential district or be developed as a commercial centre. 70 
Fitt insisted that his record since being elected as a public 
representative would defy all comers, that he had consistently served 
the interests of all sections of the community in the Dock area, and 
would continue to do so. 71 He ran with two more prospective 
councillors from the Republican Labour Party - Tom Fitzpatrick and 
James McMenamin. 
The unionists, for their part, selected candidates with strong 
connections in Dock to counter the reverses they had been suffering: 
Sean McMaster, chairman of the Local Unionist Association and a 
craneman by occupation; Charles Maginnis, a labourer, also a native 
of the area; and Billy McDowell, a shop owner who had lived there 
for twenty years. Paddy Wilson, who ran on a straight Labour ticket, 
was also a native of Dock working in an aircraft factory. Thus, 
Fitt's opponents could not be considered as opulent outsiders. 
The Belfast News Letter conveyed something of the carnival 
atmosphere of electioneering in the locality: 
The other Wards had nothing on Dock, where pacemaker Gerry Fitt 
set a swinging pattern for his Republican colleagues Messrs 
Fitzpatrick and McMenamin. Youngsters and adults alike turned out 
in their hundreds to add something of the 'Lagan beat' to the 
proceedings and to add that final touch. St Peter's Brass and 
Reed Band provided the music and accompaniment. 
But wait, Gerry and his boys didn't quite have it all their own 
way in Belfast's dockland. For although his party set a cracking 
pace and the band struck up to the music of the 'Minstrel Boy' a 
few yards around the corner was none other than a party of 
unionists singing and dancing to the music of 'Derry 
Wa 11 s' . 72 
The results of the election were impressive for Republican 
Labour - all three candidates were returned, with Fitt again topping 
the poll. Gerry Fitt and the Republican Labour Party had achieved 
dominance in Dock. The next opportunity which the party had to test 
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their electoral strength was the October 1964 United Kingdom general 
election. 
Diamond was chosen by Republican Labour to contest the West 
Belfast seat. (It should be noted that the Dock Ward was within the 
East Belfast constituency - one which always returned a unionist). 
The unionist candidate was Jim Kilfedder, a Donegal born barrister. 
The N.I.L.P. selected Billy Boyd, whose platform was pro-border yet 
non-sectarian and the Republican candidate was Liam McMillan. Gerry 
Fitt was Diamond's election agent. 
The election became particularly noteworthy due to rioting which 
broke out on Divis Street at the foot of the Catholic Falls Road. On 
his Divis Street headquarters, McMillan displayed traditional 
republican regalia - pictures of James Connolly and Patrick Pearse 
and the Irish Tricolour. This was in direct violation of the 1954 
Flags and Emblems Bill, which stated that it was illegal to display 
any symbol that would cause provocation and lead to the disruption of 
public order. In such a situation the Royal Ulster Constabulary 
(R.U.C.) were empowered to remove the objectionable material. 
Loyalists, led by publicity-hungry Ian Paisley, made it known 
that they were offended by the republican display and threatened to 
remove it if the R.U.C. did not. The Minister for Home Affairs, 
Brian McConnell, capitulated under this pressure and ordered the 
R.U.C. into Divis Street. 
The police presence caused a riot, with Catholics emerging to 
defend the republican symbols. It was the worst disturbance in 
Northern Ireland since the 1930s, lasting for three days and ending 
With twenty-one policemen and fifty civilians injured. 
Fitt tried to end the fray by asking the Belfast Corporation to 
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pass an emergency resolution calling upon all sections of the 
community in 
further a 
the city "to desist from any action which could lead to 
exacerbation of relations." 73 This action showed 
that Fitt made some effort to end the internecine episode although he 
was not convinced that all politicians shared his attitude. 
After the riots, Fitt was very critical of the unionist 
administration. He spoke at Stormont and alleged that the whole 
affair was an intrigue, and further maintained that the government 
announcements to have the flags taken down were designed to bring out 
the largest possible crowd to witness their removal. In short, the 
riot was a political stunt to swing votes away from Diamond. 74 
It was thus in these abnormal conditions that the election in 
West Belfast took place. If Fitt's alleged machinations of the 
Unionist Government were true, it calculated correctly - the 
unionists won, but on a minority vote. Kilfedder polled 21,337 
votes, Diamond 14,678, Boyd 12,571 and McMillan 3,256. 
It is unlikely that Diamond secured any Protestant support; he 
had no need to cultivate such a foundation as M.P. for Catholic Falls 
at Stormont. The Republican Labour support in Dock was inaccessible 
and anyway much of it from Protestants would have been of a personal 
kind for Fitt. It is also possible that Boyd made some inroads on 
the Catholic vote; certainly the republican element was not 
formidable. McMillan lost his deposit, as did his three colleagues 
in the other city constituencies. Indeed, he would perhaps have got 
fewer votes but for the unrest in Divis Street, which no doubt 
propelled a percentage back to a more militant viewpoint. Even with 
this motivation the republican vote was still only 6%. 
The New Nation, still voicing a demand for greater method within 
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nationalist politics, commented on the defeat of Diamond: "The 
failure of the Republican Labour candidate in West Belfast clearly 
indicates that a large number of enthusiastic helpers is no 
substitute for a good machine." 75 
In the Republic, Hibernia communicated disillusionment: 
The Anglophiles, intent on guarding their dominant position, 
behaved as though they were the injured party, the opposition 
pathetically divided made feeble attempts to find a united banner, 
aired their grievances without hope of redress, and lost their 
deposits. The result was the same as before. Twelve true men and 
blue76 represent us in the mother of Parliaments. 77 
Diamond and Boyd both polled reasonable figures, 28.3% and 24.3% 
respectively, which combined, would have defeated the unionists. As 
it was, both gained sufficient support to allow the common enemy to 
win to the detriment of labourist politics. 
The next time, with Fitt as the candidate, the results of the 
West Belfast election for the United Kingdom parliament were 
different. The 1964 election had one wider implication for Northern 
Ireland politics. In Britain, the Labour Party under Harold Wilson 
was elected. Labour politicians did not enjoy the cosy relationship 
that their Conservative counterparts had with the unionists and there 
were many of them who became concerned and sympathetic to Catholic 
complaints of discrimination. 
In the same month as the 1964 election, McAteer, under 
increasing pressure to formulate a vigorous nationalist coalition, 
invited the Belfast "Labour orientated anti-partitionist" M.P's to 
join in a new organization and the Republican Labour Party agreed to 
enter into talks. Any optimism that there may have been about a 
merger between nationalists of the rural areas and the Republican 
Labourites was soon dashed, for on December 6 the party decided to 
, 
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postpone consideration of a possible link-up. Commenting on this 
decision, Fitt told the Irish News that he had been disenchanted in 
the past that attempts at unity had fallen through. Fitt added that 
while he was very pleased to see the nationally minded moving in the 
direction of unity, there would have to be definite guarantees that 
all sections of the working class were represented in any such united 
front. 78 
The voting of the party's executive was very close. The Dock 
branch was totally opposed to the prospect of a merger but on the 
other hand, Sean McGivern of the Andersonstown branch and party 
secretary resigned because of what he felt was a reluctance by the 
leadership to create a unified national movement. 79 It is 
possible that Fitt and his Dock colleagues felt that to freely enter 
an openly nationalist structure would have alienated Protestant 
support in the area. However, it is also possible that careerist 
concerns mitigated against unity - a point noted by the New Nation: 
We regret the breakdown in the negotiations between the leaders of 
the Nationalist Party and the Belfast anti-partitionist groups 
especially as the reason given seems to amount to little more than 
distrust arising over past experiences. In such an attitude there 
is evidence of a pathetic lack of vision and a miserable concern 
with merely personal prestige, which creates divisions and 
prevents any real progress. 80 
The episode illustrates that Fitt's nationalist and socialist 
sentiments could not be reconciled in an Irish context. Fitt had 
frequently posed as a champion of Irish unity, but when his possible 
affiliation to a coalition geared to fulfil that aspiration was 
proposed, he fell back on his working class socialist credentials. 
Fitt was something of a political chameleon. 
Fitt's political activity was temporarily interrupted on 
December 9, when he suddenly collapsed while speaking at Stormont. 
, 
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He was admitted to the Royal Victoria Hospital and required a blood 
transfusion for a gastric haemorrhage. This was not the only time 
that the rigours of political life would hospitalise Fitt, but on 
this occasion he was well enough to return to the House on January 
19, 1965, and was personally welcomed back by O'Neill. 81 
Five days previously, and just three months after the sectarian 
riots in Divis Street, O'Neill and Lemass met in Belfast. Although 
Fitt would have considered his politics to be substantially different 
from the two premiers, he considered the meeting a welcome gesture 
and articulated his feelings at Stormont. In the same speech he also 
voiced his approval on the Nationalist Party becoming official 
opposition, a step which he felt had brought about "a more realistic 
political atmosphere in Northern Ireland." In keeping with the 
conciliatory spirit of his speech and indeed with the apparent 
normalising of Northern politics at the time, Fitt re-affirmed his 
own brand of constitutional nationalism and showed that he was no 
socialist revolutionary: 
In my constituency there are many people who believe in the 
ultimate ideal in which I believe, the eventual reunification of 
this country. The way to bring this about is to recognise that 
Stormont exists, to use this House and all its institutions to 
further the interests and well being of all constituents, 
irrespective of their political beliefs. If we can bring peace 
and harmony to this community it will be only a little step before 
we can eventually bring about a unity of mind in the whole 
isl and. 82 
Two days after these words, the divisions within the Republican 
Labour Party were becoming more apparent. On February 5, 1965, the 
Irish News reported that the Andersonstown Branch of West Belfast had 
unanimously voted to disaffiliate from the party. 83 
Evidently there were elements in the party who were more 
concerned with the Republican than the Labour tag and the fact that 
, 
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Andersonstown is a Catholic area may well have accounted for this 
emphasis. 
The unionist administration was remarkably adept at taking 
decisions which lacked political sensitivity and brought traditional 
attitudes to the forefront. One such decision was made by the 
Minister of Development, William Craig, to name the new city in 
Armagh, Craigavon, after the first prime minister of Northern 
Ireland, James Craig. James Craig was considered an arch bigot by 
the Catholic community. The Irish News reported Fitt's reaction: 
The name could only be accepted as a calculated insult to the 
minority in Northern Ireland. It was the final insult at this 
time when there was so much talk about building bridges between 
different sections of the community. 
The minority had often been charged with having long memories but 
it was within the memory of many members that Lord Craigavon said 
this was a Protestant parliament for a Protestant people. 
The minority could 
the city seemed to 
Government was to 
Protestant people. 84 
never forget this statement and the naming of 
show that the policy of the Northern Ireland 
maintain a Protestant parliament for a 
The above statement was an emotional response from an emotional 
politician. Indeed much of his fluent rhetoric stemmed from fervent 
reaction to prejudice. The following day he argued that if the 
inhabitants of the new city were going to be faced with sectarian 
strife then any advantages would be negated. He fulminated: "Why 
not go the whole hog and call it Paisleyville? This would be 
accepted just as well by the people who are now congratulating the 
Minister on the name selected."85 
Despite tension generated by Craigavon and other matters, such 
as the siting of the new university in largely Protestant Coleraine 
rather than largely Catholic and depressed Londonderry, and later in 
early 1966, the controversy over the naming of a bridge over the 
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river Lagan, there was an optimism about a thaw in community 
t . S 86 re 1 a , on . This was noted by Hibernia, which re-publ i_shed 
two editorials: one from the staunchly pro-unionist Belfast News 
.1,&tter, the other from the more moderate pro-unionist Belfast 
gleqraph, both confirming new attitudes: 
senator Lennon87 is entitled to call for more from the 
Government than expressions of greater goodwill - deeds must 
follow words if bridges are to be built between the two sections 
of the population but he should appreciate that progress towards a 
new order must be slow if it is to be sure, and that too 
preci~itate action could wipe out the advances already 
made. 8 
As for the Unionist Party, the curiosity, some would say the 
tragedy of the situation is that despite the knowledge of the way 
rising living standards have dulled anti-partition protest, it 
will not make a direct move to enlist support for the constitution 
from members of the steadily growing Catholic population. 
If a policy of co-operation is to mean anything more than window 
dressing it must have this end in view. But what unionist will 
brave the Protestant flank and say so? when in fact will the 
attempt be made to diminish the influence of religion in 
politics. 89 
In the midst of this seemingly cordial era, Fitt had to defend 
his Stormont seat since O'Neill called an election for November 25, 
1965. Dock, as we have seen, had never been retained. Fitt was 
fighting against history. The sectarian reputation of the Ward would 
again be put to the test. The Unionist Party again put forward 
William Oliver to contest the Dock seat. 
In an attempt to swing the election, O'Neill decided to visit 
the constituency himself. The Irish News reported Fitt's reaction to 
this attempt to "cadge votes": "No Arab tribesman or African pearl 
diver could be more foreign to the people of Dock or more ignorant of 
their needs and problems than the Eton-bred schoolboy who proposed to 
de 5cend on the place with scarf flying on election eve."90 
Also worthy of mention in this issue of the Irish News, was the 
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publication of a telegram from James Connelly's daughter, Ina, to 
fitt: "I wish you every success and return once more to parliament 
for this historic division which my father contested in 1913. I 
sincerely pray that the electorate of Dock will, to his memory, give 
you an overwhelming majority." 91 There can be little doubt 
that fitt had an acute sensitivity to what was required on the 
ground, and was well aware that an amalgam of Republican and Labour 
would unite the various strands of potential voters. 
fitt's prediction for the result was assured. "There can be no 
doubt about the outcome. I, as one of the people have faith in the 
peoples' verdict." 92 
was again successful. 
His optimism was well founded since he 
The result was the only substantial unionist reverse in the 
Stormont election. Fitt more than doubled his majority despite a 
lower poll and the Belfast News Letter acknowledged: 
Dodgy Dock turned up trumps for Republican Labour man, Mr Gerry 
Fitt, who withstood the unionist challenge, from Mr William 
Oliver, whom Mr Fitt beat by 507 votes in 1962. He built on this 
vote this time, adding nearly 1,000 votes. The result represents 
a substantial swing to the anti-partition candidate. 93 
The Newsletter clearly still considered Fitt to be a 
nationalist. Fitton the other hand claimed that his victory was one 
for the working class and socialism. Yet it seems, that although the 
election had perhaps lost some of its sectarian crudity, it was still 
Protestant unionist versus Catholic nationalist. Hibernia reported 
Oliver's reaction to his defeat: 
Alderman Oliver explaining on television why he had lost in Dock 
to Republican Labour said some of his people had stayed at home. 
Asked why they had done this he said it was because they favoured 
Labour or Liberal or other parties. His people presumably include 
all Protestants. 94 
At the end of the year, Harold Wilson called another United 
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Kingdom general election for March 31, 1966. The newly formed N.D.P. 
stated its intent to contest West Belfast. 95 In the following 
week Fitt announced his candidacy for the same seat. He combined his 
nationalist and socialist credentials. 
1 believe that this Division can only be won by someone adhering 
to the principles of James Connolly and fighting tenaciously for 
the ultimate reunification of this country. I realise that many 
of the electorate in this area are of a different religious 
persuasion to my own, but I also am aware that these people know 
me as a Labour representative who has taken an unequivocal stand 
where the needs of the working classes have been concerned. I 
will be fighting this election on my record as a Labour 
representative, and as such, I feel confident that the working 
class in West Belfast will ensure my return to 
Westminster. 96 
Fitt's intervention clearly threatened to split the 
nationally-minded vote and leave it open for the unionists to retain 
the seat. When I asked Fitt why he decided to stand and perhaps 
split the nationalist vote, he replied: 
The new party were totally anathema to me. They were Catholic 
middle class schoolteachers and they called themselves the 
National Democratic Party. They were people I had nothing in 
common with. They were Catholic middle class who believed they 
had been educated and there was a God-given right for them to 
represent the Catholic working class ... People who had no idea 
how the Catholic people live in Dock or Falls or Ballymurphy. 
Thev appointed themselves as such and totally infuriated 
me.97 
Evidently the middle class professional image of the N.D.P. 
caused friction with other nationalist elements. 98 There was 
some debate within the Republican Labour Party about whether they 
should contest the election or not. Fitt was in favour of 
participation regardless of the result, because he felt that if the 
N.D.P. established their presence, then the political influence of 
the Republican Labour Party would be greatly diminished. Harry 
Diamond, on the other hand, was against splitting the Catholic vote, 
arguing that West Belfast was a sectarian constituency. Without 
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consulting his party colleagues, Fitt leaked Republican Labour's 
intention to the press - another indication of the individualistic 
nature of his politics to which he now admits: "I am very much of an 
individualist. I make my own mind up on something and think that I 
am right and other people have their point of view but it is not 
going to change my opinion - so I was never the ideal party 
leader. "99 On this occasion, Fitt's dogmatic attitude won the 
day, and as we have seen, was selected to contest the election 
although Diamond was recorded dissenting to party involvement. 
On March 2, 1966, the N.D.P. announced their candidate - a 
thirty six year old primary school teacher, Mr Joseph Lavery, who 
claimed: "The time has now come when elections in Northern Ireland 
must not be fought on shibboleths and slogans, but rather on 
intelligent 
involved. 11100 
and rational argument about the issues 
Fitt went on record regretting the N.D.P. decision, which he 
believed would lead to the unionists retaining the seat: 
The N.D.P. entered the political arena last year with the 
intention of unifying the nationally minded forces against the 
Unionist Party... and since then they have adopted the attitude 
that they are the only spokesman for the nationally minded 
electorate. In effect they are one more splinter party in 
opposition to the unionists. 101 
The dispute between the two parties precipitated bitter 
recrimination in the following week. On March 6, Fitt declared: 
Not one single vote has so far been cast for the National 
Democratic Party in the City of Belfast and I am certain that the 
electors of the Falls area will show in no uncertain manner their 
distaste for the tactics being employed by the National Democratic 
Party .102 
Answering suggestions that the N.D.P. withdraw from the contest 
to avoid a split vote, a party spokesman argued with an undisguised 
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gibe at Fitt: 
The Northern Ireland electorate is sick to death of the lone 
operator and the opportunist in politics. We want to help build a 
proper political party because this is the only way to get rid of 
the unionists. We believe that the electorate recognises this and 
will continue to support us accordingly. 103 
Fitt retorted that the N.D.P. were campaigning on a purely 
sectional appeal . 104 On the following day, March 10, the rift 
between the two parties widened as both indicated that they intended 
to remain in contention. An N.D.P. spokesman declared that they 
would not be stampeded by the "Tammany Hall tactics that are being 
used in the West. "105 
Meanwhile, Fitt acquired the backing of eight Nationalist M.P's, 
including McAteer and Austin Currie. 106 This mounting support 
for Fitt from the Nationalist Party forced the N.D.P. to seek a 
compromise, and they suggested that he could win the nomination from 
a united party - a merger between the two. Diamond strongly opposed 
this suggestion, his comment reflecting the temper of the conflict: 
A proposal of a shotgun wedding or merger with a faction outside 
of this unity (the unity of support for Fitt) on the eve of the 
election cannot be taken seriously when accompanied by taunts and 
sneers and statements dripPiing with hatred and abuse of a popular 
hard working representative. 07 
The threat of a three-cornered challenge for West Belfast was 
finally ended on March 13 when the N.D.P. capitulated to the 
increased pressure and withdrew Lavery. The statement announcing the 
withdrawal followed an appeal from McAteer to the party's Central 
Council . Fitt's inflexible attitude had won the day. His 
determination had ensured that he would be the only nationalist in 
the contest against the unionists. Nevertheless, the severity of the 
clash revealed a great deal of enmity between the "working class 
nationalists" and the "middle class nationalists." There would be 
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important implications for Fitt in the 1970s due to this discord. 
If Fitt was to overcome Unionist Party incumbent Kilfedder, he 
had to gain at least 5,000 of the voters who had previously plumped 
for the N.I.L.P. However, many of the people who would have voted 
for Boyd would have been appalled at Fitt's republican tag. 
Kilfedder, therefore, predictably laid great emphasis on his 
opponent's republicanism and the question of the constitution: "Why 
doesn't Mr Fitt talk about his policies - his republicanism which 
will put us in with the south." 108 He told a Belfast Telegraph 
reporter: "No amount of pretence at being the Labour candidate by my 
Republican opponent can hide the fact that the contest is a simple 
referendum - a vote for or against the Ulster constitutional 
position. "109 
Fitt, however, as was typical, was ambiguous in his election 
speeches, managing both to emphasize his socialist credentials as 
we 11 as h i s n at i on al i st asp i rat i on . 110 This approach did not 
fool all Protestant electors, as the following appraisal from the 
Belfast Telegraph indicates: "Mr. Fitt, for all his engaging 
personality and his avoidance of an exclusively religious appeal, is 
primarily an anti-partitionist, and it will be an elastic conscience 
which is able to support both him and the constitution at the same 
time. "111 
In a letter to the Telegraph, Michael Farrell, then chairman of 
the Queen's University Labour group, and later to become an important 
member of People's Democracy (P.O.), wrote that he recognised the 
dilemma facing Labour voters in West Belfast due to the importance of 
the constitutional issue. Farrell appealed to the people who had 
Voted for Boyd in 1964 to vote for Fitt in 1966, citing three 
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inducements: 
Because the border is not an issue in this election and Mr Fitt 
has made it clear he does not intend to make it one. 
Because the issue in the election is whether there should be a 
Labour or Conservative government at Westminster, and Mr Fitt has 
made it abundantly clear that he will support a Labour government. 
Because we believe that Mr Fitt has shown, since his election to 
the Stormont parliament, that he is prepared to work extremely 
hard for all his constituents and indeed for many outside his 
constituency. By this he has proved his claim to be a working 
class and Labour representative. 112 
Presumably Fitt's victory and majority of over 2,000 was a 
product of these factors. Fitt polled 26,292 votes to Kilfedder's 
24,281. 
Fitt had become the first candidate to wrest West Belfast from 
the unionists since 1955, achieving this despite one of the most 
concentrated campaigns ever mounted by the Unionist Party machine. 
His victory was the most sensational, but the unionist support in the 
other three Belfast constituencies was also severely reduced. After 
his victory, Fitt exclaimed: 
West Belfast has shown its repulsion of unionism, and while the 
majority of the support which I received came from those people 
who believe in the national unity of this country, I also received 
the working class support on my record as a public representative. 
I have been elected on the Republican Labour ticket which to me 
consists of the twin ideals of the unity of the island and the 
betterment of all the people. In Westminster I will support the 
Labour government on its initiation of social and progressive 
legislation. I will maintain my stand to propagate the unity of 
Ireland and I have no doubt that I will receive the support of 
many progressive British Labour M.Ps in this connection. This is 
the happiest day of my life. It is a victory for sanity in 
Northern Ireland politics. I have received the confidence of the 
working class. Now I will carry on my efforts to bring the 
workers under the Labour umbrella. 113 
Reaction to the outcome of the election in West Belfast 
predictably corresponded to political and religious affiliation. 
Nationalist sentiment was obviously delighted. Diamond described the 
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result as a "sensational breakthrough. It is a tribute to the people 
who disregard the sectarian appeal of unionism." McAteer sent Fitt a 
congratulatory telegram which read "and then there was eleven." 
Nationalists clearly regarded Fitt as one of their own, and, despite 
his non-sectarian and labourite rhetoric, he was. Unionist reaction 
reinforced this perception. Captain Willie Orr, leader of the 
Unionist Party at Westminster, said, "It is a sad thing for Ulster, 
when the famous constituency of West Belfast has chosen to go 
republican." 114 
To what extent then did Protestants vote for Fitt? A degree of 
elucidation can be provided by looking at past elections for the 
constituency. 
The 1964 election was, as we have seen, a four-cornered contest, 
with the opposition split three ways. The Unionists Party was 
victorious but it was outpolled by 9,000 votes. In that contest, 
Kilfedder received 21,337 votes while the anti border candidates 
representing the Republican Labour Party and republicans achieved a 
combined total of 17,934 votes. The pro-border socialist Northern 
Ireland Labour Party (N.I.L.P.) polled 12,571 votes. In 1966, 
therefore, the unknown quantity were the voters who had previously 
supported the N.I.L.P. It was these votes which would decide the 
election. Fitt's task, therefore, was to gain Protestant votes from 
Kilfedder, without alienating his nucleus of nationally minded 
supporters. The last straight unionist versus anti-unionist Labour 
contest was Jack Beattie's triumph. Beattie, as we have seen, won by 
25 votes. This would reinforce the claim that the religious divide 
in the constituency was about equal. If this is the case, it seems 
Fitt did succeed in his assignment (although it is worth noting that 
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Fitt's vote was exactly 3,113 below the total opposition vote in 
1964 , and that Kilfedder polled 2,844 more than he had done in 1964 -
suggesting that many who had previously voted N.I.L.P. were merely 
dissatisfied unionists). One factor which would have persuaded this 
element was Fitt's commitment to support the Labour Party at 
Westminster on social issues. In addition he had already proved his 
ability in local government elections to win Protestant working-class 
votes. It is also likely that he won the votes of a high proportion 
of people who had previously voted republican. It was indeed an odd 
combination of religious and political loyalties that saw Fitt 
elected to Westminster. 
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CHAPTER III 
CIVIL RIGHTS OR NATIONAL RIGHTS 
Chapter I summarised what had seemed to be positive political 
developments within Northern Ireland during the mid 1960s. In 
retrospect, it is obvious that these apparent improvements were 
illusory. Indeed, they proved to be negative rather than positive 
portents for the six counties. 
The Nationalist Party as an official opposition, became even 
more aware of its impotence in stagnant political circumstances. 
Lemass' visit signalled an end to the Republic's indifference to the 
North. The Campaign for Democracy in Ulster's sympathy for the 
plight of British Catholics in Northern Ireland developed into 
demands for the liberalisation of the Stormont regime, electoral 
reform and the abolition of all forms of discrimination. Most 
importantly, the Campaign for Social Justice evolved into a 
comprehensive Civil Rights movement which would achieve more reforms 
than any armed struggle had managed. 
Terence O'Neill in his capacity as prime minister, pinpointed 
the year of deterioration as 1966, the same year that Fitt was 
elected to Westminster. 1 Fitt promised he would ensure that 
the discrimination which existed in Northern Ireland would be 
vigorously exposed. At Westminster, his attempts to highlight the 
iniquities of unionism, were met with an almost total ignorance of 
the reality. However, four years later, the Unionist government was 
fighting for survival. Fitt had fulfilled his promise and must take 
some credit for destabilizing the state. This is not to say that the 
labour government of the time was instrumental in helping him. But 
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if it were not for the Civil Rights movement, that government would 
have adopted the policy of its predecessors towards Northern Ireland 
and done nothing. Even with the advent of the Civil Rights movement, 
little was achieved. 
This chapter will trace Fitt's political career in this crucial 
period of Irish history. James Callaghan considers that Fitt was a 
"guiding spirit" of Civil Rights. 2 Fitt did indeed use his 
personal qualities and high profile to highlight the condition of the 
Northern Catholic. He clearly enjoyed the freedom that his 
individual style of politics allowed. We will see, however, that by 
1969 there emerged a new group of articulate and pragmatic political 
operators - Paddy Devlin, John Hume, Bernadette Devlin, Ivan Cooper, 
Paddy O'Hanlon and Austin Currie, who, although they did not obscure 
Fitt, did make him slightly less distinct. This circumstance also 
created the impression that Fitt was the elder statesman of 
nationalist politics. The contacts with senior members of the Labour 
Party, which he alone established, further reinforced this image. By 
1970, therefore, Fitt would increasingly be regarded as the voice of 
moderation, which was bound to lead him into disagreement with 
radicals like Bernadette Devlin who was also elected to Westminster 
in this period. Fitt says of their time at parliament: 
There was no relationship. I was quite happy when Bernadette came 
here to show her around. She was after all an anti-unionist 
representatiave but Bernadette always had a crowd of student 
minders all around her. Michael Farrell, Louden Seth and Eamon 
Mccann - and all these "nutters" were all around. They dragged 
her up and down the country you just could not talk to 
Bernadette. She was under the influence of all the people who 
were on her bandwagon. 3 
Fitt's socialism in this period retained its intuitive 
characteristics but his nationalism was not unvarying. On occasion 
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between 1966 and 1970, Fitt showed himself to be militant, though 
much of this militancy was voiced against a background of apparent 
stability within Northern Ireland. He would not have been the first 
Irish politician to promote constitutional change through the threat 
of the revolutionary scenario. Furthermore, there is evidence that 
Fitt's nationalism is more discernable in Northern Ireland and the 
Republic than it is in London, he had different voices for different 
venues. This wavering suggests that Fitt had no clear political 
ideology. It also left him open to the unionist charge that although 
he said he did not want the border removed by force, in fact his 
actions showed the opposite. 
Chapter II established that Fitt's "Republican" label was 
essentially tactical. This chapter confirms this and also reveals 
that he was totally unprepared for the re-emergence of the I.R.A. in 
1969. He recalls their appearance in his home constituency: "In the 
Dock area the I.R.A. formed the Third Battalion. They were the scum 
of the earth. They were people who had all sorts of convictions for 
petty theft - social rejects, and then all of a sudden they were the 
I.R.A." 4 He clearly allowed the "Republican" part of his label 
to become totally inappropriate and was quite happy that British 
soldiers were on the streets when the violence began. The Belfast 
Telegraph quoted him saying "Thank God for the British 
troops." 5 
Although Fitt was responsible for much of the unionist dilemma 
in 1969, he, like all constitutional nationalists, was totally 
unprepared for the discontinuity of the state. 6 His loose 
commitment to the idea of a united Ireland was no substitute for a 
coherent political philosophy. In other words, it is easy to aspire 
r 
~ 
' 
86 
for a united Ireland - it is not so easy to implement it. In 1969 
Fitt had not the strategy for promoting the ideal he had espoused 
through the decade. As the nationalist mood became more militant and 
Civil Rights was replaced by a demand for national liberation, Fitt 
and his fellow constitutionalists fell into a period of temporary 
political limbo. Thus, nobody represented the Catholic community in 
any political discourse and this was only resolved a year later with 
the establishment of the Social Democratic and Labour Party 
(S.O.L.P.). By then, however, the I.R.A. had filled the vacuum. 
Much of the blame for this eventuality can be blamed on unionist 
politics. 
Although O'Neill could claim to have made some effort to win the 
minority over to unionism, his liberalism was essentially a facade. 
However, his style of unionism was sufficiently removed from 
traditional tenets that the monolithic unionist bloc which had been 
maintained for over forty years began to disintegrate. He had no 
greater critic than Ian Paisley who adjudged the new politics to be a 
betrayal of both Protestantism and unionism. 
comment: 
Bew and Patterson 
The effect of O'Neill's policies was therefore to create tensions 
between his government and some of the most backward elements of 
the Unionist Party, and this allowed him to represent himself as a 
progressive force whilst in fact no actual strategy of reforming 
sectarian relations existed. 7 
On April 18, 1966, the fiftieth anniversary of the Easter 
Rebellion was celebrated in Belfast with a colourful procession. 
O'Neill had exhibited the typical unionist fear of nationalist 
expression by banning trains from Dublin to Belfast - an action which 
exacerbated rather than reduced tension. 
In the parade, Fitt walked with the I.T.G.W.U. and was loudly 
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applauded by the crowds, reflecting his tremendous 
't 8 popular, y. He had actually not intended to march but 
O'Neill's move prompted him to break a prior engagement in London to 
take part. 9 The march, as always, was a tribute to the 
republican martyrs. Fitt's attendance presumably meant that he 
endorsed the ideal behind the Easter Rebellion. This conflicts 
sharply with his present view, he now maintains that Connolly made a 
grave error in his involvement: 
I believe Connolly may have made a mistake by getting involved in 
1916 because he was a Labour man, a socialist, an internationalist 
but he was caught up in the whole nationalist upheaval of the 
time. Patrick Pearse and James Connolly were like chalk and 
cheese. 10 
In Fitt's view, Pearse and Connolly were fighting for different 
Irelands. Pearse was an Irish cultural nationalist who put social 
issues in a secondary position. The Easter rebellion would thus be a 
blood sacrifice to rejuvenate the Irish people's desire to assert 
their independence; an independence which history had shown they had 
continually strived to achieve. Connolly on the other hand, wanted a 
independent workers' republic of Ireland. 
Onlookers of the 1966 parade would not have made such a 
distinction and Fitt was astute enough to know that his 
identification with such a parade would have secured him some 
support. Yet, to be fair, there was no perception that such physical 
force as a political weapon would ever be used again. In 1966 the 
I.R.A. was practically defunct in the North. Danny Morrison, then 
Education Officer of Sinn Fein, remarked "As far as we were concerned 
there was absolutely no chance of the 1.R.A. appearing again. They 
were something in the history books." 11 
Bowyer Bell talks of the relationship between Fitt and Sinn Fein 
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at this juncture: "In Belfast relations with Gerry Fitt who as good 
as owned and operated the new Republican Labour Party, were good if 
not intimate. His tactic of using his seats in Stormont and 
Westminster to harass the unionist machine was analysed if not 
1 t d II 12 emu a e . The display of mutual respect between Fitt and 
republican elements in the 1960s would not continue in the 1970s. 
Fitt made it clear that he wished to retain his individuality at 
Westminster by discounting rumours that he would apply for the Labour 
Party Whip. He told the Irish News: 
I am contemplating no such move but as I have already indicated I 
will support the government on its initiation of social and 
progressive legislation. As a socialist I have admired Mr 
Wilson's government in the last session and I have no doubt that 
in the next session we will have a great deal in common in our 
approach to present day problems. 
Fitt went on to describe his relationship with the C.D.U: "I am 
on the friendliest terms with at least 60 members of the new Labour 
government. They regard my victory in West Belfast as a signal 
breakthrough and I feel I can now propagate the cause they have been 
advocating." 
Fitt then made clear his position on the twin ideal of national 
unity and social and economic justice for the Irish working class. 
"Never at any time will I renounce either. I realise that there are 
many members in the British Labour Movement who agree with the 
eventual reuniting of the country. 1113 Fitt, evidently was 
still a nationalist. 
Considering this commitment to a united Ireland, in addition to 
other statements throughout the late 1950s and 1960s, one would have 
expected a maiden speech at Westminster heavily spiced with 
nationalist sentiment. It did not happen. The contradiction in what 
, 
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Fitt told the Irish News and what he asked for in his speech at 
Westminster is revealing. It is evident that Fitt had one voice for 
London and another for Belfast. 
The fact that there was little or no nationalist bravado is not 
to say that the speech was not dramatic. Fitt was a skilful orator, 
and, although he was mindful of the Westminster convention that the 
Imperial government would not interfere in Ulster's affairs, he used 
the opportunity to make a decided impact on the House. The speech is 
worth looking at in some detail as it is indicative of much of his 
political conviction. 
brand of republicanism. 
He began with an elucidation of his personal 
Since the election I have read in sections of the British press 
that I have been classified as an Irish Republican. I should take 
this opportunity to classify my political allegiance. To classify 
me as an Irish Republican is not strictly correct. The Irish 
Republican Party in Ireland does not recognise the authority of 
this House in any part of Ireland and its members would indeed 
refuse to take their seats in this House. 
He then reveals a trust of the British parliament and the 
British people, a trust that he would never relinquish: 
I have not given up hope, and I have not yet determined to follow 
the line of the Irish Republican Party, because I believe that 
during my term as the representative of West Belfast in this House 
I will be able to appeal to every reasonable member in this 
chamber, and, through them, to every reasonable member of the 
British public. I feel certain that at the end of this parliament 
dramatic changes will have taken place in the north of Ireland. 
Fitt was intent on presenting himself as a parliamentarian 
rather than a revolutionary socialist, which was indeed the case. 
His intuition that British measures would solve the Irish problem, 
remained a dictum of Fitt's political philosophy and would eventually 
lead him into confrontation with more radical elements. 
In the next segment of his speech Fitt demonstrated a distinct 
proclivity towards integration. Rather than lament the existence of 
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the border, he explains the differences in elections in Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland showing that in the latter, they were devoid of 
economic and social content. 
In Northe~n Ireland, at every succeeding election there are no 
economic issues involved. In this island of Britain, the recent 
election was fought on the different policies and philosophies of 
the Conservative Party, the Liberal Party and the Labour Party, 
and the Labour Party were victorious. In Northern Ireland, no 
such issues entered the contest. 
Fitt's demand for assimilation focused on the 1920 Government of 
Ireland Act, which implemented devolved administration in Northern 
Ireland. He asked for the Act to be modified to deprive Stormont 
control over the electoral process. 
The changing social conditions over the past 50 years make the 
Government of Ireland Act completely unworkable. When we realise 
how every concept of British democracy is being flouted in 
Northern Ireland we conclude that now, immediately, is the time to 
amend that Act. 
A further demand for equity between the United Kingdom and 
Northern Ireland was voiced through a request for the extension of 
the British Representation of the Peoples Act of 1949 to the 
province. Fitt claimed that the fundamental basis of democracy, that 
is One Man One Vote was abused in the six counties: 
We have an anti-democratic electoral system. This would not be 
tolerated in any other freedom-loving country. In Northern 
Ireland the same people are elected to administer the different 
Acts - the one applicable to Northern Ireland and the one 
applicable for Imperial elections. Can we expect these same 
people to administer their own electoral laws, on the one hand, 
and then to wear a different hat and administer the 1949 
Representation of the People Act? The first aim of the Northern 
Ireland Unionist Party is to perpetuate its own existence there. 
Let there be no mistake about that. 
Fitt was determined to inform the House that Northern Irish 
elections revolved around whether one was a Catholic or a Protestant. 
Although Fitt went on to declare his socialist values, he did 
not propose a socialist hypothesis to resolve the political 
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believe that it is only right that I should highlight this state 
of affairs in the British Parliament, since entry into political 
life I have always opposed discrimination or sectarianism in any 
way. This is not applicable to one religion only, because if 
anyone not of my own religion was a victim of discrimination, I 
would be the first to fight on his behalf. 20 
Fitt was still playing the role of the constitutional 
nationalist. 
In June, speaking at the Irish Club in London, Fitt discounted 
force as an instrument to unite Ireland arguing that to love Ireland 
did not mean it was necessary to hate England: 
Ireland cannot be united by the use of force. Today, the world is 
contracting. The advent of the E.E.C. and economic factors will 
lead to the abolition of the border. It is because Sinn Fein 
advocates a Republic immediately that they win no seats and lose 
their deposits. Their slogan is: Give us a Republic now whether 
everybody will starve or not is no concern of ours. 21 
This declaration from the most well-known nationalist politician 
was the only bright spot in a damaging month for the unionist 
regime. Fitt's machinations had prompted the British media to probe 
into Northern Ireland affairs a little more than they had been 
accustomed to, resulting in some derogatory conclusions. 22 
Events in Northern Ireland did not help. Ian Paisley's 
demagoguery had led to two days of sectarian riots at Cromac Square 
in Belfast, and at the end of June there were fatalities. The Ulster 
Volunteer Force (U.V.F.), a Protestant paramilitary force completely 
opposed to what they perceived as the liberal unionist regime, 
ambushed four Catholics at Malvern Street in Belfast, killing one and 
seriously wounding two. Although the crisis point had not yet been 
reached, these were arguably the first deaths of the "troubles." 
In the immediate aftermath of the murders, Fitt and Paul Rose 
called an emergency meeting of M.P's at Westminster and decided to 
form a deputation to see Prime Minister Wilson and Home Secretary, 
r 
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RoY Jenkins. Meanwhile, in Northern Ireland, O'Neill announced at 
Stormont that the U.V.F. was to be declared illegal and he equated 
them with the I.R.A. At Westminster, Wilson labelled the U.V.F. a 
"quasi-Fascist organisation masquerading behind a clerical cloak." 
Mere denunciation from Wilson was not enough for Fitt and he again 
called on Britain to exercise her responsibility. "It is for the 
government to take action and not the government of Northern 
I rel and. "23 
In August, "the informal" meeting between O'Neill and Wilson 
took place, with Fitt having made sure that Wilson was equipped with 
the facts about Northern Ireland. The agenda included discussion on 
electoral practices, discrimination in housing and jobs - the details 
that Fitt had highlighted at Westminster. Evidently Wilson was more 
conscious of minority charges than any of his predecessors. Fitt for 
his part, was optimistic about the meeting's results. 24 
O'Neill's autobiography reveals, despite Fitt's hopes, that the 
encounter between the two prime ministers was very cordial. The 
exchanges were along general lines, with Wilson exhibiting sympathy 
for the circumstances in which O'Neill had to operate. 25 
Nevertheless, it was Fitt who was responsible for bringing about this 
meeting through his persistence at Westminster. Three days later, he 
launched yet another attack on what he considered as Britain's 
dereliction of responsibility in not conforming to the dictates of 
the Government of Ireland Act. 
I say, Sir, that this Act gives ultimate and over-riding 
responsibility to the parliament of the United Kingdom, and as the 
representative of Belfast West, as the representative of 26,000 
people, I stand here to demand of the British government that they 
accept the responsibility which they themselves have written into 
this Act of 1920. 
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He then launched a scathing barrage on unionist policy in the 
north, claiming that unemployment percentage figures in places like 
Strabane, Newcastle, Dungannon, Enniskillen and Londonderry had never 
been brought to the attention of the London parliament. He argued 
that every one of these areas had an anti-unionist majority and 
consequently, money dispensed by Westminster was denied them: 
These areas are denied any industrial development on the ground 
that they are not worth it, that they are anti-unionist and worthy 
of no consideration ... As a socialist I do not want to see any 
unemployed man in Northern Ireland, irrespective of his religious 
or political beliefs. This is not so with my unionist colleagues, 
who deliberately deny employment to areas in the country because 
they do not support the Unionist Party. 
Fitt finished this parliamentary offensive with a plea to be 
relieved of the restrictions of the Westminster Convention, a plea 
which the Deputy Speaker rejected. 26 
In the following week the Irish News contained an editorial 
which summed up the nationalist perception of what Fitt had 
accomplished thus far at Westminster. It also revealed the respect 
that he had gained. Entitled the "Voice from West Belfast" it read: 
In his direct and unaffected fashion, Mr Gerry Fitt is making a 
habit of disturbing that august and leisurely institution at 
Westminster to which he was elected earlier this year. Making no 
genuflections to convention, he wants the House to remember that 
there are other voices in this area than those of the cohort of 
Unionist M.P's who sit so complacently on the Tory benches; 
silent in their subservience to the Tory Whip, and trudging 
dutifully into the division lobby against the government. Mr 
Fitt's hard hitting speech on Tuesday night was another example of 
his efforts to bring six county affairs to the attention of the 
British government. Whilst he provides much needed illumination, 
he is also adding considerably to the education of the new M.P's 
who are less informed about this area than they are about Bangkok 
or Bechuanaland. 27 
After the summer, pressure on Wilson from Labour backbenchers 
slackened somewhat. The lull can be attributed to the crisis which 
had arisen in Rhodesia and which occupied much of the prime 
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minister's attention but, nevertheless, Fitt had made a mark on the 
Westminster scene. Although tangible reforms were negligible if not 
non-existent, he had succeeded in isolating the Unionist M.P's, and 
with the help of Paisley's actions, had focused attention on the 
undemocratic set-up in Northern Ireland. It seemed as if the 
unionist administration at Stormont would not be permitted to press 
on regardless, as in the old days of Conservative government. 
In 1967, Fitt continued to push the Northern Ireland unionist 
administration into a defensive position. In February, a conference 
on the Irish question was held in London and attended by delegates 
from the British Trade Union and Labour movement. In sharp contrast 
to his maiden speech at Westminster, Fitt's address to the conference 
was much more "nationalist" inspired. Although again calling for 
parity between Northern Ireland and Britain, Fitt also addressed the 
problem of partition. He warned that if matters in Northern Ireland 
did not improve 'men of principle' would take matters into their own 
hands: 
Many people in Northern Ireland have a Sinn Fein outlook, and 
indeed in years gone by I have disagreed with them on the question 
of violence. An an Irish socialist I do not want to see one 
Irishman shooting another Irishman. I do not believe that they 
will solve the Irish question. But these people have a principle 
- they say that the partition of Ireland has existed now for 
forty-seven years, that it is useless to try to talk to a British 
government that they will not listen, that they themselves created 
the problem and they are unwilling to take any steps to solve it, 
and I have been told time and time again that the only answer to 
the partition of Ireland, lies in the hands of Irishmen themselves 
and it can only be reunited by force. 
He again, as he had done at Westminster, recounted the various 
Catholic grievances and then again reissued his clear warning that 
the minority would not wait forever for civil justice: 
There 
exists 
is no time for delay in facing up to the problem which 
in Northern Ireland. Those people in Northern Ireland who 
, 
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are at the moment British subjects and citizens of the United 
Kingdom are not being treated as such, and are looking to the 
British parliament for reforms. If reforms are not forthcoming 
who could blame them for taking whatever action they see fit in 
the circumstances? I for one would certainly not blame 
them. 28 
In the 1970s, Fitt did what once he claimed he would not do. 
When the P.I.R.A. emerged and embarked on a military campaign to oust 
the British from Ireland, he continually denounced them. To be fair, 
he would not have been the first Irish politician to capitalize on 
the perceived threat of unconstitutional methods of political 
agitation to gain constitutional reform - both O'Connell and Parnell 
were prone to employ such methods to add weight to their political 
rhetoric. In 1967 sabre rattling would not have been taken seriously 
and Fitt, like all constitutional politicians, was totally unprepared 
for the revival of the I.R.A. in 1969. Yet despite this, there is a 
clear inconsistency in Fitt's politics. 
As already stated, the principal contradiction in O'Neill's 
liberalism was that it raised Catholic expectations but avoided 
authentic reform. Northern Ireland remained a Protestant state for a 
Protestant people. Thus, the Northern Irish Civil Rights Association 
(N.I.C.R.A) was formed in February 1967 to combat religious 
inequalities. This organization sprang from the amalgamation of the 
C.S.J. and the Northern Wolfe Tone Society. It is wrong to suggest 
that the movement was an entirely Catholic one. 29 However, 
throughout its life, unionists claimed that it was a front for the 
LR.A. In reality it was a broad coalition of socialists, 
nationalists, communists, liberals and even the leader of the Young 
Unionists. 
The N.I.C.R.A. aims were: one man one vote in local elections, 
Gerry Fitt, M.P., leader of Northern Ireland's Social Democ 
Labour Party 
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the ending of gerrymandered electoral boundaries, apparatus to 
eliminate discrimination by public authorities, the fair allocation 
of public housing, the disbandment of the 'B' Specials and the repeal 
of the Special Powers Act. The campaign was not designed to end 
partition and eschewed the historic tradition of violence and 
bloodshed. Like Fitt, it was intent on seeking "British" rights for 
all the people in Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, unionist opinion 
was convinced that they were dealing with the customary bout of 
nationalist agitation, albeit in a somewhat unconventional form. The 
N.I.C.R.A., it was thought, was simply subverting the constitution. 
Although it was Londonderry rather than Belfast which provided the 
inspiration for the movement, it was not to be long until its 
strengths and Fitt's would complement each other. 
An indication of how Fitt was viewed by the more extreme 
elements in the Protestant community was revealed in April. In that 
month, the Protestant Telegraph (a violently sectarian newspaper, 
launched by Paisley) demanded "ARREST FENIAN FITT. "3° Fitt 
complained at Westminster, arguing that it was an attack on his 
integrity as an M.P. The Speaker ruled that in publishing the 
demand, the 
privilege, 
Privileges. 
newspaper was guilty of a prima facie breach of 
and referred the grievance to the Committee of 
The Committee declared that the publication was in 
contempt for using such statements. It resolved to take no further 
action in the matter as it would only highlight the abusive 
statement. 31 The incident shows that Fitt was considered a 
blatant nationalist and detested by certain elements of the unionist 
population. Undeterred, Fitt continued to attack the unionist 
administration. 
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Also in April, Fitt brought three Labour M.P's over to Northern 
Ireland - Paul Rose, Maurice Miller and Stan Orme, intending to show 
them the North's "ugliest spots" in an effort to verify the 
allegations he had been making at Westminster. 32 The four 
toured the towns west of the Bann, including Coalisland, Dungannon 
and Strabane. Austin Currie remarked that Fitt delivered the most 
"powerful oratorial performance" he had ever witnessed at the last 
stop. 33 Unionist M.P's were outraged at the intrusion, and not 
impressed by the report submitted to the Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, 
severely criticising the unionist administration. Miller maintained 
that despite all its problems and difficulties, India had more 
democratic rights than Northern Ireland. Orme told the Irish News: 
There was a crack in the Tory edifice when like a breath of fresh 
air Gerry Fitt came as a true Irish representative to 
Westminster. The Unionist Party at that time decided that Gerry 
Fitt would not have much influence on his own, but Mr Fitt had 
brought the Irish question fully and fairly before the British 
M.P's. He had been able to refute the quasi liberalism of the 
unionists who were sweet reasonableness in Westminster. 34 
Fitt promised that the fact-finding mission was only the first. In 
1968 this policy would pay handsome dividends. 
In May, the local government elections took place. This was 
another occasion to see if Fitt's machinations at Westminster would 
cause his Protestant support to diminish. The conflict between the 
Republican Labour Party and the N.D.P. continued during the election. 
Initially the two parties formed a pact designed to prevent them 
competing against each other for Catholic votes in the same wards. 
The N.D.P. claimed that the concord collapsed because Fitt failed to 
carry out an undertaking not to put Republican Labour candidates into 
the Falls Ward. Fitt, on the other hand, claimed there was a faction 
in the West Belfast branch of the N.D.P. which was bitterly opposed 
I 
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to him and the Republican Labour Party. He felt, therefore, that the 
onlY honourable course was to fight for as many seats as 
. bl 35 poss, e. The clash between Fitt and the N.D.P. is a clear 
indication that the antagonisms of the previous year had not abated. 
It also shows that Fitt was quite capable of reneging on an agreement 
if he felt it politically expedient. 
During the election, Fitt was opposed for the Aldermanship in 
Dock but as was becoming customary he was successful, as were his 
three colleagues who were elected as councillors. The results meant 
that the Republican Labour Party had gained complete control of the 
Dock Ward. Fitt polled 2,499 votes and won with the highest majority 
ever in local government in the history of Dock, presumably with the 
help of non-Catholic support. He now also had the backing of seven 
party colleagues at the City Hall; the three councillors elected in 
Dock and two each from Smithfield and the Falls. Republican Labour 
were firmly established in Belfast. After his triumph he reasserted 
his nationalist attitude: 
For far too long the opposition forces in the North have been 
divided against themselves to the advantage of our unionist 
masters. I think that the results of this election prove that the 
only alternative to unionism is a progressive labour and socialist 
movement embodying the principles of the eventual reunification of 
this country into a 32 county republic. 36 
Fitt remained very much the darling of the Irish News. In the 
wake of his victory its editorial stated: 
Only Mr Fitt, it seems, has the sort of influence that can 
diminish prejudices, even among those not normally his supporters, 
to carry his standard to victory at the polls. His rousing 
victory in Dock, with three colleagues riding in on the tide, was 
no inconsiderable achievement, and the overwhelming defeat of his 
avowedly sectarian opponent set the pattern for a general 
rejection of Protestant unionists in other Wards. 37 
At the end of the month, Glasgow Celtic became the first British 
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soccer club to win the European Cup. That success produced 
utterances 
episode is 
from Fitt which have taken on a mythical dimension and the 
often cited as an example of the 11 real 11 Gerry Fitt. As 
such, it deserves some attention. Glasgow Celtic were and are 
traditionally supported by Scottish Catholics; Glasgow Rangers on 
the other hand are traditionally supported by Scottish Protestants -
this support extends to Northern Ireland with the same religious 
cleavage. A crowd of fifteen thousand took part in one of the 
largest parades ever seen in the Falls Road district to celebrate 
Celtic's victory. 
crowd on May 29: 
Fitt was invited to the revelry and addressed the 
As I stand on this platform and witness such a vast concourse, I 
am more than ever convinced that the ordinary people of West 
Belfast are prepared to take a stand in defence of all the ideals 
which have been their way of life for so long. 1966 has indeed 
proved to be a year of great significance to Falls, Central, Dock 
and many other areas. We have beaten our opponents in politics, 
sports and in every other field they dare to confront us and I 
have no doubt that this will be the continuing trend in the years 
to come. 38 
In certain circles in Belfast today it is commonly assumed that 
Fitt's remarks were a direct reference to a Celtic victory over 
Rangers, a Catholic victory over Protestantism. The irony of this is 
that in order to win the cup Celtic defeated Inter Milan of Catholic 
Italy in the final. The misconception may have occurred due to the 
fact that on May 31 Rangers were defeated in the second major 
European soccer competition final, the European Cup Winners Cup, two 
days after Fitt's bravado. 
Nevertheless, Fitt at the time was severely criticised for his 
bluster. 
him. 39 
An editorial in the Belfast Telegraph disparaged 
Also a resolution was passed by the Belfast Young 
Unionist Association reading: "The remarks were deliberately 
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intended to incite bad community relations and this would appear to 
be another illustration of Mr Fitt's hypocrisy." 40 
Fitt was reported to be amused at the sectarian allegations: 
When I said we had beaten our opponents I was referring to the 
ordinary working class people who supported the Glasgow Celtic 
football team and to those around who were listening to my remarks 
- many of whom were supporters of mine in the West Belfast 
election. I insist I was not bringing religion into sport and I 
repeat that at no time have I regarded myself as a representative 
solely of Catholic people as opposed to Protestants. 41 
For all his back peddling and prevarication it is clear that 
Fitt, for an instant at least, was taken up with the spirit of the 
moment. In this celebrated instant he again displayed a propensity 
for emotional outburst. There seems little doubt that in this case, 
he classified the opponents of Republican Socialism as those who were 
not Catholics and those who did not support Glasgow Celtic. He was 
not the first Northern Irish politician to tell the crowd what they 
wanted to hear, yet this was the most blatant example of his playing 
of the sectarian card. He was clearly at ease in the role of the 
"Green politician." Other incidents confirm this. 
In June, Fitt spoke at a rally in Trafalgar Square, attended by 
some British Labour M.P's. The meeting proved to be another occasion 
when there was controversy over what Fitt did or did not say. The 
accuser this time was Prime Minister O'Neill who, at an Orange Order 
function in Cloughmills, alleged that Fitt had advocated a return to 
violence in Ulster politics. He quoted Fitt as saying: "If 
constitutional methods fail, the people of Northern Ireland who are 
at present the victims of this oppression are quite entitled to take 
what means they can to end it." 
Fitt in his own defence claimed that O'Neill had distorted the 
meaning of his words: 
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What I did say was, if the Northern Ireland government continues 
its present policies of discrimination, gerrymandering and social 
injustice, some members might in desperation resort to extreme 
methods. I believe that this is a risk which exists in the 
unhealthy atmosphere of Northern Ireland and which persists in the 
absence of any tangible evidence of bridge building activities by 
the prime minister, about which he talks so much and does so 
1 i tt 1 e. 42 
It seems that the only certain conclusion that can be drawn from 
the episode is that Fitt's rhetoric was not always totally 
unambiguous. The indeterminate nature of Fitt's politics left him 
open to accusations of indulging in political intrigue. The 
ill-feeling between unionists and nationalists continued. In 
November, O'Neill said that both Fitt and Austin Currie were playing 
with fire. Fitt took the opportunity to declare, "I have never at 
any time in my political career in Northern Ireland incited or will 
incite anyone to violence."~ There is no evidence to suggest 
that he goaded people to violence. Fitt, like constitutional 
politicians before him, utilised a perceived threat of violence to 
force constitutional change. However, it can not be denied that he 
must have been aware of the encouragement such speeches would have 
given to more extreme nationalists. A dispassionate assessment might 
conclude that there was a contrast between the voice of moderation at 
Westminster and his speeches outside the House. 
The long awaited Northern Ireland debate at Westminster finally 
came in October. Fitt's contribution showed how little the Labour 
government had changed conditions in Northern Ireland. It had been 
fourteen months since the regions problems had last been debated by 
parliament and Fitt had hoped dramatic changes would have taken place 
within the province. It was with deep disappointment that he told 
the House that no changes in Northern Ireland had taken place. 
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Fitt proceeded to press for the Race Relations Act to be 
implemented in Northern Ireland. He argued that the same protection 
afforded to Pakistanis, Indians and other immigrants to Britain 
should be applied to all United Kingdom citizens, including the 
catholics of Northern Ireland. 
Fitt again made a plea for parity between Northern Ireland and 
Britain and made it explicit that he did not require anything else. 
"That is all we ask. We do not ask for more." He again forecast 
future disorder, claiming, "As a pacifist, I do not want to see 
violence, but I do not want to see the people trampled under by the 
jackboot Unionist Party." 44 
Replying to Fitt's speech, Jenkins acknowledged that the Labour 
government was "deeply concerned" about the situation in Northern 
Ireland. He cautioned Stormont that Westminster would not interfere 
in Ulster "provided" it was satisfied things were moving in the right 
direction. Despite the Home Secretary's salutary warning, it is 
evident from Fitt's utterances that the situation in Northern Ireland 
remained unchanged. Fitt's goal to speed up the liberalisation of 
the Stormont regime had not materialised. He had secured a ready 
hearing among Labour M.P's, ministers and backbenchers alike, and had 
proved himself an able orator and an astute political operator, but 
although his presence at Westminster had put the unionists on the 
defensive, the parliamentary convention of non interference relating 
to Northern Ireland remained intact. Furthermore, in his book, 8 
House Divided, James Callaghan stresses how little public attention 
was paid to Northern Ireland. 45 
Labour government stood "idly by." 
If the truth be told, the 
Nevertheless, Fitt remained optimistic, and in his political 
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review of 1967 written for the Irish News he concluded: 
It is my sincere hope that on the next occasion when the people_of 
these constituencies have an opportunity to elect representatives 
they will ensure that the nationalist ideal will be given 
expression in the corridors of power at Westminster. 
on entering into the year 1968, I can only pledge myself to carry 
on as I have been doing in the past and I am confident that the 
New Year will bring further defeats for unionism in Northern 
Ireland. 46 
Although much of Fitt's wrath was vented on the unionist 
administration he was not adverse to criticising the government in 
the South. In these instances, his rhetoric was again often set in a 
framework of nationalist resentment, a component missing in his 
Westminster addresses. 
In January 1968 he spoke at University College Galway's Literary 
and Debating Society. He reiterated his wish for the integration of 
the Labour Movement in the North and the South and likened the 
Republic's Fianna Fail Party to the Unionist Party, calling them 
"Siamese twins." 47 
In October 1967, in a speech calling for stronger action to end 
partition, he attacked the Fianna Fail government's attitude to the 
issue of the border. 
Manchester: 
Fitt told the United Ireland Association in 
I wonder sometimes if the Southern government is prepared to 
accept the responsibility of the reunification of Ireland. If 
they are, they have not taken any very dramatic steps to achieve 
this. They could be much more forceful in demanding their right 
to the six county territory. 48 
Evidently Fitt envisaged that the Southern administration had a 
catalytic role to play in the ending of partition. In his address to 
the Galway students, he argued that there were hundreds of thousands 
of Northern Irish holding an uncompromising allegiance to the ideal 
of a united Ireland who looked in vain for support from successive 
t 49 thern governmen s. 
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Fitt's nationalism was 
perceptible in the Republic than at Westminster. 
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undeniably more 
In the same month, Fitt tabled an emergency resolution which was 
adopted at a C.D.U. conference in the Irish Club in London. This 
resolution called on those M.P's at Westminster who were sponsors of 
CD U to take "all possible action in the House of Commons to the · · · 
question the legality of the existing convention." In his speech he 
argued, "Northern Ireland seemed to be the forgotten child of British 
politics and the British Prime Minister is not prepared to risk a 
constitutional crisis over it."~ The resolution was further 
evidence of the lack of vigour from Fitt's fellow socialists in 
government. 
Fitt's continued attacks on the unionists brought him into 
inevitable conflict with O'Neill. In a speech in Strabane, O'Neill 
described Fitt as a political opportunist who could not go on being a 
republican in Belfast and a socialist in London. He said: 
Mr Fitt is like that remarkable animal, the chameleon which 
changes its colours to suit its background. He did not recall 
much use of the term British subject when Mr Fitt marched behind 
the Tricolour in Belfast to celebrate the 1916 Rebellion. 
I believe that the political opportunists, although they may 
win short term successes, generally fail in the long run, because 
in due course people find them out. One cannot forever be a 
republican in Belfast and a socialist in London - a nationalist at 
Stormont and a British subject at Westminster. Nor can one build 
an enduring political career upon a great heap of irresponsible 
criticism and denigration. 
O'Neill's speech compounds the critical allegations that were 
made in this period against Fitt. Fitt for his part retorted: 
This speech will be recognised for what it is the sordid attempt 
by a puny politician who is fighting for his political life. As I 
have said before if the day ever dawns when the prime minister 
congratulates me, I shall hastily re-examine my conscience to see 
what I have done wrong. 
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fitt then went on to reaffirm his allegiance to the Connolly ideal: 
He (O'Neill) recognises that during my political career I. have 
sought to unite and serve the working class people of this area, 
irrespective of religion or political adherence, and so hasten the 
day when all people of the six counties will find their true place 
in the establishment of a Irish Socialist Republic for the 32 
counties of this island. 51 
In June, Fitt had a further opportunity to express his fealty to 
the Connolly doctrine at a ceremony on the Falls Road honouring the 
hundredth birthday of his hero. Fitt addressed the crowd and said: 
"They had gathered to commemorate the birth and death of one of 
Ireland's greatest sons who bound himself to the cause of the working 
class." He argued that when Connolly died from the bullets of a 
firing squad the oppressors of the people thought they had seen the 
end of him and his ideals but they were wrong. They did not foresee 
that young men would take up the banner that he laid down. Fitt, 
declared, that like Connolly, he believed that there could be no 
peace in Ireland until a socialist republic existed. 
The most revealing aspect of Fitt's address was the time span 
envisaged for the transformation of Ireland. Fitt hoped that "as a 
result of this week of remembrance they would dedicate themselves to 
the task of establishing an Irish socialist republic within the 
lifetime of the oldest member of the platform party."~ 
The dissimilarity between the content of this discourse and the 
speeches at Westminster is very apparent. Thus, there is certainly 
evidence to suggest that although Fitt may have demanded only civil 
rights in London, he was equally vociferous in his demand for a 
united Ireland in Belfast. 
In retrospect, Fitt maintains that the legitimate civil rights 
campaign began on June 20 when Austin Currie began a squat in 
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Dungannon to highlight the discrimination in housing. 53 At the 
time he fully supported Currie. He claimed that he regretted that 
the situation had escalated to such an extent but argued that Currie 
had used every parliamentary vehicle to right the wrongs in the 
area. He believed responsibility for the situation rested with the 
Unionist Party.~ 
Three days later a protest meeting was held in the town. Fitt 
argued that the Unionist Party had undergone a recent right-wing 
fascist attempt to take over the administration: 
We have been told that Captain O'Neill is a great Liberal - he is 
a great Liberal but he certainly does not act as a great Liberal. 
We have been told that he is the best of a bad bunch, that the 
minority of Northern Ireland should not do anything to upset 
Terence's plans. I say this. A lot of people try to impress upon 
you that Paisley would walk over you with hobnail boots and 
Captain O'Neill would walk over you with bedroom slippers. So far 
as I am concerned nobody is going to walk over me whether they are 
in their bare feet or not. 55 
This was further evidence that Fitt was easily capable of filling the 
role of the radical politician. 
The Civil Rights movement had begun and Fitt was determined to 
be a part of it. At Westminster, he continued to raise the Northern 
Ireland question through the only vehicle available to him, question 
time. 
Fitt continually demanded that the British government take 
responsibility for the problems of Northern Ireland. Although Wilson 
acknowledged that Fitt had been very active in raising the issues of 
human rights and discrimination since he had entered the Commons, he 
was as steadfast in his reliance on Stormont putting its own house in 
order as Fitt was in his appeal to the Imperial parliament. He told 
Fitt: "I think these matters must be left for discussion with the 
government of Northern Ireland. The Prime Minister of Northern 
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Ireland and his colleagues know we cannot continue indefinitely with 
the present situation. Something has to be done." 56 
Yet nothing was done within Northern Ireland to appease minority 
leaders. Fitt responded with undisguised sabre-rattling. At a James 
Connolly commemoration meeting in Derry in July, he announced his 
intention to establish the Republican Labour Party in that city. 
I am prepared to take my ideals and my philosophies out of Belfast 
because by staying in the city I am only denigrating every 
principle for which Connolly ever stood. When I come to Derry I 
promise you I will change the system ... The day for talking has 
gone, the day for action has arrived. If every individual here to 
day goes home and re-dedicates himself to change the system as it 
operates in Derry, then we will change the system as it operates 
in the six counties and in the whole island of Ireland. If 
constitutional methods do not bring social justice, if they do not 
bring democracy to Northern Ireland7 then I am quite prepared to go outside constitutional methods ... 5 
The disparity between Fitt's remarks here and his moderate tone 
in London is patently obvious. McAteer predictably disapproved of 
Fitt's move into Derry, plainly feeling that it would damage his own 
party's prominence in the city. He remarked: "It is a rather poor 
way to seek the unity which is preached to us on all sides. It is 
enough to make James Connolly turn in his grave." 
Fitt remained unrepentant, and, although unwilling to attack the 
integrity of the Nationalist Party, he argued that the Derry people 
had not been given the leadership to fight unionism to which they 
were entitled. 
Belfast: 
He did not want his party to remain confined to 
In the past we have been roundly attacked just for this. I am 
sure on reflection Mr McAteer will realise that his gimmicky reply 
to my Derry speech will be no answer to the problems which beset 
that city The decision was taken in line with the party's 
policy to extend its sphere of influence and to propagate the 
ideals and philosophy of James Connolly. 58 
This episode was indicative of the ever present divide in 
nationalist politics. 
occasion, advocate 
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It also shows that Fitt did, at least on this 
"unconstitutional" methods of political 
agitation. It is not clear what he meant by "unconstitutional" but 
the gathering would have considered it an exoneration for the use of 
violence to achieve political aims. 
On August 24, 1968, the C.S.J. backed by the N.I.C.R.A. 
organized the first big Civil Rights march from Coal island to 
Dungannon in County Tyrone. The protest arose as a result of 
discontent at discrimination in housing, rather than over 
specifically political issues. Nevertheless, it offended Paisley's 
brand of Loyalism and he announced a counter-demonstration. This led 
to the Civil Rights march being banned from entering the town centre 
- an attempt to restrict it to Catholic areas. Fitt called for 
support, exhibiting, yet again, a shift in emphasis away from his 
moderate Westminster stance: 
Ireland's history teaches us that unless the ordinary citizens are 
prepared to fight on their own behalf victory will not be 
achieved. I now ask all those who have supported this campaign to 
let our unionist opponents and the whole world see that the time 
has arrived. 59 
The march attracted 2,500 people and passed off without any 
major trouble. Fitt was one of the speakers. The Irish News 
reported him saying: "A fire has been lit tonight which will not go 
out until Civil Rights have been established." 60 
Bernadette Devlin, who was to attain a very high political 
profile within a year, recalls a far more colourful account of Fitt's 
contribution to the march. It was her first encounter with him and 
her account gives a valuable insight to his career: "It was the 
first time in my life that I ever heard a politician in public use 
foul language. That is my first memory of Gerry Fitt, he was 
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blackguarding the police and just kept referring to them as those 
black bastards." 61 
The repercussions at Westminster were minimal in the wake of the 
demonstration. Fitt had a ten minute meeting with Wilson and he put 
down a motion objecting to the banning of the march. By the evening 
of August 28, he had acquired 59 signatures. 62 Despite the 
meeting with the prime minister and the tabled motion, the 
consequences of the August march had not been sufficient to invoke 
alarm at Westminster. The situation was to be altered in October. 
The demarcation line for politics in Northern Ireland to become 
"fashionable" was October 5, 1968, the day of the seminal Civil 
Rights march. Two days previously, in a speech in Blackpool, the 
venue for the Labour Party Conference, Fitt addressed a large 
gathering of the C.D.U. He reiterated the requests which he had 
petitioned for two and a half years: 
I do not consider I am making any outlandish requests. All I am 
asking for is that the same rights and privileges which are 
enjoyed by the people in Doncaster should be afforded to the 
people of Dungannon and Derry. 
If you consider this is too much to ask then I must say in return 
that the six counties should no longer be considered an integral 
part of the U.K. 
In a reference to the forthcoming Civil Rights march, he 
predicted that there would be trouble from the R.U.C: "I have no 
doubt that once again we will be subjected to police intervention and 
I am now in the process of inviting six of my Westminster colleagues 
to attend this march in what is allegedly an integral part of the 
U.K."~ 
Londonderry was the obvious venue for the demonstration. It was 
there that discrimination was at its most institutionalised and 
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efficient, where two thirds of the people were denied basic civil 
rights and placed in the position of a persecuted majority. In the 
autumn of 1968, a collective consciousness altered the pattern of 
events. 
After the Apprentice Boys of Derry announced an annual parade on 
October 5 over the same route as the Civil Rights march, William 
Craig, Minister of Home Affairs, banned all parades, except in 
Catholic areas, on that date. 64 Fitt considered it a stupid 
act by the Minister. "It is a deliberate attempt to provoke a 
peaceful demonstration. This is the only interpretation that can put 
on it. "65 It seems by banning the march, the unionists had 
again blundered. It is likely that more people attended because it 
was banned than if the government had ignored it. To avoid 
characterisation as a nationalist parade, no Irish Tricolours were 
permitted by the N.I.C.R.A. For the march, Fitt brought three Labour 
backbenchers over from Blackpool who had a brief to report back to 
Wilson and his Home Secretary, James Callaghan. An alliance had 
developed between Fitt and young radicals in Northern Ireland which 
was to prove a short-lived but potent combination. 
Despite N.I.C.R.A. efforts, the authorities perceived the 
protest as a nationalist conspiracy, a smoke screen for the I.R.A. 
The marchers were prevented from entering the city by a barrier of 
constables, Fitt was at the front of the march and as it tried to 
breach the R.U.C. cordon he was batoned. There followed a vicious 
baton charge on the demonstrators with over seventy injured - the 
police were quite simply guilty of indiscriminate violence. 
The events in Londonderry were relayed in newspapers and 
television not only in Ireland and Britain, but throughout the 
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world. Fitt had previously established a close contact with Mary 
Holland, a journalist for the Sunday Observer. A photograph of him 
with the injury he sustained, a head wound, was consequently on the 
front page of the following day's edition. The appearance of a 
British M.P. being attacked for protesting against abuses of 
democracy was a forceful image. The fact that television had 
captured the moment meant that any official whitewashing was 
impossible, and in the aftermath all forms of the media began to 
carry features on the problems of Northern Ireland. It was not 
unreasonable to infer that if Fitt had not been beaten this would not 
have happened. He described the moment to the Irish News: 
As I approached the police cordon at the top of Duke Street, a 
crowd of police ran over and attacked me. They didn't seem to be 
attacking anyone else and this is proved conclusively by the film. 
While I was completely surrounded by police one of them hit me on 
the head with his baton. I fell to the ground and tried to put my 
hand up to protect myself. I was hit again. I was then dragged 
away and thrown into the police van. 66 
Bernadette Devlin, also on the march, took a slightly different 
view of the incident: 
This was the Gerry Fitt I came to know. Gerry stuck his head 
under a police baton. There was never any doubt about that. He 
never denied it. It was a measure of the man. I'm not saying 
that to criticise him. The police attack was devastating. Gerry 
Fitt made a very astute political decision that if the press were 
going to be intrested in it, there would have to be an interesting 
head, so Gerry stuck his in the way and got sliced - proceeded to 
bandage it up very ostentatiously and give interviews outside the 
City Hall. In between interviews he would come into the bar and 
take the bandage off and have a few drinks and go out again when 
he was called upon. 67 
In retrospect, Fitt himself does not deny that he utilised the 
political opportunity that presented itself: 
I knew long before that they were going to beat me up. I wasn't 
going to retaliate. I wasn't going to throw stones. I got pins 
and needles and I felt the blood running down. I thought to 
myself1 I'm going to let that blood run because the cameras are 
there.b8 
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The most significant repercussions of the Londonderry march 
occurred at Westminster where the Labour government was greatly 
embarrassed by the damaging international publicity. Rose quizzed 
Wilson as to what he now intended to do about the R.U.C. Willie Orr 
resented this and asked the prime minister if he was aware that the 
R.U.C. was being disparaged. Wilson was curt in his reply: "Up to 
now we have had perhaps to rely on the statement of himself and 
others on these matters. 
television." 69 
Since then we have had British 
Although parliamentary procedure had not been the vehicle Fitt's 
message to the government had finally been received. In November, 
he clarified his position, or at least his Westminster position, when 
he told the Commons: "I say that the present situation is in no way 
aimed at the achievement of an Irish Republic. The question of 
partition does not enter into the demand of Civil Rights." 70 
In November, Fitt was again criticised for the duality of his 
politics. He had criticised Fianna Fail for its attempt to replace 
proportional representation with a a new electoral system via a 
referendum. Neil Blaney the T.D. for Donegal, also accused Fitt of 
being a chameleon: 
He is something of a chameleon who rings his colours up and down 
as it suits his purpose. He criticises the Taoiseach for 
referring to partition and says this has strengthened the Unionist 
case and could be very injurious to the Civil Rights movement. I 
question Mr Fitt's motives in regard to the nationalist population 
of Derry city for he no sooner got himself batoned in Derry than 
he was off over the border to use this incident in a most 
despicable and dishonest way in relation to the 
referendum. 71 
The contradiction in Fitt's politics is reflected in his reply: 
Over a great number of years I have been appalled at the deafening 
silence that has emanated from Fianna Fail sources in relation to 
the situation in Northern Ireland. I do know from quite authentic 
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sources in the Republic that Fianna Fail supporters had been 
advised not to associate themselves with the Civil Rights 
movement in Northern Ireland. And now at this rather late stage, 
after the overwhelming defeat in the referendum, Fianna Fail now 
proclaim themselves as the great Republican Party of Ireland. I 
think their past inactivity in this matter is sufficient to 
condemn them out of hand. 72 
Fitt therefore criticised Taoiseach Lynch for associating Civil 
Rights with anti-partitionism yet also criticised Lynch's Fianna Fail 
Party for not being republican enough and for not involving itself in 
the Civil Rights struggle. 
Whatever the contradictions and inconsistencies in Fitt's 
politics, there can be no doubt that he was hugely popular with the 
minority community after the Londonderry rally. His direct and 
dramatic involvement was arguably his finest moment in politics. Yet 
the episode also marked the juncture when events began to subsume the 
individual. The batoning of Gerry Fitt had at last convinced the 
Labour government to take notice. Fitt was an important mouthpiece 
of a minority becoming increasingly conscious of their position. 
When Fitt was elected in 1966 to Westminster, the Catholic 
community with low expectations were generally unsophisticated 
politically. October 5, 1968 radically altered the political 
climate. The formation of a new student group at Queen's University, 
The Peoples Democracy (P.O.), a radical leftist group that by and 
large adhered to Connollyite republicanism, was the most important 
manifestation. 
The ruthless rout of the marchers by the R.U.C. in Londonderry 
meant that Civil Rights became increasingly concerned with the 
security machinery of the Northern Ireland state. Londonderry also 
altered Protestant understanding of the issues involved. 73 The 
N.I.C.R.A. could not be discredited as republican and the R.U.C. had 
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been unable to intimidate it off the streets. O'Neill endeavoured to 
mollify it, but once the organization began to press for reform~, the 
contradictions in the state began to surface, and led to his demise. 
Civil Rights exposed the inherent discrimination and sectarianism 
within the infrastructure of the state; and its opposition to 
equality demands eventually led to the re-emergence of the I.R.A. in 
the summer of 1969. Fitt, like all constitutional nationalists, was 
unprepared for the sequence of events sparked by the Londonderry 
march. As seen in Chapter I, political indicators suggested further 
stabilising of the Northern entity rather than its erosion. 
In November of 1968, O'Neill announced a reform package 
conceeding some of the Civil Rights demands. However, the principle 
of "One Man One Vote" was not among them and the movement would not 
be placated without it. 
On December 9, O'Neill made a further attempt to defuse the 
increasing tension by making a television appeal for support. He 
maintained that Northern Ireland stood "on the brink of chaos" and 
called for an end to the growing civil dosorder. O'Neill told Civil 
Rights organizers that "Your voice has been heard, and clearly 
heard. Your duty now is to play your part in taking the heat out of 
the situation before blood is shed." 74 While the speech was 
generally welcomed, there was disappointment that an auspicious 
statement as regards "One Man, One Vote" was not forthcoming. This, 
it was thought, would have cleared the streets of Civil Rights 
protest. O'Neill was hindered by opposition within his party to the 
extension of universal franchise to local government elections - a 
point not lost on Fitt: 
Mr O'Neill has appealed to the Civil Rights marchers to desist 
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from further activity on the streets, and yet he had it within his 
power to ensure that this would take place by granting the 
elementary principle of One Man One Vote. I think this -proves 
that Mr O'Neill is shackled to a reactionary Unionist Party and 
while this situation remains the Civil Rights association must 
remain in existence and continue their demands for concrete 
75 reforms. 
Although O'Neill's appeal was somewhat melodramatic, the 
RA responded to it with one month's moratorium on N. I.C .. · 
demonstrations. Fitt followed suit when he announced a "Christmas 
truce" with the government. He said that he was going to be the 
"quiet man" of Ulster politics, and had decided to cease his attack 
on both the government and O'Neill, to allow them the opportunity to 
implement O'Neill's programme of reforms. 76 
The P.O., however, was unimpressed with O'Neill's television 
address and lack of substantial reform. In an effort to break the 
truce and relaunch the Civil Rights movement, a march from Belfast to 
Londonderry was announced for January 1, 1969. The organizers were 
well aware that they would be harassed. Leaders of the N.I.C.R.A. 
opposed this march, fearing that a strategy designed to provoke a 
predictable reaction would itself be construed as provocation. In 
the event, about eighty marchers left Belfast and were duly molested 
at various locations, the most serious incident occurring at 
Burntollet Bridge. It was there that an ambush had been planned, and 
the marchers were brutually attacked by Loyalists, including off-duty 
members of the 'B' Specials. The marchers eventually made their way 
to Londonderry city and were welcomed by a large crowd. That night 
rioting broke out, culminating in an unprecedented police attack on 
the Catholic Bogside district of the city. Barricades were built and 
the R.U.C. kept out of the area for a week. "Free Derry" was born. 
O'Neill predictably accused the P.O. of provocation and Fitt in his 
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recent interview with Fergus Pyle, also maintains that the legitimate 
Civil Rights campaign ended with the P.O. march. 
The march was intended to show how rotten the Northern Ireland 
state was, but everyone knew how rotten it was ... That whole 
episode introduced sectarian thinking into the campaign. 
Burntollet was a sectarian offer and a Protestant take up. It was 
no way to demand Civil Rights. 77 
The march was also a watershed in other respects. After it, 
many Catholics believed that peaceful reform of the state was 
hopeless, since this march was, after all, completely legal. It also 
marked the point where Catholic areas rather than Civil Rights 
marches were the focus of attack. As violence escalated throughout 
the year, the leaders of the N.I.C.R.A. and conventional nationalist 
leaders like Fitt began to lose what control they had of the 
situation. 
It seems as if Fitt's attitude to the march was somewhat more 
equivocal at the time. After the police attack in Londonderry, 
Eamonn Mccann recalls Fitt declaring "it's time to get the guns 
out." 78 Fitt told the Irish News that he was prepared to lead 
a deputation of the P.O. to Harold Wilson. 79 On January 8, the 
same paper reported Fitt saying that he knew many of the young 
members of the Peoples Democracy, which included Catholics, 
Protestants, and people of no religion. He admired their idealism 
and sense of justice and believed they epitomised a new generation 
who were not prepared to live under the shackles which bound their 
forebears. 80 
He was also highly critical of the activities of the R.U.C. in 
the Bogside after the march calling it a "three hour reign of 
terror. "81 When it was announced that the inquiry was to be 
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undertaken within the R.U.C., Fitt was again highly critical, 
claiming it was a "charade and a white-washing exercise designed to 
protect those members of the R.U.C. who violently abused innocent 
people in Derry city. "82 
Any gains O'Neill had made from his television address were lost 
after his attack on the marchers and the mildness of his rebuke to 
the assailants. The demand for universal suffrage in local 
government elections gained renewed impetus. 
On January 11, there was a another march, this time in the 
border town of Newry. Violence occurred after the government banned 
a section of the route through the largely Catholic town. Fitt 
claimed that the acts of violence in Newry were justified. The Irish 
Press reported his address to the Labour Party conference in Dublin: 
Some people had criticised violence in the Civil Rights movement 
in the North, but the young people who had thrown stones and 
burned police tenders in Newry were justified in doing so because 
they had been walked on and oppressed for many years of 
frustration. 83 
This is a clear cut example of Fitt endorsing "unconstitutional 
methods" of political agitation. It is a further example of the 
wavering that chracterized Fitt's political thinking and rhetoric. 
Under increased pressure from within his party, O'Neill called 
an election for February 24. He was gambling on obtaining a mandate 
by mustering up moderate Protestant and Catholic support. Fitt again 
defended Dock. In his manifesto he alleged that there was collusion 
between extremists and the "so called Liberal unionists." He argued 
that the Dock Unionist Association was a Paisleyite cell: 
Who selected my opponents? First, the Dock Unionist Association 
which everyone knows is now a Paisleyite cell. And who was 
Chairman at the selection meeting? None other than the very same 
Paisleyite who opposed me for the Aldermanship of Dock in 1967 and 
was overwhelmingly defeated by the combined votes of both the 
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catholic and Protestant socially conscious working people in this 
area. 
As was now normal, Fitt's manifesto steered well clear from 
overt republicanism. Instead it claimed that the unionists new 
tactic was a pretence of being progressive: 
No matter what my unionist opponent may claim to be, electors of 
Dock knew that he is a unionist who therefore will be a Paisleyite 
if the company suits him, or an O'Neill man if he is looking for 
money from the "Moderate Ulster" businessmen. But he can be no 
friend of the people of Dock. 84 
As the election drew near, Fitt maintained that the people of 
Dock had not been fooled by the O'Neill euphoria, and would not be 
prepared to sell their heritage: "Let our answer ring out loud and 
clear so that the people of Northern Ireland will be in no doubt that 
whatever happens elsewhere, the working class of this area 
steadfastly cling to the Connolly idealism."85 
The Belfast News Letter forecast a victory for Fitt, but with a 
reduced majority. 86 The prediction was reasonable since one 
might have expected that his Protestant support would have diminished 
owing to his activities at Westminster and his political rhetoric in 
Belfast. However, the reverse occurred. Fitt won the election with 
an increased margin - the largest in the history of the division. 
Fitt had built up a high degree of trust with the Protestant 
community. 
The results of the Stormont election on the nationalist side 
were to have important repercussions. In Londonderry, Eddie McAteer 
was defeated by John Hume, one of the Civil Rights leaders. The 
Nationalist Party, which had by now given up its role as official 
opposition, was also defeated by opponents who stood on Civil Rights 
tickets in South Armagh and mid-Londonderry. It had been dilatory in 
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;ts response to the new militancy, and suffered the consequences; in 
the 1970s it would cease to be a political force. The P.D. won.9% of 
the vote. 
Fitt's long term party colleague, Harry Diamond, was defeated by 
Paddy Devlin in the Falls. Devlin was Chairman of the N.I.L.P. and 
had been active in the Civil Rights movement. Devlin's triumph had 
grave consequences for the Republican Labour party and Diamond's 
defeat would be instrumental in influencing Fitt's later decisions. 
On the same day as the Burntollet march, it was announced that 
Fitt and Roddy Connolly, James Connolly's son, were to undertake an 
extensive United States lecture tour, at the invitation of the 
American Irish Heritage Association. The lectures were designed to 
enlighten Americans about the situation in Northern Ireland and Civil 
Rights. Fitt claimed that it would not be his intention to disparage 
Northern Ireland. Although he intended to castigate the unionists 
for a lack of social justice, he maintained he was keen to clear up 
American misconceptions. "I will be telling them the truth. That 
there are many decent Protestant and Catholic people living in 
harmony." 87 The tour was to take in several U.S. cities 
including New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Boston and Los Angeles. 
In March, Fitt travelled to Dublin to obtain an Irish Passport 
for his trip. "I'm a 32 county Irishman and this is the one way of 
proving it."M His symbolic gesture would later cause some 
controversy. 
Just as the tone and content of the speeches delivered at 
Westminster contrasted with those made elsewhere, Fitt's U.S. tour 
proved somewhat different from what he had told the press it would 
be. Despite his insistence that he would not smear Northern Ireland, 
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d headlines in the Irish media for some unequivocal fitt ma e 
statements. The Belfast Telegraph reported him speaking at Los 
Angeles comparing the Unionist Party with governments in South Africa 
and the U.S. South. He told U.S. newsmen that Catholics in Northern 
Ireland are treated worse than negroes in America. 89 Fitt's 
scheming in the States provoked hostile reaction from unionists. 
Basil Mcivor, Unionist Party member for Larkfield, classified Fitt as 
a "Pantomine Performer": 
The world is his stage. He performs in Stormont, Westminster, 
America, or wherever he happens to be. He is in the nature of an 
entertainer whose act has recently been wearing very thin - so 
thin he had to think up something really startling for his 
American audience. 90 
It was only after the violence of the summer of 1969 that U.S. 
interest in Northern Ireland became really stimulated. Nevertheless, 
Fitt made some impression. He was met by three mayors, was given a 
standing ovation when he addressed the House of Representatives in 
Massachusetts, and was made an honourary citizen of Los Angeles. He 
attended a banquet in his honour where he was one of the principal 
speakers, together with Hubert Humphrey, the Democratic candidate in 
the 1968 American election. Fitt also met Edward Kennedy. In all, 
he made 47 major speeches and appeared on 17 radio programmes. 
Fitt later denied that he had made the sweeping statement that 
Catholics were treated worse in Northern Ireland than Negroes in the 
U.S. He explained: 
I said that many Catholics in Derry are living in worse conditions 
than many coloured people in the U.S. That cannot be 
contradicted. I was talking specifically about housing and the 
failure of the Unionist government to provide homes. I have told 
American people the truth about the Civil Rights struggle in 
Northern Ireland and I have said nothing in America that I have 
not said at Westminster and Stormont. 91 
On April 9, the Belfast News Letter reported Westminster 
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Unionist M.P. for Londonderry, Robin Chichester-Clark's attempts to 
raise questions relating to Fitt's use of an Irish Passport with 
James Callaghan. In his letter to the Home Secretary he asked 
whether this was "within the obligation imposed by the Oath of 
Allegiance and within the letter and spirit of that Oath". He told 
the News Letter that "It seems a little odd that someone who is 
constantly asking for British standards of behaviour at home should 
acquire an un-British Passport to travel abroad." 92 
Fitt, for his part, claimed to be delighted that his tour was 
receiving so much publicity "But I make no apology for having an 
Irish Passport." 93 Evidently Fitt's nationalism was more 
fervent than he recalls. 
During a press conference in the U.S. Fitt was asked about his 
attitude to the P.O. He maintained that he was extremely pleased 
about the spirit of justice that motivated these young students and 
the most encouraging outlook for Northern Ireland politics was the 
community spirit that had been engendered between the Catholic and 
Protestant students at Queens. 94 
On April 17, there was a by-election for the Westminster 
mid-Ulster seat. Bernadette Devlin was then a young student member 
of the P.O. Her rhetoric was militant and anti-sectarian. On his 
return from the U.S. Fitt endorsed her: "Bernadette Devlin 
symbolises the young generation in Northern Ireland who are not 
prepared to tolerate the conditions under which their parents lived. 
I am absolutely delighted that we have found a single candidate to 
oppose the Unionist Party." 95 
Devlin won the crucial by-election. She defeated the Unionist 
Party candidate, Anna Forrest, with the largest majority, 4,211, 
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since the seat was created in 1950. The poll was 91.7% and sh owed 
that almost the entire minority community had mobilised behind the 
Civil Rights campaign. Devlin was a pan-Catholic candidate and her 
election marked the pinnacle of Catholic unity. Thereafter, -this 
cohesion would fragment and eventually disintegrate. 
Devlin's entry to Westminster as the youngest M.P. since f>itt 
also marked a watershed in Fitt's career. I asked Devlin if she felt 
she had somewhat eroded Fitt's authority and stature by her arr;val 
in London. She answered: 
I never had much to do with him at Westminster simply because I 
was too young to be sensitive to the fact that Gerry Fitt had 
ploughed that furrow and I had bounced in as some kind of new 
invention that had stolen his thunder ... It effected Gerry. His 
nose was knocked out of joint. 96 
Although Devlin stimulated the public imagination particularly 
in Britain, she was not the only new emerging politician. John Hume, 
Austin Currie, Ivan Cooper, Paddy Devlin and Paddy O'Hanlon had all 
seen their involvement in Civil Rights rewarded with electoral 
success in February 1969 and consequent media exposure. 
Fitt, who had thrived in his role as the lone voice, was no"'6 if 
not obscured, somewhat less prominent. One indication of this is 
provided by an editorial in the Irish News which stated: 
"Westminster M.P's have learned a lot about Northern Ireland fron Mr 
Gerry Fitt, they are going to learn a lot more and more vididly From 
Miss Devlin." 97 
Towards the end of April, the situation in Northern Ireland 'Was 
becoming increasingly desperate, with serious riots in both 
Londonderry and Belfast. Members of the minority community who had 
been previously responsive to O'Neill's overtures, began to 
relinquish hopes of peaceful reform. In a further attempt to pacify 
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them, O'Neill finally accepted the principle of "One Man One Vote." 
The following day, April 23 James Chichester-Clark, Northern Ireland 
Minister for Agriculture resigned from the government, he complained 
about the timing of O'Neill's acceptance. It is more likely that the 
real reason for his departure was speculation that he might become 
prime minister if O'Neill was forced to resign. 
On April 24 and 25, bombs destroyed Belfast waterpipe lines. 
The blasts were attributed to the I.R.A. and turned members of the 
Unionist Party against O'Neill and his policy of conciliation. 
Rather than attend a meeting of the Unionist Party's Standing 
Committee, which would have seen O'Neill lose a vote of confidence, 
he resigned (it was later argued that the U.V.F. was responsible for 
planting the explosives, a tactic designed both to incriminate the 
I.R.A. and bring about the fall of O'Neill). 
After O'Neill's departure, Fitt issued the following warning: 
"The new prime minister must realise urgently that steps must be 
taken to introduce reforms, otherwise the same fate would befall 
him. Repression was not an answer." 98 
The selection of Chichester-Clark as the new prime minister 
changed nothing. He was essentially in the same mould as O'Neill, 
and was thus likewise susceptible to the more extreme elements in his 
party - a point not lost on Fitt, who claimed: "It is extremely 
obvious that Mr Chichester-Clark will be a prisoner within the ranks 
of his own party as was his predecessor and that his actions will be 
dictated by his reactionaries in the party." 99 
Despite the truth of Fitt's statement, Chichester-Clark did make 
some effort to reduce tension. He re-affirmed the government's newly 
acquired pledge to "One Man One Vote" and ordered an amnesty for 
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those convicted or charged with political offences. The timing of 
these directives was unfortunate, as they came immediately prior to 
the summer marching season. 
In an attempt to reduce confrontation on the streets, 
Chichester-Clark's administration introduced a Public Order Bill to 
prevent inflammatory counter-demonstrations taking place. This move 
was construed as repressive legislation by the opposition. Fitt, who 
had recently left hospital after being admitted for exhaustion, was 
at Stormont to voice his disapproval and make a prophetic 
prediction. He argued that the new legislation "will make violent 
revolution inevitable." 100 Despite its intent, the Public 
Order Bill did nothing to prevent a series of riots and sectarian 
clashes throughout the month of July. 
On July 25, Fitt gave evidence to the Cameron Commission in 
Belfast. This Commission was instructed to trace the causes of the 
violence of October 5, 1968 and to analyse the forces involved. In a 
two and a half hour interview, Fitt gave his version of why the 
people had taken to the streets. 
The chaos of July was paltry compared with the incidents in 
August. On August 2, 1969, an Orange march past the Catholic Unity 
flats in Belfast and led to three days of rioting, and, as a result, 
families began to move from Protestant and Catholic areas where they 
were in a minority. Fitt urged the police to stem this tendency: 
These evictions could snowball with disastrous results. The 
government and the police will have to take strong action to 
protect threatened families. The court should impose the severest 
penalties on people convicted of threatening families - Protestant 
or Roman Catholic. 
Fitt also announced that in his Dock constituency, a Housing 
Action Committee was to be set up with the intention of protecting 
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families and their homes. 
101 On the following day as Stormont 
seemed to be losing control, Chichester-Clark met with Callaghan. 
Fitt predicted that the forthcoming week would be a testing time for 
Northern Ireland. He recommended that Britain should assert its 
authority and take full power under the Government of Ireland Act to 
maintain law and order. 102 
The critical instant proved to be August 12 - the date 
commemorated by the Apprentice Boys of Derry, who hold an annual 
celebration of the 1689 seige of the city. At the end of July, Fitt 
had drawn attention to what he had termed the "invasion" of Derry by 
the Apprentice Boys and he warned of a series of confrontations, yet 
again placing all responsibility for all eventualities on the British 
government. "We have now done all we can to make the British 
government fully aware of the present situation. The rest is up to 
them. 11103 The government disregarded all pleas to ban the 
march, and stone throwing quickly escalated into a full scale riot in 
the Derry Bogside. The Derry Defence Association encouraged by 
Bernadette Devlin had constructed barricades which were manned with 
petrol bombers .104 
The attack continued for twenty-four hours before the R.U.C. 
fell back after failing to penetrate the Catholic ghetto. In an 
effort to re-establish authority the unionists ordered the 
mobilisation of the 'B' Specials, and what became known as the 
"Battle of the B .d" d ogs, e ensue . By August 14, the prospect of Civil 
War was a real possibility, and was given some brief stimulus by the 
swaggering rhetoric from Jack Lynch, premier of the Irish Republic. 
Lynch said: 
It is also evident that the Stormont government is no longer in 
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control of the situation. Indeed the present situation is the 
inevitable outcome of the policies pursued for decades by 
successive Stormont governments. It is clear that the Irish 
government can no longer stand by and see innocent people injured 
and perhaps worse. 105 
The violence in Londonderry ended only with the intervention of 
British troops. In the late afternoon of August 14, the army entered 
the city center and undertook negotiations with the Derry Defence 
Association. The authorities agreed to withdraw both the R.U.C. and 
the 'B' Specials and not to infringe on the Bogside. Meanwhile, 
violence had erupted again in Belfast. 
Much of the Falls Road was burnt out, as were parts of other 
Catholic streets. There were six fatalities - five Catholics and one 
Protestant. Barricades were erected in Catholic areas and arms were 
moved up from the Republic, Paddy Devlin being prominent in the 
negotiations for the arms. As in Londonderry, James Callaghan 
introduced troops which succeeded in defusing the situation. 
Callaghan confirms that Fitt was very instrumental in this decision. 
He recalls: 
Gerry Fitt telephoned again and said that only British troops 
could restore calm in Belfast. There was no doubt that his 
apprehensions were genuine but I could not forebear to remind him 
that Lynch had said that British troops would be unwelcome. What 
was his opinion? Fitt was emphatic that the Catholic minority in 
Belfast would not take that view. Only British Troops could save 
them from the wrath of the Protestants and he urged that they 
should be brought in at once. 106 
On August 18, opposition politicians called a press conference 
to give their version of what was happening in Northern Ireland. 
Fitt alleged that the unionist version of what had occurred in 
Belfast was a "verbal avalanche of misrepresentation and downright 
lies." He went on to categorically deny that the I.R.A. had inspired 
the rioting in an attempt to subvert the constitution: 
r 
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The I.R.A. had no part to play in the campaign, and any 
republicans evident in the course of the confrontation were armed 
onlY with sticks, stones and perhaps petrol bombs. They had to 
take a stand to defend their lives and the lives of their wives 
and children. 
on the contrary, he maintained it was 'B' Specials who fired the 
first shot, supported by the U.V.F. and extreme unionists. He made a 
candid appeal for direct rule from Westminster "so that we may all 
have a chance of social justice for the rest of our lives. 111 ITT 
Two days later, Wilson set up a commission under Lord Hunt to enquire 
into the structure of the R.U.C. and the 'B' Specials. Fitt welcomed 
the gesture feeling that this inquiry would "clear the air. 11108 
A week later, Callaghan came to Belfast and outlined his plans 
for a prescription of social and government reform which he felt 
would normalise the situation. Fitt also accompanied him on a tour 
of the riot areas in Belfast where the Home Secretary received a 
genial welcome from the inhabitants. 
It is uniformally acknowledged that in the summer of 1969, the 
I.R.A. as a military force was almost non-existent in Northern 
Ireland. The organization was rural rather than urban, and any 
activists they had were submerged into the Civil Rights movement. 
Nevertheless, at the time the I.R.A. claimed that twenty of its 
men were involved in defending the Catholic enclaves. 109 This 
was resented by more moderate leaders as it added weight to the 
unionist myth that the riots had been sparked off by the I.R.A. 
As events developed the I.R.A. was reborn, aided by insensitive 
British security measures and the rise of the U.V.F. In December the 
movement split, with the traditional republican 11 Provisional 11 I.R.A. 
breaking from the socialist 11 0fficials 11 • It was to be the 
"Provisionals" who would embark on the most sustained military 
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campaign in the history of Northern Ireland. 
The events of August 1969 had some significant consequences. 
For example, the violent confrontation of that month instilled a 
greater political consciousness among the working class Catholics in 
urban areas. It had also proved conclusively that the unionist 
administration was unable to absorb or resist the new social forces 
which had emerged. The intervention of the army had opened up the 
constitutional position, and most importantly in connection with 
Fitt, the diminishing role of leading individuals was further 
reduced, particularly in Belfast. 
Despite the efforts of Callaghan, the barricades remained 
intact. As Loyalists demanded an end to the no-go Catholic areas, 
Fitt issued a peace appeal: "I have no hesitation in supporting the 
prime minister's call for peace particularly over the weekend. I 
call on all those who support me politically to do nothing, by word 
or action, which could possibly inflame the already very dangerous 
situation." There was no indication now that Fitt wished to flirt 
with "unconstitutional methods." 
Despite Fitt's plea, and those of others, rioting continued. On 
September 11, Fitt, Paddy Devlin and Paddy Kennedy, the Republican 
Labour Stormont M.P. for Belfast Central, together with members of 
the Belfast Citizens Defence Committee, went to London for talks with 
Callaghan and agreed to take the barricades down. 
statement Fitt said: 
In a joint 
We have been given guarantees which we have accepted as strong 
enough to give adequate protection to all those behind the 
barricades. We recognise the dangerous situation which exists and 
we fully recognise the distress and tra~edy, particularly to many 
innocent people over the last few weeks. 11 
On the same day as Fitt and other local politicians had 
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seemingly re-asserted their influence as elected representatives, the 
Cameron Commission reported its findings. It clearly indicateq the 
injustices of the Northern Ireland governmental system, and, in so 
doing, endorsed the demands of the Civil Rights movement. The 
behaviour of the R.U.C. and the 'B' Specials also came under severe 
criticism, as did Fitt, although it was admitted that the police 
assault he suffered was without justification. The report concluded 
that: 
Mr Fitt sought publicity for himself and his political views, and 
must clearly have envisaged the possibility of a violent clash 
with the police as providing the publicity he so ardently sought. 
His conduct in our judgement was reckless and wholly irresponsible 
in a person occupying his public position. 112 
Fitt's reaction was unrepentant: 
I make no apology for my action on that day. On the contrary, I 
am glad I have lived to see the day when the oppressed people of 
Northern Ireland finall~ got off their knees to throw off the yoke 
of unionist oppression. 1 3 
The nationalist community could have felt little apprehension 
about the Cameron charge. 
Fitt, however: 
Paul Rose felt it necessary to defend 
I have known Mr Fitt for five years and while like all politicians 
he may seek publicity, this can hardly be a criticism. There are 
times when his speeches may have been emotive, but I know of no 
occasion on which he has ever been inflammatory and it was not his 
fault that the police set upon him as a target in full view of 
millions of television viewers at the beginning of the current 
disturbances. 114 
Despite the irrelevancy of the charge for the nationalist 
community, and the remonstrations of Rose, the Cameron verdict 
certainly would have damaged Fitt's credibility at Westminster. 
On October 10, the Hunt Report was published. It recommended 
that the R.U.C. should be disarmed and that the 'B' Specials should 
be replaced by a part-time military force under the control of the 
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General Officer Commanding in Northern Ireland. The keynote of the 
document was that policing in Northern Ireland became akin to 
policing in Great Britain. Fitt considered that the recommendations 
were acceptable to the whole community and a further vindication of 
the demands of the Civil Rights movement. 115 
However, his welcome of the new reforms altered when it was 
announced in November that the new force would be called the "Ulster 
Defence Regiment" (U.D.R.). He found the word "Ulster" in the title 
offensive. It presumably offended his nationalist sentiment: 
I, in company with a large number of Labour supporters, take 
offence at the description of the new forces arrogating to itself 
(Ulster Defence). This is seen at Westminster as an attempt to 
give official recognition to the term "Ulster" as it is understood 
by the Unionist Party. 116 
Fitt was not the only politician who felt that this new title 
was unsuitable. Bernadette Devlin proposed an amendment that the 
name be changed to the "Local Territorial Forces (Northern Ireland)" 
but it was defeated by 163 votes to 36. 
On December 3, opposition members at Stormont decided to form a 
parliamentary alliance in the hope that a united body would exercise 
a greater impact on the discussions and decisions taken at Stormont. 
A number of shadow appointments were designated. Fitt was allocated 
the role of shadow "Home Affairs", his contacts at the Home Office 
making him the obvious choice. This measure was the beginning of a 
long process which eventually saw the creation of a new opposition 
party. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AND LABOUR PARTY 
Although still essentially an old style street politician~ the 
Gerry Fitt who emerged in the 1970s was somewhat different from that 
of the 1960s. In the earlier decade particularly outside 
Westminster, Fitt posed as and was perceived as a militant 
politician. His involvement in the Londonderry Civil Rights march 
and the conclusions drawn by the Cameron Commission, are the most 
overt examples - actions prompted by the lack of success through 
parliamentary manoeuvres. In the 1970s, however, he was a voice of 
moderation, the violence of the summer of 1969 having had its impact 
on his thinking. As the decade progressed, this change of position 
brought him into increased conflict with more radical nationalists. 
First, his own Republican Labour Party, then the P.O. and the 
re-emerged I.R.A. Nevertheless, this chapter will show that in the 
early 1970s, Fitt did not relinquish his aspiration for Irish unity. 
He was still essentially an anti-unionist and by implication a 
nationalist. However, any flirtation with non-constitutional 
rhetoric exhibited in the 1960s was not evident in the 1970s. Fitt 
consistently condemned all forms of violence from wherever it 
emanated. In the process, he became an implacable opponent of the 
P.I.R.A. and he showed tremendous courage in this action. As a 
result, his home on the Antrim Road in Belfast began to look 
increasingly like a fortress owing to the danger of paramilitary 
attack from both sides of the religious divide. 1 
This chapter will also show that although the references to 
James Connolly are conspicuous by their near absence, Fitt never 
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stopped in his endeavour to prove himself a non sectarian socialist 
politician. He became leader of the Social Democratic and Labour 
Party (S.D.L.P.). The party was an amalgamation of disparate groups 
within the Catholic community, its unifying thread being its minority 
status. The S.D.L.P. terminated old style nationalist politics. 
Every constituency created modern political organizations. In the 
s.D.L.P. ideology and policy followed the recruitment of individual 
members. It was a party constructed from the top down. Despite 
Fitt's claims about the socialist credentials of the party, he was 
unable to convince Protestants to join it. He made attempts to bring 
about discussions with the representatives of the Protestant working 
class, but they proved futile. 2 In short, although he may have 
established himself as a socialist politician who represented 
Protestants as well as Catholics, he was unable as leader of the 
S.D.L.P. to attract the corporate Protestant community. As with all 
political parties in Northern Ireland, the S.D.L.P's policies and 
membership were a direct result of its position on the border. 
Fitt viewed the prospects for 1970 with a high degree of 
pessimism. 
implemented. 3 
He expected confrontation unless reforms were quickly 
On February 5, Chichester-Clark re-introduced 
the draconian Public Order Bill. Fitt was conciliatory in his 
reaction and argued that this was not the time for protest. 4 
The street clashes since the summer of 1969 had clearly made an 
impression on Fitt. He maintained his conciliatory posture in the 
following month, when at Westminster he paid tribute to the role 
Played by the army in Northern Ireland: "The whole community on both 
Sides of the political fence, owes a debt of gratitude to the British 
army for its action over a number of months." 5 
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Fitt's attitude was bound to lead him into conflict with the 
uncompromising P.O. At the end of March, P.O. held a meeting in 
Portadown, a mainly Protestant town, which led to a clash with 
Loyalists. Fitt condemned the former at Stormont for inciting 
trouble and the P.O. in turn issued a statement in response to his 
allegations: 
Have you Mr Fitt, abandoned the position you held in October 1968 
when you defied law and order in the name of social justice. Do 
your reported comments on the Portadown meeting mean that you must 
now believe that law and order must precede social justice? ... 
Do you uphold the moral right of Orange Fascists to stone any 
meeting they disagree with? 
The Irish News asked Fitt to comment on the statement. He said: 
After listening to the questions posed by the P.O., I am more than 
ever of the opinion that they are a group of infallible 
nincompoops intent on giving themselves an aura of importance 
which they do not deserve. The circumstances of the Portadown 
fracas as reported in the press would intimate to all and sundry 
that certain members of the P.O. are intent on creating the 
greatest possible frictions and then scurrying to their own 
habitats, which is normally at a safe distance from the trouble 
they have created. 
Fitt's comments are ironic when we recall that previously he had 
been involved in demonstrations in which he hoped that police would 
attack protestors. 
his new position. 
There was a high degree of double standards in 
Fitt's response to the Portadown incident provides another 
reason why he held P.O. in so low regard resentment of people with 
a formal education encroaching upon his area of competence. 
I don't have to take lessons from the P.O. on matters of social justice, a battle which I have been fighting before many of them 
had passed their 11 plus. The series of questions which they have 
posed on this occasion will be treated by me with the contempt 
they deserve. 6 
The beginning of April saw the first major clash between 
Catholics and the British army. In the Belfast district of 
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Ballymurphy there were several days of rioting sparked by an Orange 
parade that passed nearby. As in August 1969, there were forced 
evictions - this time Protestant families were uprooted. Fitt 
declared that he could not condone or forgive those responsible for 
intimidating people from their homes "Protestants had his sympathy 
and support as much as Catholics." 7 
Three days later he travelled to London to seek emergency talks 
on the situation with James Callaghan and the British Secretary of 
Defence, Denis Healey. He maintained: "Unless the situation is 
resolved many thousands of innocent people, both Protestant and 
Catholic, are faced with misery and despair." 8 
At Westminster, Fitt still clung to his belief that the Labour 
government would make the unionists toe the line. He feared the 
consequences of a Labour defeat at election time and thus pleaded for 
the immediate introduction of the post August reforms. "There is a 
fear in Northern Ireland that if, unfortunately this government were 
to be defeated at the next general election, and a Tory government 
were elected, the new government would not pressurise the Unionist 
Party. 119 At this point of his career Fitt was totally 
committed to the British Labour Party. He consequently became a 
virulent anti-Tory since he believed that they were intent on a 
policy of coercion in Northern Ireland. 
Wilson called the general election of which Fitt feared for the 
following June. The Republican Labour Party unanimously chose Fitt 
to stand again in West Belfast, (his selection hardly coming as a 
surprise). Accepting his nomination, Fitt described his opponent, 
Brian McRoberts, as one of the most reactionary candidates to contest 
West Be 1 fast. Fitt proclaimed "A tense atmosphere exists in which 
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right wing unionism is attempting to stultify the reforms which have 
been won at great cost." 10 
Further evidence of Fitt's commitment and faith in the Labour 
government can be seen in his taking time to support his socialist 
colleagues in Britain during the election. In Manchester, he spoke 
in support of Gerald Kaufmann. Referring to the reform programme 
again, Fitt expressed his belief that it needed the protection of a 
further electoral mandate for Labour and his fear that if one was not 
forthcoming, then a serious escalation of the "present tensions" 
would be the outcome. 11 Encouraged by opinion polls, Fitt was 
confident of a Labour victory which would enable those in the 
Connolly tradition of Labour supporters to undo the half century of 
unionist mis-rule and Tory neglect. 12 As the election drew 
closer, the nationalist/republican content of his rhetoric became 
increasingly strident. "Never was it more urgent for every 
nationalist of every shade, and every republican whatever his 
allegiance of the moment, and every true labour man to ensure that 
their voices and the peoples interests are heard at 
Westminster. "13 Fitt attacked his opponent for posing as a 
moderate, but in reality accepting the unqualified support of Mr 
Paisley and his "cohorts." 14 
As in previous campaigns, Fitt had to balance his republican and 
labour associations; McRoberts, on the other hand, predictably based 
his campaign on the benefits of Northern Ireland being an integral 
part of the United Kingdom. There was some debate as to how the 
population shifts caused by the August 1969 violence would effect the 
result. There was also speculation that voters would not cross the 
Peace-line which divided the constituency for fear of intimidation in 
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a "hostile" area. The uncertainty of the election meant that Fitt 
would still have to woo the Protestant element to retain the support 
he had secured in 1966. His Civil Rights record would possibly work 
against him, with Protestants equating his headline-grabbing 
activities as synonymous with nationalism. On the other hand, his 
pro-Labour Party attitude at Westminster was to his advantage. 
From one of his campaign platforms on election day, Fitt 
displayed the latest edition of the Protestant Telegraph which he 
described as the: 
Most scurrilous anti-Catholic rag ever to be published in 
Ireland. But I am honoured to be named in this sheet as one of 
the rebels who Paisley says must not be returned to Westminster. 
This obscene publication comes out on the side of my unionist 
opponent, Mr McRoberts. 15 
Regardless of the support of the Protestant Telegraph Fitt 
successfully defended his Westminster seat. He polled 30,649 votes 
to McRoberts 27,451. Indeed it seemed as if he had managed to 
transform a marginal seat into a safe anti-unionist constituency. 
Fitt was not the only "rebel" candidate to be returned to 
Westminster. Bernadette Devlin retained mid Ulster and Frank McManus 
a Unity candidate won the Fermanagh/South Tyrone seat. But the 
general election also saw the return of the Conservative Party to 
power in Britain, a development Fitt viewed with a great deal of 
apprehension. 
After his victory, Fitt claimed that the result proved that 
Protestants had voted for him, still he reasserted his position on 
the national question: 
To these people I say I accept your support as a working class 
representative and I will in the future, as in the past, endeavour 
to serve all my constituents. But there can be no doubt about 
where I stand on the national question and those who supported me 
at the polls must be under no doubt that I believe in the eventual 
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reunification of my country with the establishment of a socialist 
government for all the people of Ireland. 16 
on the weekend of July 3 and 5 the so-called "Rape of the Falls" 
occurred and the Northern Ireland problem began to take the form of a 
colonial conflict. After the army carried out an armed search in 
Balkan Street, they clashed with the I.R.A. The army then placed 
(illegally as it transpired) the inhabitants of the lower Falls Road 
under curfew. During the curfew five people were killed and sixty 
five, including fifteen members of the British army were injured. 
The result was a deterioration in army/Catholic community relations 
which benefited the Official and Provisional I.R.A. Fitt told the 
Belfast Telegraph that he found the situation "heart 
breaking." 17 
On July 6, Fitt and Paddy Devlin left for London to protest to 
the new British Home Secretary, Reginald Maudling, about the 
brutality of the British army, particularly Scottish troops, over the 
weekend. Accounts of the episode differ but Catholic politicians 
were very critical. Devlin suggested it was "the most savage and 
brutal attack ever made on citizens in any country in the world." 
Fitt called for a public inquiry and warned that "Unless steps are 
taken to have such an inquiry the whole place would go up in 
flames." 18 During that meeting Fitt argued that the weekend's 
events showed that the Conservative government was prepared to 
support the Unionist Party at all costs. Maudling refused to discuss 
the role of the army but assured Fitt that the Conservatives were 
committed to follow the reform policy of the Labour Party. 19 
On July 8, Fitt made it clear that Maudling's remonstrations on 
Tory commitment to the reform programme were not accepted. He argued 
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that there had been a decided change in policies and attitudes in 
Northern Ireland with the Conservatives supporting the Unionist. Party 
b · d 21 in a very ,ase way. Evidently Fitt felt that return of the 
conservatives to power had changed the whole complexion of politics 
in Northern Ireland. His allegations containing much truth. The 
conservative Party and the Unionist Party had strong and close 
links. Unionist demands for a military solution would have found 
sympathetic ears from certain Tory circles. 
violence continued. 
Nevertheless, the 
On August 11, R.U.C. Constables Donaldson and Millar were killed 
by a booby-trap bomb in Crossmaglen, South Armagh. Nobody claimed 
responsibility, but the culprits were presumably one of the two 
I.R.A. organizations. Fitt was unequivocal in his condemnation: 
I condemn with all my heart those responsible for the dastardly 
crime. I am filled with horror and contempt that there are still 
within this community such persons who have so little regard for 
human life. I appeal to all sections of the community to do 
everything possible to ensure that those ~uilty of this crime are 
brought to justice as speedily as possible. 1 
Ironically on the same day as those assassinations, both Fitt 
and Paddy Devlin were at the funeral of old I.R.A. leader Jimmy 
Steele, who had been jailed in the 1930s and 1940s for republican 
military activity, and was responsible for Provisional I.R.A. 
publicity up to his death. 22 This funeral incorporated the 
tradition of firing shots over the coffin. In a statement recalling 
the death of the two policemen, Brian Faulkner noted that both Devlin 
and Fitt had witnessed this event and charged: "No one outside the 
Security Forces is entitled to hold arms at this time. They have a 
responsibility to name the men." 
Fitt candidly maintained that he did not see the incident: "I 
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was at the end of a cortege of nearly 4,000 people and I neither 
heard nor saw shots being fired." He considered Faulkner's statement 
as a "shabby attempt to focus attention away from the problems within 
his own party." 23 At this point Fitt still felt able to show 
some deference to the republican dead. 
The combination of a desire to wrest the initiative away from 
the Provisionals, and a wish to facilitate the Conservative 
government's request for a single identifiable nationalist political 
party with which it could bargain, finally produced the "Social 
Democratic and Labour Party" (S.D.L.P.) on August 21. 
This new group consisted of six opposition M.P's: John Hume, 
Paddy O'Hanlon and Ivan Cooper (previously Independents); Paddy 
Devlin (elected as a member of the N.I.L.P.); Austin Currie (a 
Nationalist) and Fitt. 
the caucus thus: 
Rumpf and Hepburn explain the formation of 
People's Democracy never looked like taking the lead in Ulster 
Catholic politics, and of course never set out to do precisely 
that. The Nationalist Party, with its President no longer in 
Parliament after 1969, proved unable to reassert its leadership. 
Thus there developed in 1969-70 a growing demand for a "United 
Opposition" at Stormont under the leadership of those M.P's who 
had been active in Civil Rights. It sought to be a genuine left 
of centre Civil Rights and Trade Union opposition, but when the 
N.I.L.P. pulled in its horns at the end of 1969 it was left simply 
as a demand for unity among M.P's representing Catholic 
seats. 24 
Fitt's high profile at Westminster and during the Civil Rights 
era made him an obvious candidate for the new party. Both he and 
Devlin insisted on the inclusion of the term "Labour" in the party's 
title, as a condition for their participation and, as they saw it, 
that of the Belfast working class. 25 
S.D.L.P. leadership was also a crucial issue. 
mentioned as a possible leader and said on August 18, 1970: 
Fitt was 
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I have not sought any personal political advancement but I am 
fully convinced that real leadership must be given to the 
minority, and it is with this ideal in mind that I am prepared to 
engage in further discussions with my party colleagues in an 
effort to do all in our power to give expression to the real 
hopes, fears and aspirations of those opposed to unionism. 26 
On that same day, the Irish News reported Devlin, Hume and 
Currie endorsing Fitt as leader. Hume said: "I have worked for the 
creation of a left of centre democratically organised movement. If 
that can be created then Gerry Fitt is acceptable to me as leader." 
As for Currie, he said "I have no doubt that Gerry Fitt is the one 
person with the necessary experience, ability and general 
acceptability to lead such a grouping." 27 
Telegraph commented on the question of the leadership: 
The Belfast 
The choice of a leader has always been a source of potential 
disagreement. This time the name of Mr Gerry Fitt has been 
mentioned. There is no doubt that he is an able politician. But 
the opposition benches have accommodated individuals with strong 
characters and it is at least questionable if such individuality 
can be successfully moulded into a team with sufficient discipline 
to withstand all the pressures of old loyalties and ideological 
stands. 28 
The above editorial exhibited considerable foresight. Early 
optimistic S.D.L.P. statements contrast with comments of 
retrospective regret from the main protaganists. 
On August 21, having accepted the leadership, Fitt presided over 
the party's first press conference and announced the intention to 
provide a socialist alternative to unionism. 29 He claimed that 
his party had support throughout Northern Ireland. Fitt clarified 
its position that the unity of Ireland could only be achieved through 
consent: 
Violence will not unite the people in Ireland - will not do away 
with the border in Ireland. There is only one way in which this 
country can be united, and that is by a massive process of 
education, by a massive attempt by this new party to go out and 
instill confidence into those who were formerly our political 
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opponents or did not take any part in politics whatsoever. 30 
Fitt had now abandoned a tendency to use the threat of vi9lent 
scenarios as a political weapon. In the 1970s, he rejected all forms 
of violence as being inimical to progress in Northern Ireland. 
The optimism and professionalism that the S.D.L.P. exhibited at 
its inaugural press conference, hid personal and ideological 
differences that did not auger well for the future. In retrospect, 
Fitt claims that he was disinclined to join the party at all: 
We were all together in our opposition to the unionists and lots 
of people began to talk about having one party. I was all too 
well aware of the differences between Belfast and rural politics. 
I was very reluctant to do it. I did not need a party but the 
others did because they could not go on being just Civil Righters. 
Paddy Devlin was a key figure. If he had not won the election of 
1969 and Harry Diamond had been re-elected we would have had our 
Republican Labour Party and there would not be an S.D.L.P. 31 
He also maintains that Austin Currie was instrumental in 
persuading him to join the party - a decision which in retrospect he 
considers 11 disastrous. 1132 Currie commented: 
He is right. I take some responsibility for him joining and being 
leader. I was determined the new party should come into 
existence. I recognised the differences between Belfast politics 
and the country politics and I felt that Gerry's participation in 
it was essential and there was only one way Gerry would 
participate and he certainly was not going to accept the 
leadership of John Hume. He effectively became leader on R.T.E. 
radio as a result of an interview. 33 
Fitt accepted the leadership on the air in response to an 
interviewer's questions when he heard that both Currie and Hume had 
nominated him, a further example of his political opportunism. 
In reality, Fitt and Hume were the only realistic candidates for 
the leadership. When asked if he would have accepted Hume as leader, 
Fitt replied: "There was no way they could have had any other leader 
because I was the key figure. I was the M.P. for West Belfast. 
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There was no way I would have been in the party unless I was the 
d n34 lea er. 
Paddy Devlin contends that Fitt's leadership was the product of 
an "anti-Hume move." 35 Hume, himself claims he was uncertain: 
I don't know because I didn't care who was leader. I genuinely 
wanted a political party formed and I didn't care who led it as 
long as it was a democratic political party. I was approached and 
told that if I agreed to Fitt becoming leader he would join the 
party. I agreed. No problem. 36 
In the event, Hume became deputy leader. Considering the make 
up of the party, and the fact that it emerged as primarily a 
nationalist party rather than a socialist party, it was perhaps Hume 
rather than Fitt who was the natural leader. Hume himself thought 
so: 
Gerry never made any contribution to debate within the party, to 
philosophy, to policy documents, to strategy. They were all 
written by me. Gerry was a figurehead. His strengths were his 
personality. He is very personable, a man of great humour. He 
gets on with everybody in that sense but he had no direction. No 
plan for solving the problem. He was a reactor. He was 
anti-unionist basically. He emerged from a situation where he was 
a street fighter, fighting against somebody. It was Rangers and 
Celtic. He was a Celtic man that won. 37 
Hume's contention has some validity. We have seen that Fitt was 
very much an individualist and as such would not have been easy with 
the yoke of a political party. He wanted to do his own thing and he 
trusted his own instinct. He was not an organizational man nor 
indeed a political theorist. Fitt was a political personality. This 
instinctive opposition of unionism contrasts sharply with the 
academic approach of Hume with his concern for policies and 
strategy. Indeed the quotations from Hume and Fitt capture perfectly 
the differences between Belfast politics and the rest of nationalist 
Ulster. Fitt for his part maintains that he suspected the life of 
the new party would not be long: 
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I never thought it would last. It has lasted nominally but it is 
still not a Belfast Party. Belfast has been swamped by the 
nationalists. It has not changed the issues. The S.D.L .. P. in 
Belfast is irrelevant. They don't win elections and they will 
never win West Belfast. The differences that were there then, are 
there now. 38 
There is a clear disagreement between Fitt and Hume as regards 
the present political situation in West Belfast. Hume had assumed 
that Fitt was bringing all his Republican Labour councillors from 
west Belfast into the new party. He did not. He only brought one 
and according to Hume: "that division between the ones he left 
behind and the S.D.L.P. was a division that caused alienation between 
West Belfast and the rest of us, which led to the West Belfast of 
today. "39 
Hume's belief regarding Republican Labour councillors was 
totally unfounded. Fitt's parting from his former colleagues was far 
from amicable. On August 24, it was reported that both Fitt and 
Senator Paddy Wilson were expelled from the Republican Labour Party. 
The decision was taken by a vote of 52 to 1. A statement issued by 
the party was read by Patrick Kennedy (Republican Labour Stormont 
M.P. for Belfast Central), who had refused to join the S.D.L.P. This 
stressed that the two had effectively expelled themselves by joining 
another political organization, and also, that Fitt had been given no 
mandate from either the party or his constituents, to form a new 
organization. Referring to the S.D.L.P., the statement noted "that 
not once in the party's statement of aims had the words socialist or 
republican been used." The statement also rejected the S.D.L.P's 
stance on the constitutional position. "No one section of the Irish 
people has the right to take a decision for that one section only 
Without the nation as a whole being consulted." 40 At the 
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inaugural press conference of the S.D.L.P., Fitt had given the 
impression that the Republican Labour Party supported him. He said 
"As I see it, the representatives here have a mandate from their 
constituencies, whether the Unionist Party or anyone else recognises 
the fact, we are the opposition "41 The statement read by 
Kennedy undeniably indicated that he had not the support of his 
party. It seems on this occasion, that Fitt had failed to cajole his 
colleagues to come around to his way of thinking. 
Therefore, only days after its formation the S.D.L.P. was in 
difficulties. A new party whose leader was rejected by his erstwhile 
political supporters suddenly looked much less credible. The new 
grouping may have met a need, but it was seen as a "green" Labour 
party and therefore sectarian. 
For its part, the Republican Labour Party ceased to exist as a 
political force by 1973, its disintegration certainly in part, being 
a product of Fitt's absence. He now argues that his former 
constituency workers felt that the S.D.L.P. was too similar to the 
Nationalist Party and thus joined Official Sinn Fein the more 
socialist inclined republicans. 42 
By October 1970 there were some progressive developments for the 
S.D.L.P. In Belfast, its new party headquarters was opened. At the 
press conference Fitt declared that since the party had been 
launched, 1,300 applications for membership had been received, and 
branches set up in 14 of the Northern Ireland constituencies. The 
"head-without 
when 
a tail" bearing of the S.D.L.P. was also remedied in 
the N.D.P. disbanded and defected en masse to the new October, 
party.44 Ian McAllister interprets the S.D.L.P's inheritance: 
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The most easily traceable legacy of the N.D.P. was in terms of 
political organisation. It is clear that the S.D.L.P. 
constitution was modelled closely on that of the N.D.P. As the 
s.D.L.P. was formed at the parliamentary level down, rather than 
vice versa, the experience of the old N.D.P. members in 
constituency organisation and co-ordination proved invaluable in 
giving the new party a residue of support and ability in the 
country while setting up their constituency organisation. The 
considerable contribution of the N.D.P. towards contemporary 
minority political opposition in Northern Ireland is an 
acknowledged if neglected fact. 45 
The N.D.P. clearly exercised a strong influence within the newly 
established S.D.L.P. The fact that Fitt and the N.D.P. had a history 
of acrimony made his position as leader somewhat incongruous. 
Nevertheless, Fitt led the S.D.L.P. in their first talks with a 
British Minister, Richard Sharples, Minister of State, at the Home 
Office in November, where he conveyed the party's view on the 
Northern Ireland situation. 46 
The year 1971 began with renewed rioting in the Catholic 
Ballymurphy area of Belfast. It seems that neither the army nor the 
I.R.A. controlled the district and youths were intent on stoning what 
they considered a foreign army of occupation. Fitt asked the 
Minister of State for Defence, Lord Balniel, to withdraw the troops 
for a period claiming that their presence in Ballymurphy was 
heightening tension in the area and could lead to increased 
violence. 47 
The riots led to renewed unionist calls for the re-introduction 
of internment, which had been effective during the I.R.A. campaign of 
the 1950s and 1960s. Fitt held a meeting with Maudling to argue 
against its re-implementation, telling the Belfast Telegraph that 
"the due processes of the law could be invoked to weed out any 
trouble makers in the community without recourse to this draconian 
law." It seems that he considered the unrest, at this point, to be 
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the work of a hooligan element. Maudling, for his part, undertook to 
give serious thought to Fitt's assessment of the possible reacti9n to 
t 48 internmen . 
The unionist demand for internment gained increased momentum in 
February, when the I.R.A. moved from a defensive to a decidedly 
offensive strategy. Fitt told Stormont, "this city is sitting on the 
edge of a volcano."~ Two days later the British army suffered 
its first fatality when Gunner Robert Curtis was shot by the I.R.A. 
The I.R.A. in turn also lost activists killed on that same day. Fitt 
appealed for calm: 
The deaths of three Irishmen and a young British soldier in 
Belfast must surely testify to the futility of violence in the 
attainment of political or national objectives. To the death toll 
must be added the total sum of misery, fear and distress in every 
home in the city. 50 
On the British television programme "This Week" Fitt was asked 
if he was condemning the actions of the Provisionals, and he 
answered: "I condemn the actions of anyone in Northern Ireland who 
at any time, in any way, tries to escalate violence." 51 The 
violence did escalate, and at the end of the month two more members 
of the R.U.C. were assassinated in Belfast. Fitt told Callaghan that 
"The heart had been knocked out of me."~ He was clearly 
becoming disillusioned and must have been aware that the situation 
was getting out of the control of elected representatives. 
The prominent members of the S.D.L.P. also voiced their 
disapproval of the I.R.A. Hume appealed to members of the Catholic 
community not to join violent organizations. At Stormont he claimed: 
They do not defend your homes. They are leading you to 
self-destruction. They cannot right your wrongs by creating 
greater wrongs If I feel that their methods will unite this 
island under their leadership then I want nothing to do with such 
an Ireland or with such people ... 53 
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Despite these appeals, the violence intensified. On March 10, 
three young Scottish troops were lured to their death against the 
background of a bombing campaign that was gaining further momentum. 
Disorder resulted in increased pressure from right-wingers in the 
Unionist Party for the resignation of Chichester-Clark, who it was 
felt was not doing enough to improve security. On March 19, Fitt 
predicted civil war if Chichester-Clark was ousted by the 
hardliners. 54 The following day the prime minister was forced 
to resign. 
The new prime minister of Northern Ireland, Brian Faulkner, was 
considered a hardliner. At Stormont, Fitt demanded that he implement 
the reform program: "To many thousands of people through the length 
and breadth of Northern Ireland these reforms at the time mean 
absolutely nothing. We have to see the legislation transformed into 
fact." 55 
Fitt emphasised his point and predicted with some accuracy that 
Faulkner might be the last prime minister of Northern Ireland when he 
told the Belfast Telegraph: 
This victory of Mr Faulkner's could turn out to be a pyrrhic 
victory. Unless he makes it quite clear to this community in the 
early days of his administration that he is prepared to forge on 
with the reform programme announced in 1969 and furthermore to 
enlarge it with progress so that social justice will be freely 
available to everyone in Northern Ireland then Mr Faulkner will 
find that he will go down in history as the last prime minister of 
Northern Ireland. 56 
Faulkner was keen to incorporate the S.D.L.P. into the political 
system at a nominal level and proposed a committee system to work 
alongside the Stormont Cabinet. This overture was essentially hollow 
as the S.D.L.P. would have no executive or legislative power but it 
was greeted with a favourable response from Fitt and the S.D.L.P. 
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It was a start at least. On July 7, they took part in what was to 
have been a series of all-party discussions, but optimism soon 
perished. On July 8, two Catholics were killed (by the British army) 
in separate incidents in Londonderry. The result was a marked 
increase in S.D.L.P. militancy, and the first rift in the party. 
The Catholics killed in Londonderry were Desmond Beattie and 
Seamus Cusack. The army claimed that they were gunmen and bombers 
but evidence refuted this. The S.D.L.P. issued an ultimatum to the 
British government demanding an independent inquiry within a week, or 
they would pull out of Stormont indefinitely. The statement also 
proposed an "Alternative Assembly" and the move was clearly inspired 
by Hume: 
The Party heard a full and detailed report from Mr Hume on his 
investigations into the deaths. We are completely satisfied that 
Mr Hume's call for an inquiry into the circumstances of the deaths 
is fully justified and will reveal that the statements of the 
British army and the Stormont P.M. are untrue. We now reiterate 
our demand for an impartial inquiry ... 
If our demand is not met by Thursday next - exactly a week after 
the deaths of the two young men we will withdraw immediately from 
parliament and will take the necessary steps to set up an 
Alternative Assembly ... 57 
Fitt was in London at the time of the incident and was not 
notified of Hume's action. He now says that he considered it a 
"Derry thing"~ (further indicating the suspicion between 
Belfast politics and the rest of the province) and Austin Currie 
confirms that Fitt voiced opposition to this militant move. 59 
At the time, he went along with the majority but not without having 
further talks with Maudling in an attempt to avert the boycott. 
Before Fitt met the Home Secretary he said: 
I am not prepared to accept the army investigation. They should 
welcome a public, impartial inquiry because we are absolutely 
convinced that the evidence would prove conclusively that the two 
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men who lost their lives in Derry were in now~ connected with 
the throwing of nail bombs or the use of firearms. 6 
The Home Secretary sided with the military and rejected ·Fitt' s 
appeal, saying "It is an army matter." 61 
On July 15, Fitt led his colleagues out of Stormont and the rest 
of the opposition, with the exception of the lone N.I.L.P. member, 
followed suit. The S.D.L.P. claimed the break was total. Fitt told 
a Belfast news conference that by withdrawing from Stormont "we wi 11 
bring home to the world the reality of the Northern Ireland situation 
which is that Stormont is and always has been the voice of 
unionism." He assured the conference that, contrary to rumour, there 
was complete unanimity in the party on its decision. 
In reply to a suggestion that the S.D.L.P. was taking a 
revolutionary position, Fitt said "We do not support the gunmen or 
violence and our move is certainly not intended to lead to the 
position of the gunmen being strengthened." 62 The relationship 
between constitutional and revolutionary nationalists was often 
questioned by the media. 
In August, Fitt was asked by a correspondent of the London Times 
if he and the S.D.L.P. were being coerced by the I.R.A .. He replied: 
Since the day I entered politics I have never been prepared to let 
myself be subjected to pressure from any extremist organisation, 
be it the I.R.A., the Ulster Volunteer Force or anything else. I 
would rather resign both my seats than be the voice of, or accept 
the dictates of, any extremist organisation in Northern Ireland. 
He was also asked if he was in any way personally afraid of the 
LR.A.: 
I am a married man and we have five daughters. I truly love each 
and every one of my family. I have talked the whole matter over 
with my wife and my daughters and we have frankly discussed the 
possibility of me losing my life under certain circumstances. I 
would have no regrets if I lost my life as a result of standing by 
the principles I believe in. 63 
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As leader of the S.D.L.P., Fitt constantly made it clear that he 
was opposed to all types of violence, from whatever source. 
Meanwhile, the I.R.A. continued its bombing campaign. The pressure 
to apply internment became greater and on August 9, the raids began. 
By that evening, 342 men had been picked up, all but two from the 
Catholic community. One of the two non-Catholics belonged to P.D., 
the other was pro-republican. Rumour quickly circulated that the 
internees were being ill-treated. Coogan noted that "Internment did 
not crush the Provos but unleashed them."M There can be no 
doubt that it was an ill-advised policy decision and failed as an 
attempt to reassert the authority of the Stormont parliament. 
Nevertheless, internment continued. Fitt retrospectively explained 
his attitude to internment: 
I always had a rather confused attitude about internment. Some of 
the people in the New Lodge Road (a Catholic area of Belfast) I 
would have interned them myself. They were a bunch of bad 
bastards. There were others that should not have been interned at 
all but there was no way you could differentiate or identify 
them. I was always qualifying my condemnation of internment. 
That was no good to the I.R.A. They wanted outright 
condemnation. The others in the S.D.L.P. were anti-internment. 
Particularly the rural areas. Paddy Devlin was on the Falls he 
had no choice. I stood up to the Provos, that is why I have a 
bodyguard now. 65 
There seems little evidence of Fitt qualifying his condemnation 
of internment. His recollection is perhaps an example of selective 
memory. What is certain, however, is that the mood of the Catholic 
community after internment was more belligerent. The S.D.L.P. had no 
alternative but to increase its militant position and again pledge 
itself not to return to Stormont, nor co-operate with the Westminster 
or Belfast governments until internment was terminated. Fitt 
reported his protest to Maudling: "I said it had been introduced as 
a short term solution with the intention of propping up the Faulkner 
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government but it had been an appalling failure up to the moment." 
He also demanded the recall of the Westminster parliament from its 
summer recess because of the gravity of the situation in Northern 
Ireland. 66 
An example of how far removed Fitt had become from his former 
colleagues in the Republican Labour Party was indicated by the fact 
that at a widely publicised press conference, Paddy Kennedy shared a 
pl at form with the Northern Divisional Commander of the 
P.I.R.A. 67 
In an attempt to end internment, the S.D.L.P. and the 
Nationalist Party orchestrated a campaign of civil disobedience. 
They called for a complete refusal of all payments of rent and rates 
to public authorities until the last internee had been released. 
Fitt claimed that the strikes was "an attempt to bring down the 
system in a non-violent way. "68 
On August 24, Fitt left Dublin for the United States on a trip 
to include cities with large Irish-American communities - New York, 
Boston and Chicago. He told journalists the reason for the tour: 
I want to tell the people what has really been going on in 
Northern Ireland since internment and about shocking brutality by 
the British army. We want to try and get America to exert some 
diplomatic influence on Britain and the wrong headed policies 
pursued by the obstinate pig-headed Mr Heath and the Tory 
government in Westminster. 69 
While in the States, Fitt had talks with U Thant, the Secretary 
General of the United Nations. He gave Thant copies of statements 
alleging acts of brutality by British troops committed under 
internment regulations in Belfast and other centres. After the 
meeting, Fitt told reporters that he did not think the U.N. could 
take any drastic action because Northern Ireland was a part of the 
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United Kingdom and high politics were involved. 70 
Fitt reverted to a more nationalist posture in Boston and. urged 
Irish-Americans there to express their views on the situation in 
Northern Ireland to their representatives in Congress. "Congress 
could then make the feelings of the people known to prime minister 
Edward Heath." He went on: 
I also have no doubt the American delegation to the United Nations 
could make their feelings known to the British delegation. The 
war in Northern Ireland must end now without the shedding of 
another drop of blood, but there can be no peace until there is 
only one government. 
Fitt also proposed that parliament should be suspended and a 
Commission set up in its place to represent all the people of Ireland 
equally. He said the transition to the Commission might take years, 
but would result in a "united Ireland." 71 
to be a nationalist in the United States. 
Fitt found it easy 
Meanwhile back in Northern Ireland internment had produced a 
tremendous escalation of violence. At the end of August, a British 
armoured car was ambushed near the border and one soldier was 
killed. When he returned from the United States, Fitt said "This is 
just another unfortunate and tragic sequence of events since the 
British army became so involved in acting on behalf of and at the 
instruction of the Unionist Party." 72 August had seen 100 
explosions and 35 deaths - one more than in the previous seven 
months. As Farrell said, "by any standards internment had been a 
disaster. 1173 
In September, Fitt was admitted to a Dublin hospital for 
treatment of a slipped disc. While bedridden, he granted an 
exclusive interview to the Irish Independent that revealed his 
Political thoughts at this juncture. He predicted an end to 
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the border by the mid 1980s and the reunification of Ireland within 
15 years. His words seem to indicate that Catholic political 
agitation was designed to end partition. "In view of present events 
in Northern Ireland this might seem like a long time to wait, but 
when you consider that it has taken 400 years to create the present 
situation, I do not think it is too long." 74 This disclosure 
adds further fuel to the charge that despite some of his rhetoric 
Fitt's politics were essentially anti-partionist. His prediction for 
a united Ireland within fifteen years was wildly optimistic. 
London and Dublin, on the other hand, feared an all-out 
sectarian war, and were thus anxious to prompt the S.D.L.P. into 
political discussion. The Belfast Telegraph reported that members of 
Fine Gael and the Irish Labour Party visited Fitt in hospital to 
persuade him to adopt a less rigid attitude to possible talks since 
it was felt that he may have been more flexible than his S.D.L.P. 
colleagues. 75 Evidently some politicians in the Republic 
considered Fitt more pragmatic than his partners. 
Fitt was well enough to return to Westminster for a two-day 
recall to discuss the continuing crisis in Northern Ireland. 
Maudling had proposed round table talks before the termination of 
internment but the S.D.L.P. demanded the release of internees before 
any discussion. 
During the debate, James Callaghan took the unusual step of 
putting a question directly to Fitt. Callaghan asked that if there 
was a solution to internment would the S.D.L.P., without giving up 
its long term aspiration for a united Ireland, agree to participate 
in government with unionists. Fitt replied: 
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Without hesitation, I can tell the House that if there is a 
satisfactory solution of the problem of internment which at 
present besets Northern Ireland the S.D.L.P. being the l~rgest 
opposition party, would in company with other members who have 
withdrawn from the Stormont government be willing and anxious 
indeed to enter into negotiations to bring about a satisfactory 
solution in Northern Ireland. 76 
Callaghan's question proved academic since the Conservatives 
were content to persist with internment, yet the discourse shows the 
dilemma of the S.D.L.P. at the time. If they had agreed to negotiate 
while internment existed, they would have represented no one, yet 
they were committed to constitutional government. 
The P.I.R.A., for its part, maintained the bombing strategy and 
the death toll continued to rise. Fitt meanwhile continued his total 
condemnation of the bombers: 
They had managed to eliminate from their thinking one million of 
their Protestant fellow-countrymen when they claimed that their 
struggle was solely against the British army. That they can 
ignore the political opposition to a united Ireland on the part of 
one million fellow Irishmen must be beyond the comprehension of 
all sane people. If I am to be true to my political principles, 
then when I condemn the political use of British bayonets in 
Northern Ireland, I must also condemn the political use of an 
I. R. A . bomb . 77 
The S.D.L.P. held its first annual conference in Dungiven, on 
the week-end of October 23 and 24. The party re-affirmed its 
commitment to the campaign of civil disobedience, passive resistance 
and abstention from Stormont in an effort to end internment and 
change the system of government. Fitt outlined the policy of 
"reform, re-conciliation and re-unification." He also urged 
Protestants to join the party and called for accommodating gestures 
from the government of the Republic. 11 I would say those sections of 
the Constitution which offend the Protestant conscience should 
immediately be taken out of the Constitution." He argued that if 
Protestants accepted his invitation to join the S.D.L.P., he had no 
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doubt that the gunmen and explosions would stop. He also maintained 
that there was no ambiguity about the S.D.L.P. "They were a 
socialist party." 78 Fitt may well have been sincere in his 
claims but there was no doubt that his party was founded on the 
catholic vote and that Fitt and his colleagues represented themselves 
as the only people who could speak and negotiate for the minority. 
In short, a party which claims to speak for the minority is a 
Catholic party, just as a party which claims to speak for the 
majority is a Protestant party. In these circumstances Fitt's 
socialist rhetoric was futile. In any case it could be argued that 
protestations about socialism were likely to scare Protestant 
workers, who, it could be argued, are the most reactionary and 
deferential working class in the developed world. Even the basically 
unionist N.I.L.P. got nowhere with them. Fitt can be criticised for 
being incredibly naive. 
The John Hume-inspired "Alternative Assembly" met on October 26, 
its formation being evidence of the total breakdown of political 
consensus. Hume set the tone of the gathering by quoting Edward 
Carson's words "we do not care twopence whether its treason or 
not."~ It is significant that Fitt missed the opening of the 
opposition "Parliament," since he was arguably the least militant of 
the leading figures in the S.D.L.P., and possibly wished to distance 
himself from the proceedings. Hume apologised for his absence, 
saying that he was attending a funeral. 80 The Assembly held 
only one other meeting. 
Paul Bew and Henry Patterson explain the condition of the 
S.D.L.P. at the turn of the year: 
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The continuation of internment and detention, the dense army 
presence and the incapacity of the state to control sectarian 
assassinations combined to produce rather conditional support for 
the S.D.L.P. amongst the Catholics. The effect of the post-68 
mobilisations had been to create a whole range of local defence 
groups, community associations and smaller leftish and republican 
groups which, together with the Provisionals, increasingly 
criticised the S.D.L.P. and argued that it would shortly be 
absorbed and co-opted. 81 
The year ended on a particularly bad note for Fitt. On December 
4, fifteen people died in an explosion at a Catholic pub on the New 
Lodge Road. He said "I am personally so shocked that I cannot think 
clearly what next week will hold. All I know is there will be 14 
funerals from my constituency and that is all I can think 
of. n82 
There were 174 fatalities in 1971 - 115 civilians, 43 members of 
the British army, 19 I.R.A. activists, 11 members of the R.U.C. and 5 
members of the U.D.R. 1972 proved to be an even bloodier year. 
On January 30, 1972 thirteen men were shot dead by British 
paratroopers in Londonderry's "Bloody Sunday." The shootings 
occurred during an illegal march organized by the Civil Rights 
Association to protest against internment. The army claimed that 
they had been fired upon first, but nationalist and Catholic Ireland 
rejected this, and a wave of intense anger swept the country. Fitt 
fulminated: 
It must now be evident to all that the British army in Northern 
Ireland has now taken on all the trappings of an army of 
occupation determined to use their superior military might to keep 
in power a corrupt and discredited government that has gained the 
odium of the world. 83 
At Westminster, Bernadette Devlin claimed "The government may 
well have lit a fire in Ireland, the flames of which may not die out 
until the last vestige of British rule has gone from that country." 
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Fitt spoke subsequently, endorsing Devlin's sentiments and demanding 
the suspension of Stormont and the withdrawal of the British.army. 
His speech was charged with emotion: 
Until last Sunday I regarded myself as a man of moderation. I 
have consistently condemned violence. I have condemned every life 
that was unnecessarily taken, every shot that was fired and every 
explosion that has taken place. But I am consistent with my own 
conscience, with the fact that I was born and reared, and will be 
until the day I die, an Irishman. If I condemn the violence of 
anyone in Northern Ireland I must condemn the violence of the 
British army that was meted out to the Irish people in the city of 
Derry last Sunday. 84 
Fitt's emotion was reflected in the Republic, where the British 
Embassy in Dublin was burned to the ground during a national day of 
mourning on February 2. 
In the following week Fitt attended a Newry Civil Rights march 
along with thousands of other protesters. He addressed the crowd and 
claimed that the march represented a total rejection of Stormont. He 
also claimed the demonstration was an indication that the vast 
majority of those opposed to unionist government supported a 
non-violent movement: 
Newry has indeed reason to be proud tonight. It will be 
remembered that the first violence of the Civil Rights movement 
unfortunately and tragically took place in Newry in January, 1969 
(an action that was justified by Fitt) and it was only right that 
this historic town should have availed itself of this opportunity 
before the eyes of the world to prove its solidarity and support 
for non-violent action in its endeavour to rid itself forever of 
the injustices perpetrated under unionism and so ably by the Tory 
administration at Westminster. 85 
After 'Bloody Sunday' and the Newry march, the whole minority 
community was united in its opposition to Stormont. 
Edward Heath appealed to the Northern minority representatives 
to re-think and agree to peace talks without pre-conditions but Fitt 
rejected this request: "I find the whole matter rather confusing. 
On the one hand Mr Heath is asking for talks while at the same time 
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we are being told in Newry from a helicopter that we are all going to 
jail for six months." 86 
Meanwhile, the violence continued. On February 22, the Official 
1.R.A. bombed Paratroopers Headquarters at Aldershot, England, 
killing six civilians and an army chaplain. Three days later, 
Northern Ireland Minister of State and Home Affairs, John Taylor, was 
seriously wounded in a Official I.R.A. assassination attempt. 
On March 4, two women were killed and 136 people were injured by 
a bomb in the crowded Abercorn restaurant in Belfast. Fitt 
considered it the most serious tragedy since the outbreak of the 
'Troubles': "This barbaric act will have repercussions on the Irish 
people through the world for generations to come, and will have 
sullied the name of the Irish race."87 
As a consequence of the civil disobedience campaign, Fitt had 
not attended Belfast Corporation and was thus due to be expelled. 
However, the anti-unionist streak in Fitt was too entrenched to 
relinquish his hold in the Dock Ward without a fight. He therefore 
made a token appearance at the City Hall which enabled him to keep 
his seat. This displeased his S.D.L.P. colleagues and the 
Andersonstown P.O. severely criticised Fitt for his decision: 
This action should come as no surprise to anyone who has watched 
Mr Fitt's cheap political manouvering throughout the present 
struggle. While the people have been demanding the unconditional 
release of all internees and political prisoners and a no to the 
Special Powers Act, Fitt has attempted to wriggle out of his "no 
talks" dilemma by demanding that the internees be released or 
charged. The peoples demand still stands we have no intention of 
watering them down to allow Fitt and co to crawl to Maudling's 
sell out table. 
The people have withdrawn consent from Stormont and rejected the 
corrupt sectarian structures which are necessary to keep it 
standing. Fitt by continuing to hold on to his Council seat, and 
attending however briefly - a council meeting has shown that he 
has not withdrawn from the system he is merely hibernating until 
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Maudling can fix him up a seat in the Cabinet. 88 
Fitt's old colleagues in the Republican Labour Party. also 
chastised him for his decision to appear at City Hall. 89 
When the other Dock seat fell vacant due to S.D.L.P. abstention, 
the prospect of a unionist taking over was again too much for Fitt. 
He announced that his wife, Ann would contest the seat, although if 
victorious she would, like her husband, boycott Council meetings. 
Redevelopment and slum clearance had changed the religious demography 
of the Dock Ward to such an extent so that by 1972 Catholics were a 2 
to 1 majority. The only hope of the other candidate, David Robb of 
the Constitution Party depended on enough S.D.L.P. voters deciding to 
boycott the election. In her election address, Ann Fitt argued that 
her husband would fail in his duty to the Dock residents if he did 
not provide an opportunity for them to decide whether they were 
prepared to allow "sectarian bigots" to return to the area where they 
had been previously "totally and firmly rejected." 90 She had a 
comfortable victory. Robb lost his deposit. 
The City Hall episodes are further evidence that Fitt's politics 
were based on personality. S.D.L.P. colleagues, Paddy Devlin, John 
Hume and Austin Currie all suggested to the author that Fitt had 
little organizational ability and indeed no interest in it. They 
also indicated that he provided little input into policy and 
strategy. We have already noted that Fitt himself readily admits 
that he was not the ideal party leader. Fitt was still content to 
rely on his own political instincts. 
After Bloody Sunday, Edward Heath was coming under increasing 
pressure to adopt some sort of initiative in Northern Ireland as the 
province proceeded to drift towards total anarchy. Fitt was one of 
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the more vocal complainers: "It is disgraceful, all their plans seem 
to be in the Sea of Tranquility." 91 In retrospect, it seems 
likely that Heath had already decided to close Stormont at this 
juncture. 
On March 20, a no-warning bomb killed six in Belfast. This 
brought the total number of deaths in 1972 to 76; 282 people had 
thus far died since the 'Troubles' began, and 219 since the 
introduction of internment. On March 22, Faulkner met Heath in 
London and was told that Westminster was going to take all security 
powers away from Stormont. Right wing pressure within the Unionist 
Party would not allow Faulkner to relinquish control of security. It 
seemed that his position was untenable. Fitt commented that any 
announcement of the resignation of the Stormont government would 
cause no regret in the minority community: "This was the only 
possible step for the Conservative government to take and one hopes 
now that they will be prepared to use all their resources should any 
attempt be made to give a re-birth to unionism by a show of force by 
unionist extremists." 91 
On March 24, Heath announced that the Faulkner government was 
resigning, that Westminster was suspending the Stormont parliament, 
and that William Whitelaw was to be the new Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland. Two and a half years after the entrance of British 
troops, direct rule had arrived. Of the task ahead, Fitt said, "Our 
sole motivation in this endeavour will be what is good for the people 
of Northern Ireland."93 Fitt recalls the fall of Stormont: 
Some people said that we should have stayed in Stormont and 
reformed it. Others said, and I think I was one, that you could 
not reform Stormont because the unionists were so deeply 
entrenched in there. Looking back, in retrospect, it may have 
been better not to call for the abolition of Stormont but reform 
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it from within. 94 
Fitt's view has certainly changed. On the day the resignation 
was announced he told the Belfast Telegraph: "I have always regarded 
Stormont since its inception in 1930 throughout the long years of its 
history as being an absolute disaster for the communities in Northern 
Ireland and for the people of Ireland as a whole."95 
Fitt's basic position after direct rule was still nationalist, 
although for the first time there is an indication that there is some 
dilution of the sentiment. He admitted that a united Ireland might 
take a long time to emerge. He spoke at Westminster on March 28: 
We should be realistic and recognise that we are always going to 
have the Irish problem with us until the day when Ireland is 
reunited. No one can say when that will be, whether it will be 5, 
10, 15, 20 or 30 years hence. Some day it will happen. Some day 
it must come. No one can say when or how it will be brought about 
Therefore, if we are to take steps now effectively to 
preclude the achievement of that ideal at any time in the future, 
we are only stirring up trouble for ourselves in the years to 
come. 96 
As Farrell points out, the advent of direct rule also had a 
profound impact on minority politics: "the suspension of Stormont 
had fragmented the almost total solidarity of the Catholic population 
produced by internment and reinforced by Bloody Sunday. 1197 Fi tt 
and the S.D.L.P. led the body committed to compromise - a point noted 
by the editorial of the Belfast Telegraph: 
It may stick in many a Protestant throat to admit it, but the most 
effective instrument for peace in the Catholic community now is 
the S.D.L.P., and M.P's like Mr Hume and Mr Fitt are fully 
accepting their responsibilities. They are confident they have 
popular support for their plea to give peace a chance and the 
people must show it in every way they can. 98 
Fitt did indeed call for the cessation of violence, but without 
success. Sporadic outbursts of shootings and bombings occurred 
throughout the province, and on April 15, British paratroopers shot 
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dead Joe Mccann. The somewhat ambivalent position of the S.D.L.P. 
was indicated by the fact that both Paddy Devlin and Paddy O'Hanlon 
attended his funeral. 99 However, by the end of May, Fitt and 
the S.D.L.P. had recognised that they were in direct competition with 
the I.R.A. Fitt said: 11 In this situation, the position is now 
clear. We are opposed to the men of violence and we will fight them 
at each and every opportunity that is given to us. 11100 
On May 28, an I.R.A. bomb exploded prematurely in the Short 
Strand area of Belfast, killing 8 people. On the following day, the 
Official I.R.A. ordered an indefinite ceasefire after unfavourable 
reaction to its killing of Ranger William Best (a Catholic) while 
visiting his family in Londonderry. Fitt was pleased by the 
Officials' cessation of hostilities and hoped the Provisionals would 
follow suit. 101 
The Provisionals did indeed come under some considerable 
pressure to follow the example of the Officials. Consequently, they 
offered to meet Whitelaw - an offer which their Commander in Chief, 
Sean MacStiofan, said, was a "further expression of the republican 
movement's desire to secure a lasting peace. 111 ~ Whitelaw 
quickly dismissed this overture, saying that he "could not respond to 
ultimatums from terrorists who are causing suffering to innocent 
civilians in Northern Ireland and shooting British troops. 111 ro 
The S.D.L.P. had considered the Provisional's offer to be a "sincere 
attempt to produce an atmosphere for a peaceful settlement of the 
North's problems and representative of their willingness to engage in 
peaceful and political activities. 11104 Meanwhile, Fitt had 
been the main sponsor of a motion at Westminster urging Whitelaw to 
review the case of prisoners claiming political status. Thirty 
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Labour M.P's, along with Bernadette Devlin and Frank McManus, had 
signed the motion. 
At this juncture the republican movement had no effective 
political leadership. Provis i ona 1 Sinn Fein was very much 
subordinate to the I .R.A. so John Hume and Paddy Devlin effectively 
fil 1 ed the vacuum. Hume and Devlin orchestrated a week's secret 
diplomacy between Whitelaw and the leaders of the I. R.A. 10s 
The negotiations ended with Whitelaw conceding "special category 
status" to paramilitary prisoners. This meant that they would be 
housed separately from habitual prisoners, and ensured that they 
could wear their own clothes, have more frequent visits and an end to 
penal work. In short, the I.R.A. were granted a measure of political 
authenticity which implied that the organization were not merely 
gangsters and thugs. Fitt's machinations at Westminster show that he 
was in favour of the move. The talks ended a republican hunger 
strike which was reaching a critical stage, and prompted the 
Provisionals to announce a ceasefire for June 27, calling for a 
reciprocal response from the British. 
This truce proved to be very fragile and ended on July 9, after 
a clash in the Lenadoon area of Belfast. Fitt, speaking from London, 
said that he had been saddened "almost to the brink of 
despair. 11106 His gloom would have been accentuated by 
developments in the Protestant community. 
In September, 1971 the Ulster Defence Association (U.D.A.) 
started operations. It began as a co-ordinating body for Loyalist 
vigilante groups and it quickly became the largest Protestant 
paramilitary organization. Fitt argued that it was not only 
republican forces which were determined to defeat Whitelaw's efforts, 
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that fear and frustration existed in the minority community because 
of intimidation by the U.D.A. He also acknowledged that Catholics as 
a result may be weaned back into at least giving passive support to 
the I.R.A. because they felt the need of some form of protection. 
Fitt continued to attack internment "while internees are still 
interned, it still will create a running sore throughout the minority 
community in Northern Ireland." 107 Nevertheless, internment 
remained and the Provisional's campaign continued. On July 21, 9 
people were killed when 22 bombs were set off in Belfast's "Bloody 
Friday." 
Catholics continued to feel the Protestant backlash as the 
U.D.A. continued its campaign of sectarian assassination. The day 
after "Bloody Friday" saw the discovery of a Catholic couple's bodies 
in North Belfast, tortured and shot by the U.D.A. On July 27, the 
hooded body of Francis McStravik, a Catholic, was found in Belfast's 
Sandy Row. He had been shot through the head. Fitt launched a 
strong protest to Whitelaw against what he called the apparent 
inability and unwillingness of the security forces to track down the 
perpetrators of the series of foul murders in Belfast. 108 
Whitelaw responded on July 31, in "Operation Motorman" when the 
army moved into both Catholic and Protestant "No-Go" areas at 
4.30am. He was determined to move against the Provisionals, who for 
their part, did not resist, being unwilling to engage the army in 
open combat. The Protestant community assisted the army in taking 
down their barricades, claiming that they were a response to 
republican "No-Go" areas. West Belfast saw the beginning of a period 
of military occupation. 
On August 7, after dialogue with the Republic's government, Fitt 
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and the S.D.L.P. held their first meeting with Whitelaw. They 
demanded an end to internment, arms searches in Protestant areas and 
an easing of army pressure on the inhabitants of minority districts. 
Whitelaw responded by releasing 47 internees and promising to let 
Heath know the views of the party . 109 
The fact that the S.D.L.P. met Whitelaw while internment still 
operated drew criticism from militants. The P.O. weekly paper Free 
Citizen Unfree Citizen claimed, "They are out to channel the 
discontent of the Northern minority away from the dangerous 
revol uti onari es and back into the Parliamentary system. 11110 On 
August 22, nine people were killed in a Newry Customs Office bombing. 
The S.D.L.P. continued undaunted. In September, they published 
a policy document which called for joint Irish sovereignty over 
Northern Ireland, and for a British declaration in favour of eventual 
unity. Whitelaw for his part, set out proposals for the creation of 
special tribunals to deal with internees. Fitt felt that they did 
not go far enough and refused to end the boycott on talks, or attend 
a Conference in Darlington to discuss political initiatives. He was 
adamant: 
I am not prepared to sit at a Conference table when my 
constituents are held in internment without trial, when they are 
being held as political hostages. While people are interned 
without trial the S.D.L.P. feel unable to engage in any meaningful 
discussion with the government. 111 
The attitude of the S.D.L.P. was suddenly altered following 
government publication on October 30 of a Green Paper on the future 
of Northern Ireland. Although this document re-affirmed that there 
could be no change in constitutional terms without majority consent 
from within Northern Ireland, it did recognise an Irish dimension: 
A settlement must also recognise Northern Ireland's position 
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within Ireland as a whole It is therefore clearly desirable 
that any new arrangements for Northern Ireland should, whilst 
meeting the wishes of Northern I rel and and Great Britain, b_e so 
far as Rossible, acceptable to and accepted by the Republic of 
Ireland. 1 2 
The prospect of Irish unification proved sufficient bait to lure 
the S.D.L.P. back to participation in Northern politics. At their 
annual party conference, a substantial policy change was adopted, and 
the decision taken to enter into discussions with Whitelaw. Thus the 
party brought to an end its policy of not negotiating while 
internment lasted. In his address Fitt said: "Now is the time for 
the S.D.L.P. to make its voice heard in any talks that are taking 
place. If the British government think they can issue a White Paper 
based on the charade that took place in Darlington then they can have 
another think. "113 
"political hostages." 
Apparently the internees were no longer 
In an attempt to dilute the implications of the Green Paper, the 
British government held a referendum on the border on March 8, 1973. 
All anti-unionist groups, including the S.D.L.P., called for a 
boycott. Fitt was blunt "Take no part in it." He claimed: 
This is the only election in which the result was pre-determined 
over 50 years ago at the setting up of this state, when borders 
were deliberately drawn to give a permanent majority to a 
Protestant ascendancy in the North .... In these circumstances we 
will not allow ourselves to be used by the forces of reaction, and 
we urge all those who have opposed and have been oppressed by 
unionism not to participate in this election. 114 
The boycott had been effective and Fitt was correct in his 
analysis, "It had merely shown that there were more Protestants than 
Catholics and more unionists than nationalists in Northern 
Ireland." 115 The survey had proven nothing that was not already 
known. 
After reassuring the unionist population with this referendum, 
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the British government published a White Paper on March 20, outlining 
its new proposals for the governing of Northern Ireland. A new 
Executive was to be responsible to a new single Chamber Assembly. 
This Assembly was to be elected by Proportional Representation and 
the innovation of this new political initiative was compulsory 
coalition. The Irish dimension was also recognised. Periodic 
referendums were introduced to test opinion on Northern Ireland's 
constitutional status in relation to the U.K. and the Republic. 
There were also institutional arrangements for consultation and 
co-operation between Belfast and Dublin. The scheme was embodied in 
the Northern Ireland Constitution Act of August 1973. 
Fitt and the S.D.L.P. were cautious in their response to the new 
proposals. Fitt told a press conference that they recognised that 
the Paper's proposals could represent an advance of position in some 
areas, while in others, "we must express both our reservation and our 
disappointments." The S.D.L.P. felt that the Irish dimension was not 
sufficiently meaningful. Fitt endorsed this: 
We asked for a strong all Ireland institution with clearly defined 
powers. We did not get it. Instead what we got is something that 
we asked for one year ago - a formula for quadrapartite talks 
involving representatives from both sides in the North and South 
and Britain. 
At such talks we will continue to press our views as to the nature 
of any all-Ireland institution, and we believe that these views 
will become increasingly more meaningful to those who have opposed 
us. 
The S.D.L.P. did decide however, to contest elections to the new 
Assembly . 116 
329 to 5. 
reservations. 117 
The White Paper was approved at Westminster by 
Fitt abstained, a reflection of his party's 
He and the S.D.L.P. evidently were not 
satisfied over the failure to clarify British attitudes to a Council 
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of Ireland, yet they were sufficiently happy with some of the 
proposals, hence their agreement to contest elections. The 
Provisionals, on the other hand, rejected the White Paper's 
proposals. There was no let up in the military campaign and on April 
11, a British soldier was shot in the Bogside area of Londonderry, 
which brought the total number of deaths since August 1969 to 769. 
The unionists also were unimpressed with the proposals. William 
Craig formed the Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party, (V.U.P.P.) and 
resolved to fight the Assembly elections in alliance with the 
Democratic 
document. 118 
Unionist Party (D.U.P.) in opposition to the 
The Alliance Party a non sectarian unionist party 
formed in 1970, was the only group to fully endorse Westminster's 
plans. 
Although Fitt was clearly an implacable opponent of the 
Provisionals, it should be noted that he thought its political wing, 
Provisional Sinn Fein, ought to be allowed to contest the election. 
He argued that every political party should be permitted to contest 
elections in order to ascertain the feelings of the 
electorate. 119 
A dress rehersal for the Assembly elections was provided on May 
30, by the first local government elections for six years. Fitt was 
characteristically positive. "I am superbly confident. I was never 
more confident entering into an electoral battle in all my years of 
experience. "120 He announced that he too would be seeking 
election as a Local Councillor for the newly designated area 'G'. 
Area 'G' included Dock, plus strongly republican areas and equally 
strong loyalist areas. The P.D. and Provisionals decided to boycott 
the elections. Fitt and the S.D.L.P. remained unrepentant. On the 
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day of the poll Fitt argued: 
This is the first opportunity that the people of Northern Ireland 
have had of using one man one vote to undo the damage of the 
unionists in six county local government, and they are being asked 
to abstain and boycott the use of a reform which was won after so 
much suffering by the ordinary people. I believe it is completely 
irresponsible and if acted upon will only ensure that the Unionist 
Party will once again be in a position to establish their 
sectarian policies. We, the people of this area would be brought 
back again to the position we were in before 1969. 121 
The poll turned out to be high except in hardcore republican 
enclaves. The S.D.L.P. wiped out all other anti-unionist groups, and 
Fitt was elected on the first count. The N.I.L.P., the Alliance 
Party and the Republican Labour Party all polled badly. Fitt's 
success however, was soon tarnished. 
On June 26, S.D.L.P. Senator Paddy Wilson and Irene Andrews were 
stabbed to death in Belfast by the Ulster Freedom Fighters (U.F.F.)., 
a name used by the U.D.A. as a flag of convenience. These deaths 
brought the mortality total to 835 since the "Troubles" began. 
Fitt and Wilson were close friends, Wilson having been Fitt's 
only colleague in the Republican Labour Party to join him in the 
S.D.L.P. Fitt showed admirable restraint and appealed for peace: 
"It is imperative that we should all try to be calm. I know that 
young, misguided people might be tempted into taking some form of 
retaliatory action. In God's name, don't. There has been enough, 
and more than enough of killing." 122 
Two days later the elections for the new Northern Ireland 
Assembly took place, with Fitt contesting North Belfast. The 
Provisionals and P.D again urged a boycott. Fitton the other hand, 
called on electors of all religious persuasions to vote wisely in the 
interests of peace. 123 
His appeal was answered with another high poll and he topped the 
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North Belfast ballot being elected in in the first count with 8,264 
first preference votes. His nearest challenge was Johnny McQuade of 
the Democratic Unionist Loyalist Coaliation. He polled 5,148 first 
preference votes and was elected on the eleventh count. 
The S.D.L.P. gained 19 seats. Paddy Devlin, Hume, Cooper, 
Currie and O'Hanlon were also elected on the first count. The party 
gained 22% of the total poll, and had established itself as the 
official representatives of the Northern minority. In short, the 
moderates had secured a victory over the militants. 
On the unionist side, the reverse occurred. The moderates, led 
by Brian Faulkner, had accepted the White Paper with hesitancy. They 
received 29% of the poll, whereas the anti-White Paper unionists, the 
Vanguard Unionist Loyalist Coalition led by William Craig, and the 
Democratic Unionists led by Paisley, secured 31%. The middle ground 
gained only 12%, the Alliance Party doing worse than 
expected. 124 
Fitt had considered the Assembly as nothing more than a 
conference table, although he did believe that it represented an 
opportunity for spokesmen from both the Protestant and Catholic 
working classes to establish links: 
It is the working class of both religions who have suffered so 
disastrously in the past four years of turmoil and tragedy and it 
will be the immediate task of the Social Democratic and Labour 
Party to have discussions with the Protestant representatives who 
can speak with an authentic voice on behalf of the 
community. 125 
His thoughts proved naive. The first meeting of the Assembly 
broke up in pandemonium, with the speaker forced to suspend the 
sitting due to Loyalist disruption. 
Despite the Assembly setback, Whitelaw proceeded to have 
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separate talks with the parties who had voiced nominal approval of 
the White Paper - namely the Faulkner Unionists, the S.D.L.P. and the 
Alliance Party. At the end of the month, the S.D.L.P. issued an 
invitation to the other two to engage in power sharing talks. On 
October 5, it was agreed in principle to form an Executive. Whitelaw 
claimed: "Steady progress has been made. There has been certainly a 
determination on all sides to seek to resolve contentious matters in 
a spirit of good will. "126 The S.D.L.P. had made an important 
concession - there could be no change in the status of Northern 
Ireland until the next border poll in ten years time. 
On November 22, Whitelaw announced the formation of an Executive 
Designate with eleven members - six unionists, four S.D.L.P and one 
Alliance. Brian Faulkner was to be Chief Executive, with Fitt his 
deputy. It was also announced that there would be a tripartite 
conference involving London, Belfast and Dublin to negotiate details 
of a Council of Ireland. Fitt declared: "We are highly 
satisfied. "127 Fitt and the S.D.L.P. may well have been 
pleased with the outcome, but radical nationalists and republicans 
were not. The Provisionals considered Fitt and the S.D.L.P. as 
arch-collaborators and made it clear that they intended to pursue and 
intensify the armed struggle. A statement from Provisional Sinn Fein 
contained a threat to both Fitt and Hume - "We hope they understand 
the consequences of their treachery. "128 
At Westminster, Fitt and Bernadette Devlin were involved in a 
bitter exchange, with Fitt maintaining that Devlin was "a total and 
absolute irrelevancy in Northern Ireland." 129 
in a statement to the Irish News: 
Devlin countered 
Too many people have died in the past four years to allow the 
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fight to be left in the hands of their orphans. Ireland's history 
is full of Gerry Fitt's who, however well-intentioned, called a 
halt at the eleventh hour and were hailed as heroes by a p_eop le 
who realised their mistake too late. It cannot be allowed to 
happen again. There are those of us who are not prepared to see 
it again and that in the eyes of the S.D.L.P. is a crime. 130 
Although opposition and pessimism were not universal, opposition 
to power-sharing from militants in both communities did not auger 
well for the future. An editorial in the Belfast Telegraph expressed 
some hope: 
Thanks to Gerry Fitt the tough-talking in-fighter has graduated to 
the big league. He and his party have not made the mistake of 
getting themselves cornered. They have left their options open 
and their sights on community peace. They have opted for politics 
rather than confrontation which is a new direction for Irish 
national i sm. 131 
The Telegraph was correct, the S.D.L.P. was committed to 
compromise. This policy of working within the Northern Ireland 
context left Fitt and the party hierarchy open to criticism of 
collaboration, with the issue of negotiations while internment still 
operated provoking the most disparagement. The S.D.L.P. had insisted 
that its co-operation with any Westminster initiative would not be 
forthcoming until internment was ended but was persuaded from that 
position by the prospect of power-sharing. The party argued that 
with the establishment of normal politics, the necessity for 
internment would disappear. This clearly did not satisfy some 
elements in the Catholic community who considered it an insult to see 
Gerry Fitt prepared to work alongside Brian Faulkner, the architect 
of internment. 
The Catholic population in Fitt's West Belfast constituency had 
suffered a great deal under the Conservative government's "get tough" 
policy. House raids, internment and the Diplock courts had succeeded 
in alienating the population from the British. 132 Fitt voiced 
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opposition, but with constituents raised on an education of England's 
treachery to Ireland - plantations, oppression, gaols, Black a_nd 
Tans, gallows, deportation the damage had already been 
done -133 
Although the Provisional I.R.A. with some justification, claimed 
that it was they who had finally forced the demise of Stormont and 
not the S.D.L.P. "middle class collaboration", events such as "Bloody 
Friday" and a general war-weariness lost the movement a lot of 
support except in the republican urban ghettos. The fact that the 
P.I.R.A. and P.O. boycott of the Assembly elections failed showed 
that the minority community had given Fitt a mandate to lead the 
S.D.L.P. in talks aimed at power-sharing within Northern Ireland. 
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Chapter V 
CHAPTER V 
POLITICAL INITIATIVES 
argues that Gerry Fitt's nationalist position 
underwent a discernable transition during the mid 1970s. This 
transition was influenced by the political processes initiated by the 
British government. Fitt felt it was desirable to subordinate 
southern political involvement in the administrtion of the North to 
an attempt at internal accommodation with Ulster unionists. In 
practice however, Fitt succumbed to party pressure insisting on a 
strong Irish dimension. The implication, therefore, is that Fitt 
himself was not a very forceful or even an important character in the 
political dialogue, he simply went along with policies decided on by 
other people and he just acted as a kind of party spokesman and 
figurehead. 
Whilst expressing hope for the future at the third annual 
S.D.L.P. conference in December 1973, Fitt still evidently considered 
himself a nationalist politician: 
I never believed that I would see a day as this when there is such 
hope, when unionists and republicans, Protestants and Catholics, 
representatives of Orange and Green are prepared to sit down and 
discuss their differences to find areas in which it may be even 
more difficult to find agreement. 1 
He stated that no one section of the community could claim 
victory over the other, "We are not claiming total victory. No, we 
have been kicked for far too long, for too many years, to want to 
inflict the same treatment on our fellow countrymen." Fitt again 
proclaimed that the S.D.L.P. was a socialist party with an equal 
claim to Protestant and Catholic support. He explained the party 
rationale in pursuing a policy of power sharing and asked: 
187 
188 
What should we have done? Should we have waited and not talked 
until we had achieved total victory? And should Brian Faulkner 
not have talked until he had achieved total victory? If this had 
been done, the result would have been that the gunmen would have 
won and there would have been more death and destruction. There 
would have been no prospect of peace and reconciliation in this 
community. 
The motion confirming the S.D.L.P's deal with the Faulkner 
unionists and the Alliance Party was carried by 235 votes to 22. On 
the rent strike, the party leadership got endorsement by 182 votes to 
22 for a motion giving local leaders the freedom to call off the 
strike. 2 
The conference was the most successful in the party's brief 
existence. It also showed, according to Fortnight: 
Why Gerry Fitt has remained firmly in control of the top job. His 
speech - and the much reported promise of an inexhaustible supply 
of new men to take over if the men of violence should strike him 
down - lifted the Conference on to a new level with a vision of a job to be done and no other way of doing it. This was the stuff 
of leadership. 3 
Events were to prove that this estimation of Fitt's leadership 
was a very superficial one. 
At the Sunningdale conference, which began on December 6, the 
S.D.L.P., the Alliance Party, the Faulkner unionists and both the 
Dublin and London governments met to finalise an agreement on the 
Council of Ireland, without which the S.D.L.P. would not participate 
in the Executive. Ominously, on that same day in the Ulster Hall in 
Belfast, 600 delegates from Unionist Party constituency associations, 
Vanguard, the D.U.P. and the Orange Order, voted to form a new United 
Ulster Unionist Council (U.U.U.C.) to provide a common leadership. 
On December 2, Whitelaw was transferred from his post as 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to the Department of 
Employment, where Heath thought his talents would be better used 
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in dealing with the miners' strike in Britain. Fitt was disappointed 
with Whitelaw's move from the Northern Ireland scene only four days 
before such crucial talks: "One would have thought that he should 
have been allowed to remain throughout the course of the tripartite 
talks in an effort to bring that to a successful conclusion." 4 
Francis Pym was Whitelaw's successor. 
In retrospect, Fitt minimalises the importance of the 
conference: "I, myself don't think Sunningdale itself was necessary 
because Whitelaw got us together in Stormont with Brian Faulkner. We 
in fact, agreed on the Executive at Stormont. That was all agreed 
without ever going to Sunningdale." 5 
Fitt clearly plays down the importance of the Council of Ireland 
concept. In contrast, Paddy Devlin in his book, The Fall of the 
Northern Ireland Executive, clearly indicates the S.D.L.P. approach 
at Sunningdale: 
The general 
all-Ireland 
safeguards, 
to an agreed 
approach of the S.D.L.P. to the talks was to get 
institutions established which, with adequate 
would produce the dynamic that could lead ultimately 
single state for Ireland. 6 
Devlin, Hume and Currie all maintain that Fitt did not play an 
important role at Sunningdale since it appears that negotiation was 
not one of his political strengths. He, himself admits to being 
largely a spectator; "I did not take part in any of the discussions 
because as far as I was concerned the discussion had been concluded 
at Stormont. "7 Although Fitt had little prowess at 
negotiating, it seems extraordinary that a party leader would not 
take part in discussions concerning such a crucial issue as the 
Council of Ireland. This was an abrogation of responsibility. His 
assertion that there was no necessity for Sunningdale is absurd when 
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one considers the importance of the institutionalized Irish dimension 
to his party and party supporters. 
The Sunningdale conference lasted three days and a Council of 
Ireland was finally agreed upon. It was to have Executive Powers, in 
return for which the Republic would recognise the constitutional 
position of Northern Ireland. The Republic's government also agreed 
to take action against "fugitive offenders." The Council was to have 
two tiers. The Executive tier would comprise 14 Ministers, seven 
each from the Assembly and the Republic's government. This body 
would deal with tourism, agriculture, transport and electricity on an 
all-Ireland basis. The second tier, the Consultative Assembly, would 
comprise 30 members each from Dail Eireann and the Northern Ireland 
Assembly, its role being advisory. For its part, the British 
government agreed that if a majority of Northern Ireland citizens 
ever indicated a wish to become part of a united Ireland, that wish 
would be upheld. On security matters, a joint Law Commission was to 
be created to look at the issue of extradition and the possibility of 
an all-Ireland Court was to be investigated. The future of the 
police (the S.D.L.P. wanted a link between the Gardai and R.U.C. 
under the auspices of the Council) and internment were not resolved 
(This undermined S.D.L.P. participation in the Executive). The whole 
arrangement was to be ratified in the new year. 
The leaders of the parties involved projected a united and 
optimistic front. Faulkner said, "The agreement heralds a new dawn 
not just for Northern Ireland but for the whole of Ireland."8 
Oliver Napier of the Alliance Party declared, "This is a very proud 
day", and Fitt maintained, "All our objectives have been 
achieved." 9 On the same day as these utterances were reported, 
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December 1, a new Ulster Army Council, composed of Loyalist 
paramilitary organisations, declared their intention to oppos.e any 
process towards a Council of Ireland. 
The Sunningdale Agreement itself was dexterous - unionist and 
nationalist sentiment alike could claim victory. 10 Farrell 
concluded 
ambiguity." 11 
that it was "a masterpiece of balance and 
Fitt was confident that a new era had dawned and that the power 
sharing concept had sufficient support to be successful. He declared 
"I can see very clearly a hope that has never been seen before in 
Northern lreland." 12 
and the S.D.L.P. 
It was the political high point for Fitt 
On January 1, 1974, the Northern Ireland Executive officially 
took up duty. Fitt was Deputy Chief Minister, Hume was Minister for 
Commerce, Currie, Minister for Housing and Paddy Devlin Minister for 
Health and Social Security. Each promised, "I will uphold the laws 
of Northern Ireland and conscientiously fulfil my duties under the 
Constitution Act in the interest of Northern Ireland and its 
people." 13 Fitt had no qualms about taking the oath: 
I am happy with the oath which I have sworn before the Lord Chief 
Justice. It is one I can take in all conscience and all honesty 
because I have taken the oath to serve all the people of Northern 
Ireland. I know that I can speak for all my colleagues that they 
are activated by the same emotion. I believe we are entering into 
a new era, and it will not be easy. There will be many people who 
will spare no efforts to bring the administration to an end. But 
being born in Northern Ireland and living all my life in the city 
of Belfast, I am confident that the Executive speaks for the 
overwhelming majority of the people. They want this 
administration to succeed. 14 
Despite Fitt's optimism, within four days there were ominous 
signs for the future of the Executive. 
On January 4, the Ulster Unionist Council rejected the Council 
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of Ireland. Before Sunningdale, Faulkner had survived with a ten 
vote victory for power sharing, a clear indication of vulnerability. 
on this occasion, he was defeated by eighty votes. While expressing 
no surprise at the result, Fitt remained positive, claiming that if 
the Executive were to function for six months and be seen to be 
governing in the interest of all, there would be massive support for 
it even in the Unionist Council. 15 
On January 7, Faulkner resigned as Unionist Party leader. He 
considered it the only honourable course in the face of what was 
essentially a vote of no confidence. 16 Fitt commented, "I 
believe Mr. Faulkner realised that he would find it extremely 
difficult to drive the more backwood sections of the Unionist Party 
into the twentieth century." 17 Faulkner's memoirs indicate 
that he was as confident as Fitt in the Executive's potential to 
convince both communities of the benefit of power sharing. His 
resignation, however, divorced him from the Unionist Party machine 
and which had important repercussions in the following month. 
The Executive soon suffered a further set-back when a former 
Irish Minister, Kevin Boland, challenged the legality of the 
Republic's declaration of recognition of Northern Ireland's status 
written into the Sunningdale Agreement, thus putting that government 
in an awkward position. However, the Irish government argued 
successfully that it had not agreed that any part of Ireland belonged 
to the United Kingdom. It had been a 'de facto' rather than an 'de 
jure' arrangement. The legal proceedings were highly publicised and 
the judgement was a major blow to the Faulkner unionists, whose 
design in selling the Council of Ireland concept to the majority 
community depended on the Republic's recognition of the status of 
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Northern Ireland. 
In early February, Fitt made the S.D.L.P. position clear.. He 
was asked in the Assembly whether if the Southern government did not 
carry out its obligations and there was no Council of Ireland, would 
he and the S.D.L.P. still participate in the Executive. He replied: 
No, as I see it that would be a betrayal of the whole Sunningdale 
Agreement. The Agreement was reached on the basis that there 
would be a Power-Sharing Executive, that there would be a Council 
of Ireland and that the Southern government would take up a 
certain stand in relation to them. 18 
Fitt was emphatic and unequivocal in his answer. At this point 
we must assume that he was, like his colleagues, in favour of a 
Council of Ireland. 
Despite such problems, the Executive strove to counter the 
initial resistance. Faulkner noted: 
Early in February a reception for industrialists was held in the 
Ulster Office in London. It struck me very forcibly how much more 
effective our sales story was made for the 250 or so powerful men 
who came along by the simple fact that Gerry Fitt and I were 
standing side by side at the door to welcome them, and showing the 
same concern for jobs and living standards in the province we now 
governed. 19 
Adverse developments for the Executive partners continued 
however. In Britain, the miners' strike crippled the economy. Heath 
remained steadfast against it and decided to seek the electorate's 
approval for his position. Pym, Whitelaw, Faulkner and Fitt all 
cautioned him on the detrimental effect of a general election upon 
the Executive. Paddy Devlin explains: 
We knew that we would not be able to compound our position as a 
Power-Sharing entity unless we had an extended run: Two months in 
office could demonstrate potential but not practical results in 
our favour. Potential results would never be realised in the 
white heat engendered by a tribal election. 20 
The election was called for February 28. The U.U.U.C. were to 
fight the election as a single party, which was in sharp contrast to 
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the Executive parties, who made no electoral pact. 
Fitt had to again defend his West Belfast seat. · He was 
challenged by McQuade of the U.U.U.C., Brady of the Republican Clubs, 
Boyd of the N.I.L.P. and Price standing as an Independent. 
Albert Price was the father of Dolores and Marian Price, two 
sisters who were members of the Provisionals and had been convicted 
of bombings in Britain. At the time, the two were on hunger strike 
in Brixton Prison in an attempt to be sent back to Ireland to serve 
their sentences. Paddy Kennedy, who was to have gone forward for the 
Republican Labour Party, announced that he had withdrawn: 11 I am now 
standing down and I now call on all anti-unionist candidates to do 
the same. The issue in West Belfast must be the plight of the Irish 
political prisoners. 1121 The S.D.L.P. ignored such sentiment 
and confirmed that they intended to contest all 12 Westminster 
seats. Fitt declared, "Now we have created a system to end this 
conflict and through which people will learn to live together rather 
than die together. 1122 
Fitt recalls this election battle as being particularly 
"vicious." 23 Republicans printed election handbills which 
showed a picture of Fitt superimposed on a Union Jack, with the words 
"Vote Fitt for the West and support your Republican-Unionist 
candidate." 24 This being evidence of how some people felt Fitt 
had betrayed his original political ideals. 
Since the 1970 Westminster election which Fitt had won with a 
majority of 3,198, the West Belfast electorate had increased by 6,000 
to 70,000 due to an extention of the boundary into South Antrim, 
taking in Catholic Andersonstown. McQuade's only chance lay in a 
decisive split in the nationalist vote. Fitt's weakness was the 
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internment issue, and both Brady and the P.I.R.A. - backed Price 
hoped to capitalise on this. The Irish News reported that political 
observers in the constituency were giving Fitt a 50/50 chance of 
retaining the seat. 25 On the eve of the poll he declared that 
he would be the "true voice of moderation" in the next Westminster 
Parliament. 26 Fitt was no longer inclined to be perceived as a 
radical. 
Fitt retained his seat, but with a reduced majority. He polled 
19,554 votes. McQuade polled 17,374, Price 5,612, Brady 3,088 and 
Boyd 1,989. Price's vote showed that there was a nucleus of support 
for the Provisionals. 
Although Fitt was victorious in the election, as was the British 
Labour Party, the rest of the results were disastrous for the 
Executive parties. The U.U.U.C. took eleven of the twelve seats, 
with Fitt being the only anti-unionist candidate to survive. The 
U.U.U.C., with the control of the unionist election machine that 
Faulkner had relinquished on his resignation, had secured 51% of the 
vote. Thus having procured more than half the total votes cast, they 
correctly claimed that the result was a vote of "no confidence" in 
the new administration. The Faulkner unionists obtained only 13% of 
the vote, and no seats. The S.D.L.P. actually increased its vote 
from June 1973 by 24,000, but as a result of the U.U.U.C. decision to 
put up a single candidate against the divided Executive parties, 
three U.U.U.C. candidates were elected despite a pro-Executive 
majority in their constituencies. This resulted in Bernadette Devlin 
and Frank McManus being defeated in mid-Ulster and Fermanagh South 
Tyrone respectively. 
The February 1974 election had put the Sunningdale package and 
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the concept of power-sharing to the test of public opinion before the 
Executive had time to prove itself. As a consequence, traditional 
communal polarization was reflected in the results. "Dublin is just 
a Sunningdale away" proved to be an influential slogan. 
The Executive continued in the hope that its performance would 
improve its chances of survival. Merlyn Rees was the new Secretary 
of State, but his position was weakened by the fact that the Labour 
Party had formed a government on a minority vote. Fitt was reported 
to be happy about Pym's successor. 27 Rees stated categorically 
that Sunningdale was to be implemented as agreed. 28 
In the wake of the election results a "Senior Member" of the 
S.D.L.P. felt it necessary to state the party position: 
The S.D.L.P. would be most unhappy if it was attempted to put new 
conditions into the Sunningdale package before final notification 
because of an unfortunate set of electoral statistics which were 
totally freak .... there is no question of allowing hysteria to 
blow us off course. To allow this could lead to the loss of a 
landbase. It would be fatal for an~ political party to allow 
themselves to be placed in that position. 9 
It is probable that the resolve expressed by this S.D.L.P. 
spokesman was not evident in Fitt, although his persistent faith in 
Westminster remained: "Many people in Northern Ireland may believe 
that the 11 voices of the U.U.U.C. coalition will cause great 
consternation at Westminster but I can assure them that all the major 
British political parties are well aware of what the true position 
i S • H3Q But did they? Fitt's belief in British government's 
and Northern Ireland Secretary's of State (especially Labour) is 
difficult to excuse. During his career he exhibited increasing 
willingness to be dictated to and even fobbed off, long after such a 
stance could be justified. The reasons for this could be weariness 
or lack of imagination on Fitt's part. It is also likely that Fitt 
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underwent a process of "embourgeoisement" within the comfortable 
confines of Westminster with all its attendant mutual back-slapping. 
The unionists in the Executive felt it necessary to respond to 
the Protestant fears as reflected in the election results. They 
wanted to re-appraise the Council of Ireland, in view of the fact 
that the Republic's government had not delivered on its pledge 
regarding constitutional recognition and extradition. 
The reaction within the S.D.L.P. was varied. In retrospect, 
Fitt claims that he tried to play down the importance of the Council 
in order to prevent the collapse of the Executive. 31 
Faulkner's memoirs confirm this: "It always seemed to me that Gerry 
Fitt did not really care if there was a Council of Ireland or not, 
but had to go along with it because his party was insisting." 32 
Faulkner's notion confirms two points regarding Fitt. First, 
Fitt recognized that the Irish dimension represented an insuperable 
obstacle to power sharing in the north. Second, Faulkner shows that 
Fitt was merely a figurehead rather than a leader orchestrating party 
policy. Fitt was a commentator on the political scene rather than a 
key actor in it. 
There were rifts in the S.D.L.P. in April, when Austin Currie, 
one of the instigators of the rent and rates strike against 
internment in 1971, but now in charge of housing, said that all 
arrears must be paid in full, and non-payers would be levied 25p a 
week and could have payments deducted from their social security 
benefits. 33 Paddy Devlin was the most ardent in his opposition 
to this measure. After fruitless discussions with Rees on 
internment, he handed in his resignation from the Executive. He was 
persuaded to remain, however, until the outcome of the Ulster Workers 
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council (U.W.C.) strike, then three days old, was known. 34 
After the February election, opponents of the Executive b~came 
increasingly vocal. In March, the U.W.C. was formed. This 
organization had close connections with Loyalist paramilitary groups, 
particularly the U.D.A., and Loyalist politicians, most notably 
Vanguard leader, William Craig. Both were co-opted on to the 
Executive committee. The U.W.C. demanded the dissolution of the 
Assembly and new elections. In early May it announced that it would 
lead a full-scale constitutional stoppage throughout Northern Ireland 
in protest of the Executive, if a motion requesting the 
re-negotiation of the constitutional arrangements was not accepted. 
On May 14, the Northern Ireland Assembly endorsed the Sunningdale 
Agreement. The U.W.C. then announced that the strike was to proceed. 
Few workers joined the strike on its first day. However, when 
the U.W.C. barricades went up, the numbers of striking workers 
greatly increased. On May 17, tension was heightened by three car 
bombs which killed 33 civilians in Dublin and Monaghan. The S.D.L.P. 
considered that support for the strike stemmed from Loyalist 
paramilitary intimidation and urged Rees to order the dismantling of 
the barricades. By May 19, the electricity supplies for the province 
began to dwindle. Rees responded by declaring a State of Emergency 
to protect all essential services. 
The Executive was responsible for the government of Northern 
Ireland, but it had no power to enforce its authority on the 
streets. Thus, its members were keen on the use of the army to break 
the strike. Faulkner's position would have been more difficult than 
the S.D.L.P's on this issue, but his memoirs show that he was in 
favour of military action. 35 The U.W.C. began to gain the 
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upper hand in Northern Ireland and on May 21, Len Murray, the General 
secretary of the British Trades Union Congress, led a group of 200 
people on a "back to work" march. It was an unmitigated failure. 
Pressure within the Executive became severe. The unionists 
pressed the S.D.L.P. for a watering-down of the Council of Ireland, 
and on May 22 S.D.L.P. members met to discuss the situation. The 
leadership accepted that the party would have to agree to Faulkner's 
proposals for the Council to be introduced in two phases. The 
Executive members voted with the leadership, but were defeated by 8 
votes to 11. Brian Faulkner recalls the episode: 
The S.D.L.P. Executive members had a meeting of their back 
benchers to secure final approval, but when they came back they 
were more disappointed that I had ever seen them. "I'm sorry" 
said Gerry Fitt. "We can't get them to agree". It seemed as if 
the Executive was about to break up on this issue, as neither 
Alliance nor ourselves were prepared to go back on what had been 
agreed. I got up from the Executive table and said "well, if 
that's the case I am afraid it means the end of the Executive. I 
am going into the Assembly to announce the resignation of the 
Executive because of the failure to agree on the re-negotiation of 
the Council of Ireland. I was at the door when Gerry Fitt stopped 
me. "Give us another half an hour and we will try again Brian", 
he said. 36 
Fitt contacted Orme and told him of the vote. Orme then 
addressed the S.D.L.P. Assembly group and told them that there would 
be strong action against the strike and an end to internment. In the 
second vote, the earlier decision was reversed and the compromise was 
carried by 12 votes to 5. Faulkner also recalls: 
It was about an hour later that Fitt and his colleagues returned 
looking more cheerful. "We had another vote and a majority have 
agreed" he said. I went straight to the Assembly and announced 
the new proposals. It later transpired that Orme had been rushed 
up from Stormont Castle to address the S.D.L.P. backbenchers, and 
had played a major part in changing their attitude. 37 
Despite Orme's promise no major initiative from the army 
materialised. In a televised broadcast, Prime Minister Wilson did 
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castigate the Loyalists for "sponging" on British democracy, but he 
did not promise any action. As disruption became more widespread, 
the Executive became increasingly desperate. 
On May 23, Fitt, Faulkner and Napier travelled to London to 
plead with Wilson to use troops and on May 24, Fitt in an impassioned 
speech in the House of Commons, spoke of: " ... A band of unelected 
people, people who have never had a single vote cast for them in the 
ballot box, people who misname themselves the Loyalist Ulster 
Workers, are holding the entire community to ransom." Fitt claimed 
that it was not an industrial strike, as it was not about wages and 
conditions of employment. Furthermore, he demanded the use of 
British troops to ensure that the essentials of life would be made 
available to everyone in Northern Ireland. His concluding words have 
a familiar ring: 
I believe that the British government must accept their 
responsibilities. I regret that it has to be a socialist party 
that must face the position, but knowing the men who compose the 
government, and having known Labour backbenchers for some years, I 
feel that the government will show the courage that they 
undoubtedly have. 38 
On May 27, the army was finally used to take over selected 
petrol stations, but that measure was too late to halt the momentum 
of the strike. Faulkner urged Rees to negotiate with the U.W.C., but 
he refused. On May 28, Faulkner, fully aware that the consent needed 
for the perpetuation of the Executive had been lost, resigned and 
with the resignation of the unionist members, the Executive 
collapsed. On the thirteenth day of the strike the U.W.C. had 
achieved its immediate aim. 39 The S.D.L.P. and the Alliance 
Party did not resign, but were dismissed the next day. For a day, 
therefore, Gerry Fitt was acting Chief Minister for Northern Ireland. 
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Despite the important differences of outlook in the Executive, 
Fitt was very confident about this new institution's prospects. As 
late as March 18, after the disastrous election results of February, 
he claimed: 
The new Executive was given a job to do. Its members have got 
their heads down and got on with it. It has plenty on its plate. 
Legislation under way or in the pipeline ranges over the whole 
spectrum of life in the Province. More and more, the Executive is 
being seen to speak and act for the real Northern Ireland. Its 
success is clearly causing dismay to the men of violence. 40 
Fitt's optimism proved wrong, and he was visibly upset at the 
fall of the Executive. 41 Many reasons can be put forward for 
the failure of the Sunningdale Agreement and power-sharing, though in 
retrospect Fitt is adamant that the Council of Ireland was the 
component responsible. He feels bitter about what he considers to be 
militant nationalism by certain members of the S.D.L.P., and argues: 
I never believed that you would ever have a power-sharing 
Executive. As far as I was concerned I didn't want anything 
else. But the nationalists outside of Belfast insisted on a 
Council of Ireland. I disagreed, fearing it would antagonise the 
Protestants. There was nothing in the Council of Ireland 
proposals which was a danger to the unionists but it was 
symbolic. They said it is the thin edge of the wedge. It was the 
Council of Ireland proposal that killed power-sharing. 42 
Faulkner's memoirs do imply that Fitt's nationalism was less 
"green" than some of his colleagues - power-sharing was thus a 
watershed in Fitt's career. In the 1960s and early 1970s, his 
rhetoric had always retained a nationalist aspiration, but by 1974 he 
became more of a gradualist. The two are not incompatable and Fitt's 
reflections were indeed pragmatic. However, they remained private 
thoughts. If he really had any convictions he should surely have 
articulated them. If Faulkner's reminiscence is correct, Fitt's 
nationalism in 1974 was essentially a concession to party dictates. 
Privately his politics had changed. Publicly they had not. 
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In the period of the Executive, Fitt once more displayed his 
faith in Westminster and his socialist colleagues, but was again let 
down by them. Rees' promise that Sunningdale would be ratified did 
not materialise. Orme's promise to the S.D.L.P. that the Northern 
Ireland Office would act strongly against the strikers did not 
materialise. Wilson's speech to the Loyalists was ineffective. Paddy 
Devlin considered it as simply "useless" and "pathetic".~ The 
Executive was dependent on Westminster for its survival but the 
Labour government did not show any signs of the courage that it 
"undoubtedly had." Fitt's confidence was unwarranted. 
In sharp contrast to Fitt, two of the principal unionist leaders 
dismiss the idea that the Council of Ireland was the cause of the 
Executive's collapse. In a letter written on February 18, 1976, a 
few weeks before his death in a riding accident, Faulkner wrote, 
"certainly I was convinced all along that the outcry against a 
Council of Ireland was only a useful red-herring - the real 
opposition was to sharing of power."« Perhaps more surprising 
is the admission of William Craig. His objection was not, as was 
widely thought, to the Council but to power-sharing, which he 
considered a "denial of democracy." He adds, "I was always prepared 
to have a relationship with the Irish Republic provided that their 
relationship with us was correct. 
of Ireland was what tipped 
nonsense." 45 
And those who say that the Council 
the strike off are talking 
John Hume, likewise, does not agree with Fitt's assertion of the 
detrimental effect of the Council. He argued: "It was that people 
did not like to see the likes of us sitting in charge of government 
departments and they did not like to see Fitt as the virtual Deputy 
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Prime Minister of Northern Ireland. That's what it was and that's 
what they said at the time." 46 
Republicans were as delighted with the fall of the Executive as 
were the U.W.C. They had constantly condemned both it and the 
sunningdale Agreement and maintained that Fitt and the S.D.L.P. had 
"sold out" in the unification struggle. The fact that the experiment 
failed in the face of Loyalist intransigence and British inactivity, 
gave credibility to the republican sentiment that it was yet another 
example of the collaborators' faith in British politicians being 
rewarded with repercussions which trampled the aspirations of the 
minority community. 
The post-Executive period would be a difficult one for the 
S.D.L.P. Not only would it have to endure the gloating of militant 
Loyalists and republicans, but the party also need to perform 
effectively despite the apparent differences within it over the 
Council of Ireland concept. Picking up the pieces would be no easy 
task. 
Although disappointed by the disintegration of the Executive, 
Fitt did not despair. On May 29, he claimed that the power-sharing 
process had begun in Northern Ireland and it could not be stopped -
it had merely received a severe temporary set back. 47 
No immediate alternative policy existed other than a return to 
direct rule which all the parties agreed was no solution. Despite 
private reservations, Fitt made it clear that the S.D.L.P. would not 
relinquish 
minority 
Republic: 
peaceful 
its political 'raison d'etre' around the maintenance of a 
presence in government and a formalised link with the 
"The Catholic community must be allowed to aspire to the 
re-unification of Ireland by consent. If the Catholic 
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community was to be asked to become unionists as such then 
power-sharing wouldn't be possible." 48 
A political impasse had been reached, since the Protestant 
community had already rejected such proposals. The Official 
Unionists, now under the leadership of Harry West, presented a plan 
for majority-rule in a Stormont government with the offer of 
opposition participation in parliamentary committees. The proposals 
were strongly attacked by Faulkner and his new Unionist Party and by 
Fitt, who said: 
It is in fact an attempt to resurrect the old Stormont and 
ascendency government which existed before direct rule, and as 
such, would not be acceptable and would be completely rejected by 
the minority in Northern Ireland. In doing so they would have 
support from the democratic world. 
If this is the final position of the Official Unionist Party, then 
one can only predict serious political difficulties in the 
future.~ 
Fitt was aware of a possible drift away from constitutional 
nationalism in the political vacuum that now existed. In an attempt 
to fill this vacuum, Rees declared that a new Northern Ireland Bill 
would make the Secretary of State responsible for government in the 
province. The Bill would provide for a Constitutional Convention to 
be elected "to consider what provisions for the government of 
Northern Ireland would be likely to command most widespread 
acceptance throughout the community." 50 The White Paper gave 
assurances on power-sharing but the S.D.L.P. were no longer convinced 
of British resolve. Although the Paper mentioned the Irish 
dimension, it did not suggest that it would have to be acceptable to 
the Republic's government. The document also failed to recognise the 
long-term aspiration of the minority for unity. As Barry White 
points out, "Without a strong commitment to power-sharing or an Irish 
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dimension, the Convention would be seen as a calculated insult to the 
s.D.L.P. and a surrender to Protestant intransigence." 51 
Fitt's reaction at Westminster to the new Bill reflected 
s.D.L.P. pessimism with the new proposal: 
I believe that the introduction of the White Paper and the Bill 
today represent an abject and total surrender to those forces in 
Northern Ireland which set about using every endeavour to bring to 
an end the system of government that we had under the Sunningdale 
Agreement. That is the way in which this measure is being 
interpreted in Northern Ireland. 52 
Unimpressed with developments in Northern Ireland, many S.D.L.P. 
members adopted a tougher line. Eddie McGrady, Assembly member for 
South Down had already urged the British government to announce their 
intent to withdraw from the province, 53 and after the 
implications of the White Paper became known Paddy Devlin, Hugh 
Logue, Assembly representative for Londonderry, Paddy Duffy, party 
treasurer and John Duffy, the party's general secretary, all made 
scathing attacks on Rees and the British government. 54 
On July 20, the U.D.A. who had provided the muscle behind the 
U.W.C. strike, resigned from the Council. Its chairman, Andy Tyrie, 
invited representatives of the Catholic community to take part in 
talks. He said: "The S.D.L.P. are elected representatives and I 
think we would be quite prepared to speak to them. They can put 
across the views of ordinary Catholics. We think we will get a good 
response and our attitude is that we cannot go on fighting 
forever." 55 
Fitt was keen on talks, his socialist orientation always making 
him open to Protestant overtures. On August 1, discussions took 
place but the meeting proved unsuccessful. The U.D.A. spokesman 
declared that there would be no discussions until the S.D.L.P. gave 
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up its aspiration to a united Ireland. For his part Fitt claimed: 
The tone and content of the U.D.A. statement certainly does not 
reflect in any way the meeting which had taken place. I can only 
presume that there are elements within the U.D.A. who are 
determined to pre-empt any useful discussions and to make certain 
that no useful dialogue can take place. I realise that there are 
many thousands of people throughout Northern Ireland who feel 
disappointed that nothing constructive has emerged from this 
meeting, and I can only reiterate that the S.D.L.P. while clinging 
tenaciously to its policies, will make every endeavour to unite 
both communities in Northern Ireland. 56 
We can now question how "tenaciously" Fitt clung to S.D.L.P. 
policy but the same cannot be said for Hume. On August 8, he joined 
some of his S.D.L.P. colleagues in attacking the British and taking a 
more militant line. He told a party meeting in Londonderry that the 
British faced a clear choice "confrontation with violence or 
withdrawal." 57 
At the end of the month a six-man delegation flew to London for 
talks with Labour, Conservative and Liberal Party leaders, to express 
their feelings about the lack of firm direction and the continuing 
internment issue. Fitt was among the group. 58 
The S.D.L.P. followed the trip with a conference to review party 
strategy. 
Executive. 
Taking part were the 19 Assembly members and the party 
The conference also intended to plan policy for the 
forthcoming elections to Westminster and the Northern Ireland 
Constitutional Convention. Fitt said: 
We have said that the British government must spell out what it 
will accept from the political parties in Northern Ireland and 
what it will not accept. Otherwise people will be asked to vote 
at the Convention elections without being sure what they are 
voting for.~ 
Increasingly disillusioned S.D.L.P. members were not helped by 
the attitude of the government in the Republic. After the failure of 
power-sharing, the Dublin administration showed a distinct proclivity 
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to disengage from the Northern Ireland problem. On June 13, Premier 
Liam Cosgrave said: "They (citizens of the Republic) are expressing 
more and more the idea that unity or close association with a people 
so deeply imbued with violence and its effects is not what they 
want." 60 The S.D.L.P. was isolated and left to its fate. 
In September, another S.D.L.P. delegation met Harold Wilson. 
Prior to this, Fitt remarked: "The situation in the North from the 
minority point of view, is showing daily deterioration mainly due to 
military bias against the Catholic population. There will have to be 
an end to this." 61 He was pleased with the outcome of the 
meeting: 
It was a most satisfactory meeting - one of the frankest the 
S.D.L.P. has had with the British prime minister. Every aspect of 
the political situation in the North was discussed, including 
internment, the role of the British army, the role of the police 
and in particular what afpeared to be unclear attitudes expressed 
by the British government. 
Without justification, the S.D.L.P. was now convinced of 
Britain's commitment to power-sharing and an Irish dimension. It 
entered the October election with this in mind. Fitt was asked by 
the Belfast News Letter what he felt was the most important issue in 
the election, and replied: "The acceptance by the whole community in 
Northern Ireland that there must be partnership in government and the 
recognition of the legitimate aspirations of this divided community, 
consequent upon this a complete rejection of violence."~ 
Fitt was opposed in West Belfast by Johnny McQuade (the nominee 
of Paisley's D.U.P., standing on the United Ulster Coalition ticket 
and who came second to Fitt in February), Kitty O'Kane, of the 
Republican Clubs, Sam Gibson, Chairman of the U.V.F's political wing, 
the Volunteer Political Party (V.P.P.) and a Communist, Patrick 
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Kerins. 
In the previous April, Rees had removed both Provisional Sinn 
Fein and the U.V.F. from the list of proscribed organizations and 
although the U.V.F. decided to contest the election, Provisional Sinn 
Fein declined. 
O'Kane: 
Republican criticism of the S.D.L.P. came from 
The S.D.L.P. talk about the power-sharing Executive as if it were 
a golden age and have made its restoration their main political 
aim. The power-sharing Executive was in essence a Tory government 
bribe to the middle class S.D.L.P. leadership, which helped them 
accept Brian Faulkner as their leader in return for whatever 
patronage and prestige they might get out of it. 64 
O'Kane's criticism did not prevent people voting for Fitt. He 
retained his seat despite a 5% drop in turn out as compared to 
February. He increased his majority to over 5,000 votes, aided by 
the split in the unionist camp. O'Kane unexpectedly lost her 
deposit. Fitt's victory was also enhanced by the fact that there was 
no Provisional-backed candidate. 
In each of the 12 seats in Ulster the U.U.U.C. put up a single 
candidate and had 10 M.P's returned. By securing 58% of the vote 
they consolidated their post-Executive position. They lost the 
Fermanagh South Tyrone seat. Prior to the October poll, the 
S.D.L.P. and McManus (the former M.P. for that area) had reached 
agreement on a compromise nationalist candidate - Frank Maguire. 
Maguire had been active in the republican movement and was interned 
for two years in the late 1950s. The fact that the S.D.L.P. secured 
such an agreement indicated a shift of emphasis and a decidedly more 
nationalist posture. Maguire's victory showed that the anti-unionist 
population of the area preferred any nationalist to a unionist. In 
the 1980s, this reality would again be demonstrated but in a more 
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dramatic fashion. 
The S.D.L.P. itself managed to retain the 22% share of the vote 
it had achieved in February, and its total vote only dropped by 4,000 
despite the fact that it only contested 9 out of the 12 seats. In 
Britain, the Labour Party increased its majority. 
In Northern Ireland the October election did little more than 
re-confirm what the February election had already proven. Although 
the U.U.U.C. had one less seat, they increased their vote by 40,000. 
Faulkner's Unionist Party only obtained 20,754 votes - a mere 3%. On 
the basis of the October result, the U.U.U.C. would win an outright 
majority in the Convention elections. The middle ground which had 
created power-sharing and Sunningdale had gone - Northern Ireland had 
reverted back to sectarian politics. 
remarked: 
After the election Fitt 
I hope the Loyalists do not see the vote as a mandate to say there 
will be no partnership between the communities. I hope they will 
use their position to try to take whatever steps they can to 
recognise that there are two communities and that both must work 
together if there is to be any future for this province. 65 
There was little confidence within the S.D.L.P., however, that 
this hope would materialise. 
October also saw an increase in sectarian attacks on Catholics 
from the Ulster Protestant Action Force, with 10 killed in a month. 
Fitt, speaking in advance of a meeting with Wilson in which he was to 
ask for emergency measures to halt the murders said, "People are 
being murdered going to and from their work ... We are now at the 
stage where members of the public are afraid to be on the streets of 
Belfast." He maintained that he would plead on behalf of all the 
decent people of Northern Ireland, Catholic and Protestant: 
I am not being selective. All these killings have got to stop 
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otherwise there is no hope for Northern Ireland. There must be 
fathers, mothers, brothers and sisters who know the identify of 
these murderers and are harbouring them. Surely, they can see 
that only they, the community, can reject them and stop Northern 
Ireland bleeding to death. 66 
Rees appealed, "I am calling once again on all responsible 
leaders of every section of opinion to give practical support to the 
R.U.C. in their fight against criminal violence." 67 Although 
not specified, Rees' appeal would have been directed primarily at the 
s.D.L.P. Fitt and his colleagues did not respond. 
As the P.I.R.A. campaign continued in tandem with Loyalist 
assassinations, the pressure increased for the S.D.L.P. to lend 
active support to the police. Hume had shaped a policy advocating 
that nationalists must have a role in government before the S.D.L.P. 
would fully endorse the R.U.C. 68 At the end of October he still 
insisted that the R.U.C. were not acceptable to his party, although 
he felt it necessary to tell the Irish News that there was no 
difference of opinion between himself and Fitt. 69 This 
suggests that there probably was some disagreement. Fitt may have 
been leader but Hume was pulling the strings. On the following day, 
the S.D.L.P. Assembly Party reaffirmed the party's stance. 70 
In November the S.D.L.P's Executive committee endorsed the stand 
taken on policing by the party's assemblymen. Fitt did not make his 
position known through public statements to the press. I would 
suggest he was again conforming to party dictates. 
Despite the S.D.L.P. stance on the police issue, it had not 
endeared itself to republicans. For example, when it was announced 
that both party and public representatives were to visit the Maze 
Prison, which had been the location of some severe rioting in 
mid-October, republican inmates told them to "stay away. You are not 
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welcome." 
Fitt was singled out for particular criticism: "The party 
leader, Gerry Fitt has never visited the camp and therefore knows 
nothing of the conditions even though he claims to be the all-time 
expert, when speaking in parliament. 
should be recognised as such." 71 
This is pure hypocrisy and 
In parliament, however, Fitt was receiving plaudits from British 
politicians for a speech which was considered moderate and 
courageous. 
dimension: 
He actually accepted a watering down of the Irish 
I concede that the Irish dimension that we envisage may not 
initially or in the short term have anything approaching what we 
had under the Sunningdale Agreement - a Council of Ireland. I 
shall continue to work for such an establishment. If people in 
Northern Ireland learn to live together, it will be essential for 
some means to be found to enable the Northern Ireland majority, 
both Catholic and Protestant, to communicate with the rest of the 
people in the small island of Ireland. 
Fitt also made a claim which was contrary to fact, "I have never 
in this House or in Northern Ireland - nor has any member of my party 
condemned the R.U.C. in total as being unacceptable."n Fitt 
was straying from S.D.L.P. policy. Such speeches would have caused 
considerable consternation amongst his colleagues. The 
responsibilities of leading a democratic party did not sit easily 
with Fitt. Individualism was fine and workable in the circumstances 
he found himself in the 1960s, but the 1970s had produced different, 
and in many ways more complex circumstances. A street politician was 
no longer required. 
The P.I.R.A. had been far from idle since the end of the U.W.C. 
strike. It had witnessed the re-election of the Labour government, 
Which the P.I.R.A. felt had surrendered to force during the strike. 
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In an attempt to compel the British to finally disengage from 
Ireland, the Provisionals embarked on a campaign of violence in 
England. In July, a woman was killed and 36 people were injured, 
many seriously, by a no-warning bomb in the Tower of London. In 
October, 5 people were killed and 54 injured when no-warning bombs 
exploded at two pubs in Guildford. In early November, a bomb in 
Woolwich, outside London, killed two more. Finally, on November 21, 
two bombs in Birmingham killed 21 and injured a further 182. Despite 
their denials, there was an upsurge of anti-Provisional feeling in 
nationalist areas in Northern Ireland due to this carnage. 73 
As a result, the Provisional leadership was receptive to a peace 
initiative launched by a group of Protestant clergymen led by the Rev 
William Arlow, Secretary of the Irish Council of Churches. 
A few leading republicans met the churchmen on December 10, 1974 
at Smyth's village hotel in Feakle, County Clare. The republican 
group made it clear that they were prepared to discuss a cessation of 
violence and contacts were made immediately after this meeting with 
the Northern Ireland Office. On December 19, the Labour government 
signalled its willingness to proceed with talks and on the following 
day, the P.I.R.A. council announced that it would suspend operations 
over an II day period between December 22 and January 2. Fitt 
greeted the ceasefire: 
I welcome this announcement. Under any circumstances it is to be 
welcomed if it means there will be even a temporary respite from 
the murders and the bombings in the terrorist campaign. I 
fervently hope and pray that it will be continued and that we will 
see an end to this campaign which we have witnessed for the past 
five years. 74 
1974 thus ended with some optimism. 
On January 2, 1975 the Provisionals announced that they would 
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extend their Christmas ceasefire by 14 days. Fitt warned: 
If after the period of ceasefire, ... anyone in the P.I.R.A. was 
insane enough to order the resumption of hostilities· then 
thousands of lives would be lost in a period of violence much 
worse than anything experienced up to the present. In such a 
situation the I.R.A. would have no support. 75 
The Provisional's extension had been the result of indications 
from the Northern Ireland Office that they would consider their 
proposals - an end to internment in the near future and a withdrawal 
of British troops to barracks - if the ceasefire was extended for a 
further two weeks. The British innuendo, however, was not endorsed 
by any tangible gesture and the truce was allowed to lapse. Fitt had 
been correct in predicting a negative reaction in nationalist areas 
to the resumption of the campaign. This was reflected by peace 
marches in Belfast and Dublin on January 19 and further such 
gatherings in Londonderry and Newry at the end of the month. As a 
consequence, contact was re-established between the Provisionals and 
the British government. 
Rees was intent on trying to draw the Provisionals into the 
political process and on February 5 in the House of Commons he said 
that if they ceased offensive operations, the army would be gradually 
reduced to peacetime levels and eventually withdrawn to barracks. He 
also suggested that internment could be phased out. 76 Rees 
considered it the most important speech he had made on Northern 
Ireland. 77 On February 10, the Provisional army council began 
an indefinite ceasefire. On February 11, Rees announced that 
"incident centres" were to be set up in various parts of the 
province, ostensibly to monitor the ceasefire. The centers, were set 
up in existing Provisional Sinn Fein Offices where possible, and were 
supplied with telex machines and telephones - compliments of the 
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Northern Ireland Office. The prestige of the republican movement, as 
expressed by the Provisionals, had been greatly enhanced. 
While these developments evolved, the S.D.L.P. looked on, 
dismayed by the apparent preferential treatment offered to the 
Provisionals. In mid-January, Fitt had spoken out against direct 
peace negotiations between the Provisionals and the British 
government: "That would prove that people could bomb their way to 
the Conference Table." 78 It is ironic that in the previous 
August Fitt had talked with the U.D.A. whose association with the 
U.V.F. was well known. He made a distinction between republican 
paramilitaries and loyalist counterparts. 
The establishment of the "incident centres" created further 
tension between the S.D.L.P. and Rees. At Westminster, Fitt asked: 
Will he give, through me, to my constituents an understanding that 
in any talk about policing or law and order in the areas 
concerned, the elected representatives will be listened to before 
the Provisional Sinn Fein spokesman?79 
He told a Belfast Telegraph reporter: 
On the one hand, the government is saying that it is designed to 
prevent a breakdown of the ceasefire, but the I.R.A. on the other 
hand, are claiming that it gives them further recognition. This 
is something which will have to be clarified by the government. 
Elected representatives on either side - whether they be unionist 
or S.D.L.P. - would certainly object to any influence given to 
parliamentary organisations which have been rejected at the ballot 
box. 80 
Rees' apparent placation of the Provisionals stemmed from a 
desire to create a stable environment for the Convention elections. 
Hume had re-affirmed the S.D.L.P. position at the party 
conference in January: 
The central element in our philosophy is that the evils of our 
society derive from the divisions which can be resolved in one of 
two ways - by one side trying to dominate the other, or as we do, 
by abandoning the path of conflict and trying the road that has 
never really been tried, the way of partnership. It is simple, 
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clear, sensible and constructive and is the essential principle of 
our whole analysis. We would be abandoning our total approach if 
we abandoned the Irish dimension. 
Fitt made his customary appeal to Protestants "who may have had 
fears and differences with the S.D.L.P.", to have the courage to take 
the possibly dangerous course of joining "this socialist party and 
helping to evolve its policy." He added, "If this was a Catholic 
party, I would not be its leader. It is a socialist party." 81 
Fitt's grip of reality must be questioned. The only evidence to 
suggest the S.D.L.P. was not a Catholic party was the fact that it 
had one Protestant founding member, Ivan Cooper. The media referred 
to the "mainly Catholic S.D.L.P." but the party would have been hard 
pressed to produce substantial or any Protestant membership. In 
essence, the S.D.L.P. represented, in a practical sense, the majority 
in the Catholic community who disapproved of the Provisionals 
campaign. Fitt refused to acknowledge that Protestants would not 
vote or join the S.D.L.P. because they knew that if they did, this 
would not be interpreted as indicative of their socialist 
orientation, but of their support for a united Ireland. As a result, 
the Protestant community steered well clear of the S.D.L.P., ensuring 
that the party remained a Catholic sectarian party. 
After the October 1974 parliamentary election results, the 
S.D.L.P. did not approach the Convention election with much hope of 
success. The conference had voted for a strong Irish dimension as a 
pre-requisite for the return of the S.D.L.P. to Executive government 
and this was reflected in the party manifesto "Speak with Strength" 
formulated for the Convention elections. It stated: 
There is an Irish dimension to the problem. There is a British 
dimension to the problem. Any solution must take account of both. 
The principles on which our solution is based take account of both 
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dimensions, as well as the most important Northern Ireland 
dimension itself, and do in fact command the most widespread 
acceptance among the people of these islands. 82 . 
Fitt displayed some optimism, "If I thought the Convention was 
going to break down in a couple of weeks we would not be fighting 
this election."~ Such optimism was misplaced for the U.U.U.C. 
manifesto was virtually the antithesis of the S.O.L.P's - calling for 
majority rule and no interference in Northern Ireland's affairs from 
Dublin. Provisional Sinn Fein called on nationalist voters to 
boycott the election arguing that the Convention experiment was 
futile. 
Provisional Sinn Fein claimed that 53% of the people of 
Andersonstown would boycott the Convention election but Fitt 
dismissed this claim: 
I think Sinn Fein are inclined to take themselves much too 
seriously; certainly more seriously than anyone else is prepared 
to take them in either the North or West Belfast constituencies. 
It is absolutely laughable that the poll which they allege they 
have conducted should have shown that 53 per cent of the people in 
Andersonstown were not prepared to vote. I would like to know who 
these people are as I understand from my colleagues that our own 
canvass returns indicate overwhelming support and that the 
S.O.L.P. can win four seats. 84 
At this juncture, Fitt was clearly confident of his position and 
that of the S.D.L.P. in Belfast. Ten days after this expression of 
assurance, the Irish News reported that Gerry Adams, a former Brigade 
commander in the P.I.R.A. who would eventually contest Fitt's West 
Belfast seat, was given a three year sentence for attempting to 
escape from Long Kesh in July, 1974. 
As the election grew nearer, Fitt told the Belfast Telegraph: 
There can be no running away from our obligations in this election 
- the whole future of this country depends on it. There is no 
such thing as a no vote for that will be a vote for Loyalist 
ascendancy and for domination politics to continue. That can only 
lead to a continuation of bitterness and dissension. 85 
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Provisional Sinn Fein continued its attacks on the S.D.L.P., 
claiming: 
Parties like the S.D.L.P. which crawl to this conference table 
will be indulging in masochistic ritual self-humiliation 
There is nothing for the Catholic people of the six counties in 
the proposed Convention and the S.D.L.P. knows it. They have gone 
one step too far, and have left the electorate behind.B6 
The election results showed that the boycott had failed to win 
many converts from the S.D.L.P. The party received 156,000 votes, 
only 4,000 less than the high in 1973. This drop, however, did 
result in the loss of two seats from the nineteen in the Assembly. 
But the S.D.L.P. could claim that it had maintained its political 
mandate and Fitt topped the poll in North Belfast. 
The U.U.U.C. had 46 members elected to the Convention, thus 
having a substantial majority over the opposition. After the 
election Fitt remarked, "If we do not find the solution this time, we 
could find the world watching a lot of dead people here."B7 
On May 8, 1975 the Northern Ireland Convention members began the 
job of finding an acceptable political future for Northern Ireland. 
Rees' hope was that they could devise a system of government which 
would have the most widespread acceptance in the country. In his 
opening address, Fitt once more established the S.D.L.P's commitment 
to an Irish dimension: 
again I must say that however evocative, emotional or 
frustrating the term may be, there is an Irish dimension to 
Northern Ireland and its problems. We all live on this island and 
if we are ever to eradicate violence from these shores it must be 
done in co-operation with all those governments and authorities 
who have the power to do so. From that one viewpoint alone, I 
would suggest that there is a clearly defined Irish dimension. 
This is not the time to go into all the contentious issues that 
will be discussed later at the Convention but I think it is right 
to put on record my feeling at this time.BB 
It is difficult to ascertain to what extent these "feelings" 
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were his own, or those of his party. What is certain is that such a 
stance bode badly for the Convention's prospects of success .. If as 
could be expected, Fitt was merely mouthing party dictates, he was 
guilty of lack of conviction in his own political theories. The 
u.u.u.c. candidates were pledged to reject power-sharing in any shape 
or form and they were emphatically against an Irish dimension. As 
the Convention approached its summer recess, there were few signs of 
progress and informal inter-party talks in August also proved 
fruitless. 
Meanwhile, Fitt had been the lone voice at Westminster 
complaining about British co-operation with the Provisionals. He 
maintained that such relations would give the P.I.R.A. respectability 
in the urban ghettos. 89 He also kept up his incessant attacks 
on the "men of violence." Speaking at the inaugural meeting of the 
new S.D.L.P. branch in South Antrim he said: 
Make no mistake about it but the murdering gangs who are now 
rampant have one ambition only - to wreck the Convention and thus 
keep the community in turmoil. The wild men must be rejected both 
by the politicians and by the people otherwise the future will be 
very dark indeed. 90 
Fitt was prompted to continue these criticisms because of 
ceasefire problems for the republicans. The ceasefire was only 
formally with the army and the R.U.C., and the P.I.R.A. reserved the 
right to protect the nationalist community. However, the 
organization could not always maintain complete discipline, and many 
Provisionals who were unhappy with the cessation of hostilities 
embarked on maverick missions, sectarian violence thus continued. On 
July 31, the U.V.F. members murdered three of the Miami Showband near 
the border. On August 15, 5 people were killed and 40 injured in a 
P.I.R.A. attack on a pub in the Shankill Road in Belfast. On 
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September 1, four Protestants were killed outside their Orange Hall 
in South Armagh. 
It was in this atmosphere that the talks between the S.D.L.P. 
and U.U.U.C. were taking place. Such events were not at all 
conducive to any concessions on power-sharing however,and the talks 
collapsed. The unionist majority pushed its own report through and 
the S.D.L.P. effectively ceased to participate. The Convention wound 
up in early November with the unionist report of majority rule its 
main proposal but the British government refused to accept such a 
hardline recommendation. During the Convention's final debate Fitt 
said that the institution had at least identified "those members who 
were prepared to try and find a solution and those who were 
not. 1191 Indefinite direct rule loomed large. 
While the Convention was now in almost total disarray, the truce 
between the British and the Provisionals had become increasingly 
meaningless and it was clearly evident to all sides that the truce 
had effectively ended. Rees made it official on November 4, when he 
announced that "special category status" was to cease. 92 The 
British had decided to adopt the criminalisation approach to Northern 
Ireland and the Provisionals were to be presented as thugs and 
gangsters. The process was completed on November 12, when Rees 
announced that the Incident Centres were to be closed. 93 
At the end of November, the S.D.L.P. held its fifth annual 
conference. Fitt claimed that nine of the ten unionist M.P's were 
engaged in trying to bring about total integration of the North with 
Britain. It was a perturbed conference. At previous conferences 
political initiatives beckoned, the Assembly election, the formation 
of the power-sharing Executive and the Convention elections. All had 
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failed and there seemed no instrument available which the party could 
use to influence the British government. There was one bright spot 
however. On December 5, internment ended. Detention without trial 
had always been a thorn in the S.D.L.P's side, and consistently 
undermined its credibility. Internment's termination was 
understandably welcomed by Fitt: 
I am thankful that the evil scourge of internment has been brought 
to an end. From the very second of its inception, we recognised 
the political disaster that it would be, antagonising as it did 
the entire Catholic community. Thousands and thousands of the 
minority were alienated by the imposition of this scourge of their 
fellow co-religionists. People who, in normal circumstances, 
would give no support whatsoever to any men of violence felt 
themselves alienated from every political institution in Northern 
Ireland. After four and a half years of personal tragedy to those 
who were interned, and particularly their wives and families, we 
have now come to the end of an era in our political 
development. 95 
At Westminster Fitt told Rees: "Now that we have got rid of the 
running sore of detention, I and my colleagues will do everything in 
our power to involve the minority community in your attempt to reject 
the gunmen there." 96 
1976 continued in violent fashion, January being a particularly 
turbulent month. On the 4th, Loyalists killed five Catholics in 
South Armagh while on the following day Republicans shot dead ten 
Protestants. These victims had been on a bus and the only Catholic 
present had been told to stand aside. Fitt condemned both deeds: 
There are no words in any language which could adequately express 
the shock, revulsion and anger I feel at the barbaric crimes 
committed in Co. Armagh. I hope to God the people who know the 
identity of these murderers will take the necessary steps to rid 
them from our midst. I would also make an appeal to all those who 
would listen to my voice not to think for a second of revenge. 
This can only bring further tragedy. 97 
Rees, becoming increasingly desperate, again tried to get talks 
underway. In mid-January he announced at Westminster that the 
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convention was to be reconvened from February 3. Fitt was asked by 
an Irish News reporter if he felt Rees' move had bolstered the 
s.o.L.P. position. He answered: 
I would not want to say he has bolstered the S.D.L.P. position 
because that might create antagonism. The Secretary of State had 
however, reinforced the S.D.L.P. view that there would be no 
return to a devolved government on the lines of the old Stormont 
but that there would be a government which would embrace both 
communities. 98 
On the day planned for the U.U.U.C. - S.D.L.P. talks, Frank 
Stagg, an I.R.A. hunger-striker in a British prison died. He had 
gone on hunger-strike to demand special category status and a return 
to Ireland to serve his sentence. As a consequence, there was 
considerable violence in West Belfast and other Catholic areas, and 
just as in the previous August, the atmosphere was not conducive to 
compromise. On this same day, the S.D.L.P., perhaps fearing a loss 
of support to more extreme republicans, withdrew from the talks 
claiming that U.U.U.C. were not prepared to discuss power-sharing. 
On March 5, the failure of the Convention was officially acknowledged 
when Westminster formally dissolved it. Fitt was under no illusions 
as to who had scuppered progress: "The man personally responsible 
for the downfall of the Convention was none other than a Member of 
this House, the hon. Member for Antrim, North, Mr. Ian 
Paisley. "99 
A strong indication of a collapsed middle ground came with the 
March 5, 1976 dissolution of the Convention; for most people direct 
rule was the second best solution. 
The post-Executive period would have been a difficult time for 
the S.D.L.P. Despite individual party members voicing more militant 
opinions and the S.D.L.P./McManus deal over participation in the 
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Fermanagh - South Tyrone constituency, the S.D.L.P. did not radically 
change its politics. The fact that the British government had failed 
made it tempting to revert to republican orthodoxy and adopt a line 
similar to the old Nationalist Party. However, the S.D.L.P. was 
committed to constitutionalism and thus compromise and agreed to 
participate in the Convention. 
In its eight month existence the Constitutional Convention 
accomplished nothing. The S.D.L.P's twin aims of power-sharing and 
the Irish dimension had been rejected. The future of the party 
looked bleak and it was outside all forums, with the exception of 
their one M.P., Fitt, at Westminster. 
Fitt's rhetoric had upheld the S.D.L.P's aspiration for an Irish 
dimension. If, as could be expected, he was not as committed to it 
as some of his colleagues, his reservations were veiled. It is 
probable that he tried to dampen down S.D.L.P. nationalism. 
The period after the Executive again saw the Labour Party 
disappoint Fitt. Despite all his pleadings, Rees had belittled the 
importance of elected representatives by bargaining with the 
Provisionals. When "special category status" was eventually 
terminated, it was too late, since the P.I.R.A. had gained further 
credibility. The ending of internment also came too late for the 
S.D.L.P. to gain any benefit. 
Fitt continued to urge Protestants to join the S.D.L.P., but his 
unstinting claim that his was a socialist not a Catholic Party fell 
on deaf ears. He was likewise unstinting in his attacks on the 
Provisionals. In November 1975, he claimed that the "Provos had 
sullied the name of republicanism and had dragged the Irish Tricolour 
and the Starry Plough into the gutter. 11100 However, the 
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Provisionals were a reality, and, although in their political 
infancy, they were waiting in the wings ready to capitalise on 
s.D.L.P. failures. It was significant that the two seats lost by the 
s.D.L.P. in the Convention elections were in the republican 
strongholds of South Armagh and South Derry. 
In May 1975, Fitt's leadership of the party was assured when he 
was re-elected. 101 Ciaren McKeown reported on the S.D.L.P's 
fifth annual conference in November 1975: 
Familiarity with their leaders has brought respect rather than 
contempt. And Gerry Fitt, with that unique blend of humanity, wit 
and native intelligence which is the secret of his political 
flair, has no serious rivals for the leadership. There is, of 
course, a residual faction of the more academic or formal, whose 
instincts are for a more controllable leader, but he can usually 
make them laugh too. Shortly after acknowledging an outstanding 
ovation for an address in which he had them laughing and cheering 
he was jokingly asked "so it looks as if you're going to stay in 
the party for another while, Gerry? "Aye, as long as its going my 
way", he replied. There is more than a grain of truth in the 
observation that if the time ever comes when he is totally happy 
with the party, either he will be finished or the party 
will. 102 
McKeown's comment was prophetic. In the years to come, the 
S.D.L.P. was to change, and after six years, they had no tangible 
gains to boast of. The shift in direction would see Fitt 
increasingly isolated and eventually lead to his resignation. 
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CHAPTER VI 
ISOLATION AND RESIGNATION 
On October 28, 1975, Fitt had told the Belfast Telegraph: "I 
have always identified myself with the Labour Party since I was 
elected I cannot foresee any situation in which I would lend my 
support to the defeat of the present government." 1 
By March 1979, he had radically altered his position and was 
prepared to allow a Conservative administration to gain power. He 
told the same newspaper, "I certainly will not support the Labour 
government in a vote of confidence. My constituents interests and 
those of Northern Ireland must be paramount "2 Clearly, 
Fitt felt that circumstances had changed to such an extent that it 
was necessary to subordinate his socialist inclination to a 
nationalist posture. The irony of this is that Fitt was to resign 
from the S.D.L.P., in the same period, on the basis that it had 
become in his opinion, too nationalist. This chapter will account 
for this paradox. 
Although the British Labour Party had improved its position in 
the October, 1974, general election by gaining eighteen seats, its 
overall majority in the House of Commons was only three. Therefore, 
Fitt and indeed Frank Maguire were considered important 
"Independents." It seemed that Fitt was intent on supporting the 
socialist policies of the Labour Party as he had done since 1966. A 
week after the failure of the Convention he claimed: "However harsh 
the present Labour government may have shown itself to be over the 
expenditure cuts, they are infinitely preferable to a government 
which might be led by Mrs. Thatcher3 and her cohorts." 4 
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When James Callaghan took over the premiership from Harold 
Wilson in April 1976, Fitt retained his belief that the 
administration would remain committed to finding an agreement between 
both communities within the context of Northern Ireland. 5 
By the end of April, however, he had changed his tune and told 
the Labour Party Whips that his support in the lobbies could not be 
taken for granted. He felt that the government was being lulled into 
the belief that direct rule was an acceptable short-term 
solution. 6 
Fitt was looking for some political assurances about Northern 
Ireland policy from the new prime minister before renewing his 
loyalty to Labour, and in the following week received them. On May 
4, he met Callaghan to discuss his concern about government policy. 
During this meeting, he was apparently told that there was no change 
in Labour policy and afterwards said: 
Beforehand I was concerned that the government might have been 
tempted to swallow the view put around by some unionist 
politicians - particularly Mr Enoch Powell 7 - that nothing 
should be done in Northern Ireland in the hope that total 
integration would be acceptable as a solution. I am convinced 
that it is not a solution and never will be. 8 
At this juncture an abstention by Fitt would not be crucial but 
the episode does show where his allegiance lay. On this occasion, 
his misgivings were mollified but, as we have seen, there was to be 
another occasion in the future when this was not so. 
While Fitt was occupied at Westminster, his S.D.L.P. colleagues 
had ample time to dwell on their redundant political status and some 
of them began to question fundamental party principles. 
In June, Paddy Devlin argued for an independent Northern 
Ireland, maintaining that the advantage would be to remove the 
British presence 
violence. The 
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and thus the cause for republican paramilitary 
"negotiated independence" idea would promote 
reconciliation and "allow Northern Ireland to develop and prosper as 
an independent entity."9 Fitt totally rejected negotiated 
independence claiming only reconciliation between the majority and 
minority communities in the North offered the hope of real political 
progress. 10 He feared Catholic political domination by 
Protestants. 
Fitt continued to clash with the Tory opposition at 
Westminster. The Conservative spokesman on Northern Ireland was 
Airey Neave, who was extremely critical of government policy in the 
province. Neave advocated a military solution. He criticised Labour 
policy towards guerilla warfare in Northern Ireland as 
"half-hearted", and demanded that "They should go on the offensive, 
and declare war on the terrorists now." Fitt argued that any 
military solution that would be sought in the event of a Tory 
government coming into power would bring nothing but tragedy and 
disaster to Northern Ireland. 11 
Although it had been the Conservatives who had abolished 
Stormont and formulated the Sunningdale experiment, while successive 
Labour administrations had frustrated Fitt, he was still, at this 
point, avidly anti-Tory. His naive faith in the Labour Party 
persisted and his allegiance to socialism clouded his judgement in 
relation to what Tory or Labour governments might or indeed did offer 
Northern Ireland. 
Despite Fitt's vociferous campaigning at Westminster against any 
military solution, there were elements in the nationalist community 
who were increasingly turning against him. This was largely a result 
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of his criticism of the P.I.R.A. On August 9, the day of the fifth 
anniversary of internment, Fitt was forced to hold an angry mob at 
bay with a revolver after they had burst into his home. He, his 
wife, Ann, and daughter Geraldine were treated for shock. Fitt 
remained characteristically defiant. "I have taken a stand 
throughout my political life I am opposed to violence in all forms. 
1 might die, my wife might die, but I am not going to be 
intimidated. 
right. "12 
I will go on saying what I believe to be 
He described the ordeal in the Irish News: 
I picked up my gun and went to the bedroom door and there they 
were standing at the top of the stairs. I pointed the gun at them 
and said: Move, get down the stairs or you're dead. They began 
backing off and I followed them down the stairs until I was 
standing at the bottom holding them at bay in the hall ... If I 
hadn't had a gun, I'm sure I would be dead now. I don't think 
they would have shot me, but they would probably have kicked me to 
death . 13 
The following day he again attacked the Provisionals: "The only 
way the Provisional I.R.A. can be defeated is by the Catholic 
population standing together and rejecting them. The Catholic people 
must make their voices heard against violence and intimidation ... 
The I.R.A. will not be driving me out." 14 
Reaction to the attack was predictably mixed. Protestants, 
though they were sympathetic with the Fitts', took issue with his 
stand on the R.U.C. Ulster, newspaper of the U.D.A. declared: 
Yes, Mr Fitt we condemn this cowardly attack on your home by 
republican scum. But we also condemn the way you used the T.V. 
and newspapers to go police bashing. (Fitt had called for an 
inquiry into why calls for help to the R.U.C. and army went 
unheeded). You cannot expect law and order in either Catholic or 
Protestant areas if you do not fully support those who carry it 
out. The amount of Loyalists and Protestants behind the wire at 
present proves that the police are doing their duty impartially 
~ut as long as you advocate that the police will not be accepted 
in Catholic areas you only leave the Catholic supporters at the 
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mercy of republican scum who by force and intimidation regard 
themselves as the rightful heroes of Irish destiny. 15 
The Orange Standard, in a tone of patrionising irony, deplored 
the publicity for the incident in which no fatalities occurred. In 
contrast to the recent death of an R.U.C. constable killed by the 
I.R.A. that elicited no flowers from Prime Minister 
Callaghan. 16 
These publications contrasted sharply with English newspapers 
which showered him with praise. The Daily Mirror served once again 
to reinforce unflattering stereotypes of the Irish by asking, quite 
fatuously in retrospect: 
What were the mob remembering this time? It could have been the 
anniversary of the day King Billy's garter snapped. Or the day 
Daniel O'Connell had his wisdom teeth removed. 
It's all the same to the gangs who rampaged through Belfast on 
Sunday night and the bully boys who forced their way into Mr 
Fitt's home. 17 
In a similar vein, The Sun suggested: 
August is for holidays in the rest of Britain. In Ulster it is 
the month of the terrorist and the hooligan. If there is to be 
any hope for the battered province it can only come - in the words 
of the couraqeous Belfast M.P. Gerry Fitt - from standing up to 
intimidation. 1~ 
The tabloid press were not the only mediam to express admiration 
of Fitt; The Guardian did likewise: 
That Gerry Fitt lived to tell his story yesterday may well have 
been due to his courage and to the gun which - reluctantly - he 
has kept by his side, knowing how totally exposed he has been over 
the past few years to the retribution of those who seek solutions 
in Ireland wholly by terror and destruction. 19 
The Tory Daily Mail devoted a whole page article to the incident 
entitled "The defiant family Fitt declare: 
moved." 20 
We will not be 
The British media had always been sympathetic to Fitt after his 
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injury sustained in Londonderry in October 1968. Throughout the 
1970s, he had been presented as a man of moderation faced with 
overwhelming odds. This latest incident served to endear him further 
with the journalists of Fleet Street. The right wing British press 
was quite prepared to exploit Fitt for propaganda purposes. 
The day after the attack on Fitt's home, a member of the 
P.I.R.A. was shot dead by soldiers pursuing his car which went out of 
control and killed the three children of Mrs. Ann Maguire. The next 
day, the "Northern Ireland Peace People" movement was born. At their 
first rally on August 14, some 10,000 people marched while on August 
28, this number doubled. Numbers grew as both Catholics and 
Protestants joined the movement. Fitt welcomed their appearance: 
No politician worthy of the name can now show less courage than 
that seen in our streets within recent weeks by women and men. 
Politicians must now listen to the clear voice of their own 
constituents which has united with that of their political 
opponents in a demand for action along the lines indicated by 
them. 21 
War-weariness and the media ensured that the movement found a 
very receptive audience. Paddy Devlin had warned the Peace People 
not to "go political", but the movement became more and more 
identified with condemning Provisional but not Security Force 
violence. In short, the movement became anti-republican. Kevin 
Kelly describes the reason for the crusade's demise: 
If nothing else, the Peace People proved that no public group can 
possibly be non-political. Even when an organization claims not 
to be interested in economic or social debates, it is necessarily 
taking a political position - one that favours the established 
order by default. It was this wilfully ignored factor that 
ultimately caused the movement to peter-out less than one year 
after that hot August afternoon in 1976. 22 
Fitt himself came to realise the political realities of the 
situation: 
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I repeat that the S.D.L.P. wants to see every success visited upon 
the Peace Movement in Northern Ireland, but at the end of the day 
political decisions will have to be taken, and I know that the 
people who are marching in support of peace will have to depend on 
their elected representatives. I only hope that I will be 
one. 23 
At the beginning of September, the British government changed 
officials in the Northern Ireland Office, and the man chosen by 
Callaghan to replace Rees, Roy Mason, personified the policy shift 
towards criminalisation of the Provisionals. Fitt considered it 
"disastrous." He told me: "Mason was arrogant and bumptious. The 
way he spoke on the T.V. was even driving me into the arms of the 
I.R.A. I was even beginning to think they were right. He drove the 
S.D.L.P. to become more green - more nationalist - because of his 
arrogant manner." 24 Fitt's remark suggests that he identified 
more readily with the "green wing" of the S.D.L.P. during Mason's 
tenure in Northern Ireland. 
Mason is a very direct Yorkshireman, a coal miner at 14, and 
very much on the right wing of the Labour Party. Before his 
appointment he held a position in the Ministry of Defence. He was to 
implement a series of measures designed to crush the Provisionals, 
and he showed little interest in promoting political initiatives. 
Fitt's opinion has changed little. On the night of the assignation 
he commented: "He is an anti-Irish wee get", 25 and was so 
upset at the arrangement that he refused to even meet Mason. 26 
This shows that there was a personal element in the political 
differences between the two men. For his part, Mason was not 
particularly enamoured of Fitt. In a recent television interview he 
described Fitt as being "like a tap, he can switch on and switch off 
and he can turn from hot to cold." 27 The relationship, 
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despite their similar backgrounds, was at best acrimonious, and such 
an unharmonious liaison was detrimental for Northern Irish politics. 
The unionists, conversely, were delighted with the new man, who it 
was thought would listen to the army and emphasise security. 28 
In response to Mason's appointment, the S.D.L.P. issued a 
statement declaring: "The first thing the British government must 
now do is state bluntly what are their intentions, both short-term 
and long-term, for the future of Northern Ireland." It also asked if 
the British were hiding behind the Loyalist veto: 
When the British government repeatedly underline their guarantees 
to the unionist population of membership of the United Kingdom, 
are these guarantees unconditional? Are there any terms to be 
fulfilled in order to retain membership of the United Kingdom? If 
so, what are they? If not, is a section of the unionist 
population, a tiny percentage of the U.K. population, to have a 
permanent veto on how Northern Ireland is to be governed within 
the U.K.?29 
Mason did not reply. The tone of the statement showed that the 
S.D.L.P. politicians felt that they were to be ditched. The party 
turned to Dublin. A four-man delegation comprising Fitt, Devlin, 
Hume and Currie urged the Irish government to impress upon Britain 
the necessity for a new initiative to end the political deadlock in 
the North. 30 This policy proved fruitless. Cosgrave's 
administration was still reluctant to involve itself again and 
Callaghan, like Mason, gave little priority to political advance 
apart from sporadic utterances that there would have to be 
partnership government. Fitt finally agreed to meet Mason in October 
after an escalation in sectarian violence. 31 
In Britain meanwhile, the Labour Party had been defeated in two 
by-elections and consequently Fitt and Maguire attained a greater 
importance in a period when the government hoped to push some 
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controversial Bills through the Commons. Maguire came close to 
practising the abstentionist policy favoured by republicans and had 
rarely attended at Westminster. On this occasion, however, he was 
believed to have told Labour Whips that he would turn up to vote with 
the government. Fitt explained his position: 
As far as the two by-elections defeats are concerned, it will not 
affect my view about the necessity to support the government on 
this occasion. On such socialist measures as pay beds, aircraft 
and shipbuilding nationalisation and comprehensive education, I 
will certainly be supporting the government. However, on other 
matters - particularly those relating to Northern Ireland - I will 
have to review the situation as it comes along. 32 
On his election to Westminster in 1966, Fitt had simply demanded 
British rights for the citizens of Northern Ireland. By the mid 
1970s, however, he had drawn a sharp distinction between British 
politics and Northern Irish politics. 
In the event, the two Irishmen duly came through for the Labour 
Party - it won by a bare one majority vote on a motion to cut short 
discussion on the Shipbuilding and Aircraft Nationalisation Bill. 
The voting was 311 for the government, against 310 for the combined 
opposition parties. Afterwards Fitt reconfirmed his position: 
I only hope to be able to continue my representations to a 
socialist government on behalf of my constituents, but if the time 
should ever arise when there appears to be a conflict between the 
interests of a British government and the welfare of my 
constituents, I will have no hesitation in placing that welfare in 
first priority. 33 
What did Fitt mean by the "welfare of his constituents"? We can 
assume that he wanted the benefits of British socialist measures but 
at the same time he made it clear that his socialism would be 
subordinated to nationalist principles. This posture is ironic when 
we consider that, privately at least, Fitt felt S.D.L.P. nationalism 
was too strident. 
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At the S.O.L.P. Party conference at the end of the year, the 
frustrations which existed became apparent and there was a clear 
desire from some members for a change of direction. An attempt to 
challenge the policy of partnership government within the United 
Kingdom was met by Fitt: "In the end we will be proved right. We 
believe that our policy of partnership and reconciliation is the 
correct one and that it is the only policy that will bring peace to 
Northern Ireland." 34 The motion was defeated but a significant 
one-third of the delegates present voted for a proposal to refer back 
a document on party policy drawn up by the Executive. The voting was 
70 in support of existing party policy and 32 to refer it back. 
Paddy Devlin again raised the question of negotiated 
independence and was supported by Seamus Mallon, S.D.L.P. 
representative for Armagh, who considered it a "viable half way 
house" towards unity. 35 Fitt was totally against this idea: 
"I cannot foresee the day when I would support the idea of 
independence for Northern Ireland. It would leave the Catholic 
community in a very vulnerable position. 1136 By 147 votes to 51 
the conference agreed that the party should make its own study of the 
prospects of negotiated independence, although it was emphasised that 
this did not mean that the party accepted the principle of 
independence. The Belfast Telegraph reported that Fitt would 
reconsider his position if the party adopted independence as a 
pol icy. 37 In the event, when it was seen that Mason had no 
intention of pulling out, the attraction of the idea lost its 
momentum. 
The most serious challenge to party policy was a resolution put 
forward by Paddy Duffy, S.D.L.P. representative for mid Ulster, 
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calling for British withdrawal: 
we have to realise that any settlement for the North will have to 
be put to the people of the South in a referendum. The fact that 
a British presence continues to be a referee between the two 
sections of our community prevents us from getting together to 
solve our problems. 38 
Mallon supported the motion: "We oppose the British presence. 
This party fundamentally wants to see the end of British rule in this 
part of Ireland." 39 Fitt, Hume and Currie argued against the 
mot ion. 40 In the event the motion was defeated by 158 votes to 
111 but the result indicated a further swing to old-style 
national ism. 41 Furthermore, of the 17 S.D.L.P. convention 
members 10 voted for the motion, including Devlin and Cooper. Within 
the party, irreconcilable attitudes were developing. The maintenance 
of a cohesive political party would be a difficult task for Fitt and 
the leadership. 
This confused political scenario extended into 1977 with Fitt 
continuing to urge Mason to adopt some form of initiative. 42 
Mason was unmoved by such promptings: "I should not like to say 
emphatically and dogmatically that there will be no political 
initiatives from Her Majesty's Government, but I am not satisfied 
that the time is right or opportune." 43 Hume voiced opinion 
about the consequences of political inertia: "The terrible danger is 
that if constitutional political parties such as the S.D.L.P. are 
seen to be having no success, people will turn away in another 
direction and the only direction being offered is the gun."« 
The erection of political structures which would involve both 
communities in the government of the province was still basic 
S.D.L.P. policy. At a debate in London organized by Young 
Conservatives in January, Fitt argued: "Then and only then will the 
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I.R.A., U.D.A., U.V.F., Red Hand Commandos 45 and all the other 
despicable organisations and their set of initials which mean so much 
to the tragedy of Northern Ireland, fade into 
. . f. 1146 ins1gn1 1cance. 
In March, Brian Faulkner was killed in a riding accident. 
Faulkner was the only unionist leader who could have perhaps gained 
enough public support to enable a power-sharing government to take 
root and become a permanent feature of Northern Ireland politics. 
Fitt was quick to pay tribute: 
I was a political opponent of his for many years but I found him 
to be a man of absolute honour and integrity in his approach to 
trying to create a power-sharing community in Northern Ireland. 
Those who still believe in power-sharing will sadly miss his 
influence in this field because he was convinced this was the only 
way ahead for Northern Ireland. 47 
Even with Faulkner's considerable political skill, it is highly 
unlikely that the concept of power-sharing could have been 
resurrected. His death spelt its permanent demise. 
Meanwhile, Mason continued to strive for a military solution to 
the problems of Northern Ireland. He told the House of Commons that 
the British government had the will to win the battle against the 
LR.A.: 
What is required ... is for us to point out that this is a battle 
not only of propaganda but of wills, and that we have the will to 
win. If the people will back the R.U.C. in its endeavours they 
will find out that it is beating the terrorists step by step. In 
1976, 934 persons were convicted, on indictment of scheduled 
offences. It is by giving the R.U.C. encouragement, standing by 
law and order, and being able to process people throuqh the Courts 
as common criminals that we shall beat the terrorists.4'B 
Fitt was certainly no friend of the Provisionals, yet he was 
frustrated at Mason's lack of endeavour to establish devolved 
government in Northern Ireland, yet he still remained loyal to the 
Labour Party. Both he and Maguire voted with the government in a 
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Tory motion of no-confidence, on March 23. This result was 322 to 
298 in favour of the government which was helped by a pact with the 
Liberal Party. 49 
Despite all Mason's efforts against the Provisionals, Paisley 
claimed that not enough was being done on the security front and 
called a strike, demanding tougher measures. Fitt declared in the 
Commons, "the gauntlet thrown down by the fascists in Northern 
Ireland should be picked up by this democratic parliament. 1150 
The strike lacked the emotion of 1974. On April 29, shipyard 
workers voted not to support the stoppage; Official Unionist, 
Vanguard and Orange Order leaders had already expressed their 
opposition. Mason refused to be coerced and used the army and police 
to respond to allegations of intimidation. On May 3, the first day 
of the strike, many factories remained open. On May 6, power station 
workers refused to support the stoppage and it was finally called off 
on May 13, with the U.D.A. largely discredited. Only Paisley claimed 
that the strike had been a success. On the previous day Fitt had 
made his views on Paisley quite clear at Westminster when he stated 
that "the hon. Member for Antrim North is in urgent need of 
psychiatric treatment and that he is more to be pitied than 
blamed. "51 By contrast, Fitt praised Mason and told the Irish 
News, "His conduct during the strike leads me to withdraw anything I 
said when he was appointed. He showed himself to be a person who 
would not be bullied." 52 Fitt also went as far as to give 
guarded tribute to the R.U.C. He said that their action during the 
strike had done much to improve relations between themselves and the 
Catholic community. He claimed also that there could be no overnight 
transition in the way Catholics regarded the police but the R.U.C. 
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had done much to "engender a new trust."~ Such sentiments 
caused some consternation among his "greener" colleagues in the 
s.o.L.P., but provoked outright hostility from Provisional Sinn 
Fein. A statement described Fitt's comment as "totally ridiculous" 
and claimed: 
In the two weeks that he refers to, approximatell 10 cases of 
torture at the R.U.C. Barracks at Castlereagh5 have been 
reported to our offices. It is this performance that symbolises 
the true role of the Loyalist R.U.C. As the armed wing of Ulster 
unionism, their history has been to smash any opposition to 
English and Loyalist rule in the six occupied counties, a role 
seen very clearly in this past nine years. It is very obvious 
that Mr Fitt is merely doing the British government's 
work. 55 
The extent to which Fitt's comments may have been detrimental to 
the S.D.L.P. were tested in the local government elections held in 
the week following the strike. Fitt declared that the election was 
an opportunity for both communities to make their attitude to the men 
of violence patently clear. 56 He again contested Belfast area 
'G', and topped the poll. 
The S.0.L.P. did well in the election. It increased its vote 
from 13.8% in 1973 to 20.6% and gained an extra 30 seats moving from 
83 to 113. The S.0.L.P. could now claim to be the sole 
representative of the minority community. Fitt was delighted with 
the result: 
I have been in politics for many years, long before many of the 
major groups were on the scene and tonight I can say that I have 
derived greater pleasure and satisfaction from being at this time 
the leader of one of the most important parties in Northern 
I rel and. 57 
Such assertions suggested that Fitt was content within the 
S.D.L.P. and comfortable with its direction and policies. 
Nevertheless, the extent to which the "tail was wagging the head" is 
open to conjecture. 
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The Official Unionists performed badly in the election, and 
gained just under 30% of the vote. The Alliance Party gained 14%, 
and the D.U.P. 12%. Fitt maintained that the strong support for the 
s.D.L.P. and Alliance Parties should have encouraged the Unionist 
Party to sever its links with Paisley and review its policies. He 
clearly desired an end to direct rule: "The only way forward is 
through reconciliation and a partnership government that can bring 
back to Northern Ireland most of the powers now held by Ministers 
seconded here from London."~ 
On August 10, the Queen began a two day visit to Northern 
Ireland as part of her Silver Jubilee celebrations. Since attendance 
at royal functions by members of the party would have stretched their 
credibility with many supporters to breaking-point, this visit put 
Fitt and the S.D.L.P. in an awkward position . The fact that the 
Queen's coming coincided with the anniversary of internment did not 
make things any easier. Consequently, Fitt and other leading 
S.D.L.P. members declined invitations to attend receptions connected 
with the visit. Fitt was flippant: "I have a hazy recollection of 
getting such a letter, but I have not yet decided what I should do 
about it. However, I would say that it is not the highest on my list 
of priorities."~ 
The Queen's presence provoked some rioting in West Belfast. 
Afterwards Fitt acknowledged that the Queen was likely to be a 
"decent human person" but suggested that the violence was a result of 
"British royalty and the Union Jack always being identified with one 
section of the community in Northern Ireland. 1160 This comment 
is interesting when we consider Fitt's later elevation to the 
peerage. 
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The S.D.L.P. had managed to tread a fine line between de facto 
and de jure recognition of the state. On most issues, with the 
exception of the police, they had avoided controversy but the royal 
visit posed a special problem. The party had to take some stand and 
decided to cling to its nationalist principles. Fitt did not stray 
from this policy. He insisted that the Loyalist community had 
adopted an attitude of intransigence and arrogance. He added: "All 
our appeals have been rejected and some minority representatives are 
beginning to feel a little tired when they are being lectured to make 
further concessions to unionism. We have given so much. We are not 
prepared to give any more." 61 
The S.D.L.P. had managed to remain united when it had some 
prospect of power. After the Jubilee celebrations no political 
initiative was formulated and party members became disillusioned. 
Many of them increased the nationalist content of their political 
rhetoric. Fitt's militant posturing is an example of his attempt to 
keep up with this drift. 
As a consequence of rising S.D.L.P. nationalism, Paddy Devlin 
resigned the Chairmanship of the S.D.L.P's Constituency 
Representatives Council. This move was in response to an S.D.L.P. 
Policy Committee document called "Facing Reality", which urged 
greater emphasis upon the Irish dimension. 62 Devlin castigated 
the party leadership for relinquishing the "left-of-centre 
principles" advocated at its formation: 
With one or two notable exceptions, none of the leading members has 
done anything to promote these policies since 1974, and little 
enough before that. In spite of the fact that we are confronted 
with the worst figures of unemployment, poverty, housing and 
general income levels in Western Europe we have rarely heard a 
cheep of protest from men who a short time ago had ministerial 
responsibility for those very departments. 63 
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Devlin's dissatisfaction with S.D.L.P. policy was widely known 
for some time. His strong criticism thus led to his expulsion from 
the party. As both Devlin and Fitt were founder members of the 
s.D.L.P., sharing an urban and labour background, one would have 
expected them to be natural allies, but this was not the case. Hume 
claimed, "They did not get on well at all."~ Currie confirmed 
this viewpoint: 
It was an up and down relationship and depended upon how one of 
them reacted to particular things and to particular personalities 
at particular times. It was never an easy relationship. Gerry, to 
large extent, felt that he had to be careful about Devlin because 
after all, Devlin was in West Belfast and could have created 
difficulties there. 65 
Fitt himself admits that their relationship was not satisfactory, 
and felt that Devlin resented his success in West Belfast: 
Paddy was from the Falls Road. I was not. I was an import from 
the other side of the city, coming in. I was like Jesus Christ on 
the Falls Road and Paddy was bound to resent this. A quite natural 
feeling. He always had a bit of a chip on his shoulder. My 
natural ally in the S.D.L.P. was Austin Currie. It should have 
been Paddy. We were together on most things but there was always 
the personal thing. 66 
Devlin on the other hand maintains that Fitt should have 
supported him in his stance. 67 As Devlin provided most of the 
socialist input into S.D.L.P. policy, and Fitt always professed that 
he was a socialist above anything else, he should logically have 
backed Devlin. He did not do so. Fitt followed the nationalist swing 
of the party and a week after Devlin resigned said: 
If the Unionist majority in the North are determined to become more 
Orange than ever before in pursuit of their own culture, then it is 
only to be expected that the minority who are part of the majority 
in this island will want to assert their culture. And that, in 
short, means the Irish dimension will always be S.D.L.P. 
policy. 68 
Fitt was quite unequivocal. There was no doubt that on this 
occasion he subordinated his socialism to nationalism. 
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With the resignation of Devlin, Fitt became the only 
socialist-orientated member of the leadership, and was thus further 
isolated. Rather than being a left of centre party committed to 
integrating the Catholic community into a constitutional framework 
the S.D.L.P. became increasingly like a crypto - Republican Party. 
By not backing Devlin (even though he probably agreed with him) Fitt 
indicated that he was prepared to submit to this direction. If his 
nationalist rhetoric was articulated for party purposes more than 
personal conviction (as evidence has suggested) he may have felt to 
relinquish the leadership would end any chance he had of dampening 
S.D.L.P. nationalism. 
The Irish Independence Party (1.1.P.), was formed in October 
1977. 69 This new party was a direct challenge to the S.D.L.P., 
its leading figures being former Unity M.P. for Fermanagh/South 
Tyrone, Frank McManus, and Fergus McAteer, son of the Nationalist 
Party leader and a Londonderry Councillor. The new party sought 
British withdrawal and attacked the S.D.L.P. for continual "sell 
outs." It was felt that it could be a threat to the S.D.L.P. in 
republican-inclined areas owing to their more militant profile. 
When the S.D.L.P. held their seventh annual conference in 
November, Fitt was surprisingly optimistic - "For the first time 
since 1974 and the fall of the Executive there is hope that political 
progress can be made in governing Northern Ireland through 
consensus. 1170 He argued that he and his party were eager to 
reach an accommodation with the unionists but he again stressed the 
Irish dimension. He claimed that the unionists "must not ask us to 
wave Union Jacks or to pay homage to every member of the British 
royal family who visits these shores. We also have our culture and 
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our cherished ideals." 71 
Fitt's speech may well have been designed to placate the 
"greener" members of the S.D.L.P., as well as being a counter-attack 
against the 1.1.P. The conference by-passed, however, a full demand 
for British withdrawal. Three motions in favour of such a move were 
dropped in the interests of party unity, although Mallon, Cooper and 
Duffy all spoke positively on their behalf. 72 The "green wing" 
of the party had been defeated. Nevertheless, the increased 
nationalist arguments within the party weakened Fitt's position as 
leader. 
Fitt's optimism at the conference was due to knowledge of 
Mason's plan to re-open political dialogue. At the end of November, 
Mason held talks with the major parties, on the basis of setting up 
an Assembly with no legislative powers. Fitt led the S.D.L.P. 
delegation in the discussions: "There are no guarantees of success, 
but at least we must explore the situation." 73 
The portents for success were not good. Mason's approach was 
half-hearted and both the S.D.L.P. and the unionists had adopted more 
intransigent positions. The unionists were aided by the new Premier 
of the Republic, Jack Lynch, who stressed his commitment to eventual 
unification after being relatively quiet on the Northern problem 
since his re-election in June. The talks failed. 
Fitt had to end the year by contenting himself with the Labour 
Party's assurance that they were still committed to power-sharing. 
He reported his meeting with Callaghan and Mason to the Irish News: 
Jim Callaghan told me that in no circumstances would a Labour 
government enter into a pact with unionists from Northern Ireland 
which would lead to the exclusion of the Catholic minority in 
future government. 
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These talks confirm the confidence the S.D.L.P. has always held in 
the Labour government, and we now look forward to a series of 
talks to further cement the relationship which our party has with 
the Labour Party as members of the socialist movement. 74 
Fitt's optimism was unjustified. He still retained a blind 
faith in the Labour Party's capacity and willingness to rectify the 
problems of Northern Ireland. All too often, high ministerial 
dialogue and soothing words placated Fitt. The year 1977 had been an 
extremely difficult and frustrating time for him and the S.D.L.P; 
1978 would be no better. 
The S.D.L.P. were then pushed into a further nationalist stance 
by the Conservative Party, keen to woo the unionists. Airey Neave 
told the Commons that "power-sharing was no longer practical," Fitt 
quickly responded to the suggestion. "Airey Neave is electioneering 
and is seeking the support of the unionist M.P's at Westminster. He 
could get their support at the cost of further bloodshed." 75 
Eddie McGrady, S.D.L.P. constituency representative for South 
Down, warned that the S.D.L.P. "in the face of new expressions of 
intolerance, intransigence and insincerity, must immediately 
re-appraise its approach to constitutional problems." 76 Fitt 
supported his colleague: 
This is a natural reaction to what Airey Neave has said. Mr Neave 
is coming out four-square for a return to majority rule in 
Northern Ireland, which is fully backing the unionist line on 
integration. Under no circumstances would we be prepared to 
accept that, and, by taking up that kind of position, it is 
naturally going to put us into a situation where we will have to 
reassess our attitudes. If that is what the Conservatives are 
doing - and it appears to be a firm lurch to the right, with Mr 
Neave playing the orange card - then it goes without saying what 
our reaction would be. 77 
Fitt presumably meant that the S.D.L.P. would play the "green" 
card. In May, Neave said that if the Conservatives came to power 
they would carry out major government reforms in Northern Ireland, 
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and if he was made Secretary of State for the province, that he would 
introduce measures to restore more power to the local electorate. 
Fitt was alarmed: 
If Maggie Thatcher is ever prime minister - and this is something 
I doubt very much will ever happen - she would do well to think of 
someone else to head the representatives of the British government 
here. We have had our share of trouble and sorrow here but I 
can't help thinking that it would be a lot worse with Mr Neave in 
his naivety at the helm. 78 
In the following month, Fitt made it quite clear why he had 
supported the Labour government despite its apathy towards finding a 
political solution. Interviewed on British television, he said that 
the minority in Northern Ireland would view with suspicion anything 
which emanated from a Thatcher government: 
It was different when it was led by Ted Heath because the minority 
in Northern Ireland felt the Conservatives under Heath were trying 
to resolve the problems of Northern Ireland. But certainly the 
Conservatives as we see them now from Belfast, are extreme right 
wing. 79 
Fitt believed that if there were a general election, it might 
create a hung parliament. If this happened, he feared the Tories 
would restore power to the unionist ascendancy. Fitt's dread of the 
Tories therefore primarily stemmed from nationalist principles rather 
than socialist noumenon. 
The antagonistic relationship between the S.D.L.P. and the 
Conservative Party did not mean that its association with the Labour 
Party was good. Indeed, the opposite was true. Fitt was anxious to 
reaffirm that Callaghan was committed to power-sharing, but this was 
not enough for some of his colleagues. Mallon was predictably one of 
the more vocal critics. After an S.D.L.P. meeting with the Labour 
Party in February, he said: "We left the prime minister and members 
of the Labour National Executive in no doubt about our attitude 
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towards them. It is one of quite considerable anger and disgust over 
their negative position." 80 
Fitt had also forgotten his new found admiration for Mason after 
the May 1977 strike, when Mason had accused the Republic of allowing 
their territory to be used by Provisionals. Fitt resented this and 
argued that Mason was looking for a scapegoat because he had not 
achieved military victory against the I.R.A. He fulminated: 
His arrogance and hostile attitude ensured that all the major 
political parties in Ireland, excluding the Loyalists and 
unionists, stood together as never before in opposition to the 
Secretary of State. 
Whitelaw, Pym and Rees never united the anti-unionist political 
parties in this island, but Mason by his arrogance and bombast has 
achieved this The days of this type of imperial arrogance 
have aone even if it does come from a former Yorkshire 
miner. 81 
Mason's machinations had clearly exasperated Fitt, and he had 
reverted to his initial opinion of the Secretary of State. Fitt may 
have had reservations about S.D.L.P. nationalism but Mason made him 
question such feelings and prompted some stinging attacks. 
Although Mason had not secured military victory against the 
Provisionals, he had come close - a point to which the Provisionals 
themselves admitted. 82 His measures had forced them to 
reorganize and by early 1978, they had changed militarily into the 
classic cell-structure of three or four activists. On February 17, 
12 people were killed when they bombed the La Mon Restaurant outside 
Belfast. This bomb exploded prematurely and the Provisionals 
apologized to the relatives of the victims. This, of course, was not 
enough to prevent condemnation and Fitt, as was his habit, was one of 
the first to denounce the action. 83 
The tragedy of La Mon was a further setback for the 
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Provisionals, but proved only temporary. The republican movement had 
opened up another front which would ultimately lead to a sequence of 
events that would transform nationalist politics and have a great 
impact on the political career of Fitt. 
When Rees had withdrawn Special Category Status in March 1976, 
all new convicted prisoners were to be treated the same - in other 
words, they would have to do penal work and wear prison clothes. The 
first convicted prisoner under the new policy was Kieran Nugent and 
he set a precedent which others would follow by refusing to be 
treated as an ordinary criminal, claiming political motivation for 
his actions. Consequently, he refused to wear prison clothes and was 
eventually issued a prison blanket. Nugent was the first to go on 
"The Blanket." 84 
In February 1978, Provisional Sinn Fein joined the P.O., 
Bernadette McAliskey (formerly Devlin), and others in the Relatives 
Action Committees, to spotlight the condition of the prisoners. In 
March, the inmates intensified their protest for political status, by 
beginning what became known as the "dirty protest." They refused to 
wash or use toilet facilities, instead smeared their own excreta on 
their cell walls and by the summer the protest involved 250 
republican prisoners. 
In August, Archbishop Tomas O Fiaich, the Catholic Church's most 
prominent figure in Ireland, visited the H-Blocks. 0 Fiaich 
described the conditions as "inhuman and degrading" and suggested 
that the authorities recognise that republican prisoners were 
different from common criminals. 85 
The republicans were pleased by such utterances from a leading 
member of the establishment - Fitt was not. He now claims that 
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because of what he considered a pro-Provisional stance by O'Fiaich he 
seriously contemplated resigning his Westminster seat. It was _only 
the intervention of his eldest daughter, Joan, which persuaded him 
not to resign. 86 Fitt's opinion that the Provisionals were 
simply murderers did not alter in the years ahead. August 24 saw the 
tenth anniversary of the first Civil Rights march from Coalisland to 
Dungannon and another was planned to mark the occasion. Fitt claimed 
that demonstration had nothing to do with the ideal behind the Civil 
Rights Movement in 1968 and explained why he would not attend: 
The march that took place on August 24, 1968 was a march which 
demanded Civil Rights for everyone in Northern Ireland who had 
been denied them. They were those who thought they would be 
denied jobs, homes and votes because of their religion or 
politics. Tomorrow's march is under completely different auspices 
and I certainly will not be there. Had the people who are running 
this march listened to what we had to say in 1968 and took heed of 
our position on violence, there would not have been 10 tragic 
years in between and there would be no prisoners. 87 
Currie also declared that he would not attend. Bernadette 
McAliskey was candid in her assessment of why the two S.D.L.P. men 
would not participate: 
The frontline in the August '68 march were people who came in from 
the outside to make their points and be seen. They all went on to 
do different things. But the people who organised the march and 
who took part in the rank and file will be there tomorrow, and 
they won't miss the big wigs from the city. 88 
In November, at its annual conference, the S.D.L.P. adopted an 
important shift in party policy. In the previous April, Paddy Duffy 
had argued that Loyalist intransigence had made it pointless for the 
S.D.L.P. to continue to strive for power-sharing. From now on, he 
claimed, the all Ireland context should be pursued.M By the 
time the conference was held, this attitude was shared by the vast 
majority of rank and file S.D.L.P. delegates. Austin Currie had 
proposed a motion that declared "disengagement to be both inevitable 
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and desirable." Even before the conference began, Fitt felt it 
necessary to deny that it was a return to old-style nationalism; 
"This doesn't mean the S.D.L.P. is a green party in the sense that 
people are trying to project it." 
Currie's motion was passed overwhelmingly by the 400 delegates, 
with only two votes against and one abstention. Speaking at the end 
of the conference, Fitt adamantly restated the party's commitment to 
the reunification of Ireland: 
Let me state it in quite blunt terms ... the S.D.L.P. does not 
believe that the partition of this country was ever justified. 
The S.D.L.P. wants to unite people of all religions and outlooks, 
not only in Northern Ireland, but the whole of Ireland, so that we 
can eventually bring about the reunification of this country by 
consent, not coercion. 
Fitt argued that it was inevitable that the British would have 
to withdraw and it was the task of his party to create the conditions 
that could make British departure "come all the more soon" and 
without the bloodshed that marked colonial disengagements in other 
parts of the world. If Fitt was less nationalist than his 
colleagues, he disguised it very well. His speech contained only one 
reference to party disunity which he described as "a very slight 
splintering" of the unanimity which had brought all those political 
parties together to oppose unionism. 89 
In 1976, the S.D.L.P. leadership had successfully, but narrowly, 
fought off a British withdrawal motion. In 1977, it had done so 
again, with greater ease. By the end of 1978, the political 
situation had reached such a level of stalemate, that the vast 
majority of the S.D.L.P. wanted the party to change its political 
approach. It was thus decided to concentrate on the Anglo-Irish 
dimension and seek support from the British and Irish governments, 
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especially the latter, to create political movement and end the 
deadlock. The fact that Fitt remained leader of the party and 
considering his rhetoric at the conference, one must conclude that he 
was again prepared to go along with the majority despite any personal 
reservations he may have had. 
The open enmity between Mason and Fitt continued into 1979. In 
February, the Secretary of State had given an interview to 
Independent Radio in which he suggested that the Official Unionists 
were the party of moderation and that the S.D.L.P. and D.U.P. were 
extremists. 90 
Commons. 91 
Fitt launched a blistering attack in the 
Soon afterwards he made it clear that he would now 
not support the Labour government in a vote of confidence: "I can't 
vote for a government whose Northern Ireland Secretary has 
antagonised most of the population of Northern Ireland and put 
himself in the pocket of the unionists." 92 There was no 
ambiguity in this statement. Fitt was prepared to suspend his 
socialist principles and operate on nationalist tenets. In short, he 
was inviting the scenario he most detested, a Tory government with 
Neave as a possible Secretary of State. 
Early in the following month he re-affirmed his position: 
They (the Labour Government) had given into unionist blackmail 
... As a matter of pure political expediency it has done deals 
with the unionist M.P's, the most notorious being the promise of 
more seats for Northern Ireland at Westminster in return for 
unionist votes to keep the Labour government in power. 93 
Fitt had been against greater representation for Ulster at 
Westminster since May 1977, when Callaghan had given the go-ahead for 
a special conference to examine the case, 94 and for the rest of 
the year, opposed any such move. 95 Fitt's resistance was 
understandable. Since the S.D.L.P. was formed the whole basis of its 
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policy was that the solution to the Northern Ireland problem could 
not be confined to the British context. That is why it insisted on 
the Irish dimension. An increase in Northern Irelandis 
representation at Westminster would therefore be a negation of a 
fundamental S.D.L.P. policy. 
Despite S.D.L.P. objections in April, Callaghan did bring in a 
Bill to increase the number of Northern Irish M.P's to a minimum of 
16 and a maximum of 18. In November, Fitt told the Commons that any 
increase in the number of seats for Northern Ireland at Westminster 
would consolidate the British dimension and make it less likely that 
unionist representatives would seek any accommodation with the 
minority in creating political structures. 96 Despite Fitt's 
protestations, Callaghan persisted, and the second reading of the 
Re-distribution of Seats (N.I.) Bill, proposing to increase Northern 
Ireland representatives to 17, was passed in the Commons and welcomed 
by the Conservative Party. Fitt commented on the result: "I do not 
accept that this Bill was brought before the House with the intention 
of giving fairness and justice to the electorate and the M.P's of 
Northern Ireland." 97 The Bill became law and was implemented 
for the 1983 Westminster election. An editorial in the Irish News 
interpreted the new legislation: 
There is a simple explanation for the Callaghan government's show 
of generosity towards the North by the decision to increase the 
number of seats at Westminster - survival. Those extra seats 
could provide the necessary votes to secure victory in vital and 
close debates. 98 
Fitt had made the same deduction and it was little wonder that 
he had become so disgruntled. In March 1979, his dismay with the 
government was given renewed impetus by the allegations of Dr Robert 
Irwin, a police surgeon, who claimed on television that he knew of at 
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least 150 people who had been seriously injured by the R.U.C. while 
in custody. 99 This testimony confirmed the findings of. an 
Amnesty International report in June 1978, which expressed concern 
about R.U.C. interrogation methods. Fitt attacked both Mason and the 
Chief Constable of the R.U.C.: 
If Mr. Mason or the Chief Constable, Sir Kenneth Newman, claim 
they are unaware of these practices then they prove themselves 
guilty of incompetence. If they were aware these practices were 
taking place then they prove themselves to be liars. In either 
case there is no longer any room for them in Northern 
I rel and. 100 
The British government issued the Bennett Report which accepted 
that there was prima facie evidence of ill-treatment having 
occurred. Mason belittled the findings by promising to act on only 2 
of its 34 recommendations to counter R.U.C. "indiscretions." 
While the controversy (over police brutality) continued, Fitt 
again made it clear that he would not support the government and 
indeed would possibly go as far as to aid the Conservatives. 
I have made it clear to all these M.P's that under no circumstance 
will I support the Labour government in a vote of confidence 
because of the attitude of the Secretary of State and the policies 
of the government in Northern Ireland. I intend to abstain, but I 
may even vote for the Tories, if I see Enoch Powell 101 going 
into the lobbies to support the government. 102 
The minority Labour government was clearly in difficulties. 
Despite agreeing, under unionist pressure, to increase the number of 
seats for Northern Ireland to 17, and despite having an informal pact 
with the Liberal party, when a vote of no-confidence was tabled it was 
certain to be a very close one. Fitt, in an emotional speech to the 
House of Commons, reiterated why he would no longer support the Labour 
Party. He told the House that this would be the "unhappiest" speech 
he had ever articulated. He maintained that throughout his time at 
Westminster he had never voted in the Conservative Lobby even when it 
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was "courageously trying to grapple" with the Northern Ireland 
problem between 1970 and 1974. He lamented the fall of the 
power-sharing Executive and blamed the U.W.C. strike on the negligent 
Labour government: 
That strike terrified the Labour government. Since then, the 
Labour government has been running away. They have not stood up 
to unionists and loyalists extremists as they should have done 
In all conscience I would be a liar and a traitor to the 
people who sent me here if I were to go into the Lobby tonight 
with the Labour government to express confidence in their handling 
of the affairs of Northern Ireland ... 
He made it clear on what basis he intended to cast his vote: 
I have a loyalty to this government, to my own working class 
movement in the United Kingdom and further afield. But I have a 
greater loyalty to the people of Northern Ireland ... It is their 
voice saying that because of what the government has done in the 
past five years - disregarded the minority and appeased the 
blackmailers of the Northern Ireland unionist majority - I cannot 
go into the Lobby with them tonight. 103 
Fitt duly abstained and the government was defeated by one vote -
311 to 310. Callaghan was forced to call a general election for May. 
In that election the Labour Party was defeated and so began eleven and 
a half years of uninterupted anti-working class policies under 
Margaret Thatcher and her Tory government. 
There is substance to the charge that Fitt had supported 
successive Labour governments, who had, in the past, displayed a lack 
of interest in Northern Ireland and indeed a lack of political and 
moral courage in defence of British Acts of parliament. By 1979, 
however, Fitt finally had enough. Two reasons influenced his change 
of heart - the decision of the government to go ahead with legislation 
for extra parliamentary seats for Ulster (ostensibly to keep the 
province in line with the rest of the United Kingdom); and his 
disgust over the attitude of Roy Mason. 
In his memoirs, James Callaghan talks of Fitt's abstension: 
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Gerry Fitt ... who had consistently supported the government in 
previous vital votes, spoke and voted against us despite desperate 
efforts by a number of Labour members to persuade him oth~rwise 
Gerry was a brave man and a warm hearted impulsive character 
but he took the wrong turning that night. 104 
Fitt remains unrepentant: "The unionists were dictating policy 
to the Labour government so it was no longer a Labour government. 
Any allegiance I had to the Labour Party evaporated. I was keeping 
the unionists in, and so I decided to abstain. I wanted to bring 
down that government." I asked him if, as a socialist and with the 
years of Thatcherism, he regretted his action. He replied, "No, at 
that time there was nothing else I could do. Given the circumstances 
that prevailed, I don't regret it. "105 Fitt's assertion that 
he is primarily a socialist hardly stands examination. Furthermore, 
if Fitt was particularly perturbed about greater Ulster 
representation at Westminster (and there is considerable evidence 
that he was), it thus marks a distinct reversal of the sentiment and 
content of his maiden speech at the House of Commons in 1966. Then 
he demanded the same rights and privileges for the people of Northern 
Ireland which were enjoyed in the rest of the United Kingdom. In 
1979, however, he opposed a bill to increase the number of Northern 
Ireland seats at Westminster. This adds fuel to the charge that his 
machinations at parliament in the late 1960s were merely an attempt 
to disrupt the unionist regime in a way which would be advantageous 
to the ending of partition. 
The 1979 general election saw Fitt exhibit supreme confidence: 
"There are some people saying this constituency is going to change 
hands, but the people know what I have done for them and I'm going to 
walk it."106 He played on his role in bringing about the 
election, claiming that intransigent unionists had sufficient votes 
to blackmail the Labour government, 
brought that blackmail to an end." 
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"but on March 20 this year I 
Ironically, he urged the 
electorate to return a strong Labour government who would be "able to 
tell the unionist parties where to go in their demands for a return 
to the old Stormont ascendency rule - then something positive might 
be achieved towards partnership rule in Northern Ireland." None of 
his opponents could possibly win, he claimed, as "A vote for them is 
a vote for unionism." 107 His optimism was justified, he won 
the election and was the only S.D.L.P. candidate returned to 
Westminster. 
In the following month, campaigns began for the European 
election. 
constituency, 
Northern 
with 
Ireland was to be a three-seater single 
election by proportional representation, in 
contrast to Britain, where the first-past-the-post-system remained. 
The P.R. scheme benefited the minority community, since the usual 
practice might have seen the unionists carry off all three seats. 
Fitt can take some credit for the continuation of P.R. in Ulster. 
In February 1978, Enoch Powell had proposed an amendment, 
calling for the first-past-the-post system to elect Northern 
Ireland's first European M.P's. Political commentators suggested 
that it would be a close vote. 108 Many left wing Labour 
members feared that P.R. in Northern Ireland would eventually lead to 
a similar procedure in Britain, to the detriment of Labour's 
electoral performance. It was expected that the Conservatives would 
probably support the unionists to a large extent. Fitt encouraged 
his Labour colleagues to support him and delivered an impassioned 
speech in the Commons which argued that the first-past-the-post 
system should not be used in Ulster because politics in the province 
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was sectarian and the majority was "artificially created" when 
Northern Ireland was established. 109 
Fitt succeeded in his task. British M.P's rejected Powell's 
proposal to bring Northern Ireland back into line with the rest of 
the United Kingdom by 241 votes to 150. Fitt was delighted with the 
outcome: "This result is very good for Northern Ireland. We will 
take that third seat. "110 
John Hume was selected by the S.D.L.P. to represent them in the 
election and he conducted a vigorous pro-European campaign, in 
contrast to the anti-European stance of the unionist politicians -
Paisley, West and Taylor. Hume, as expected, was elected, polling 
140,622 votes, 24.6% of the total vote. He won more votes than the 
combined total of the two Official Unionists, but was marginally 
short of the quota, being elected on the third count. 111 Barry 
White argues that the "European election confirmed that Hume was 
popularly regarded as the real leader of nationalist opinion in the 
North. "112 This assertion is valid since Hume had, after all, 
pushed the share of the S.D.L.P. poll to a record high. If anybody 
threatened Fitt's leadership it was indeed Hume, a point noted by 
Fortnight: 
The S.D.L.P. are also having to face up to some changes in the 
power balance. In the good old days you could point to the Social 
Democatic and Labour parts of the Party without too much 
difficulty. The Labour men were based in Belfast, and the rest in 
the country. Now with Paddy Devlin long since gone, Gerry Fitt is 
the only Labour man left. And who could blame him for feeling a 
bit uneasy at the phenomenal performance of John Hume in the 
European election. 
The article also suggested that the orientation of the party was 
changing: "The word is that most of the votes came from country 
areas, and that priests and schoolmasters were working hard at 
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. t 11113 1 • If this speculation was true, Fitt's position as 
leader was being further weakened. 
Meanwhile Fitt continued his incessant attacks on the 
Provisionals. Commenting on an upsurge in sectarian violence after 
the European election, he called them the most "desperate cowards in 
Irish history." 114 The Provisionals remained undeterred. 
August saw one of their most ruthless and dramatic operations, when 
late in the month, they detonated three bombs in two separate 
incidents on either side of the border. One killed Lord Mountbatten, 
members of his family and a 15-year-old Enniskillen boy on a boat off 
the County Sligo coast, and the others killed 18 British soldiers 
outside Warrenpoint in County Down. Fitt was appa 11 ed. 115 The 
killings prevented a planned visit by Pope John Paul II into the 
North during his visit to Ireland. Fitt claimed, "where the 
Paisleyites failed the P.I.R.A. had succeeded." 116 
At Drogheda in the Republic, the Pope addressed a crowd 
estimated at around 250,000 in October 1979 and begged all those 
engaged in violence to desist. The Provisionals rejected the Pope's 
plea in a statement claiming that only force could remove the British 
presence. 117 Fitt now maintains that the deaths in Sligo and 
Warrenpoint, combined with the Provisionals repudiation of the Papal 
request, made him severely disillusioned with politics in Northern 
I rel and. 118 It is not unreasonable to suggest that a wavering 
in Fitt's allegiance to the concept of nationalism could be 
attributed to Provisional violence. 
At the S.D.L.P. party conference that year a new policy document 
entitled "Towards a new Ireland" was overwhelmingly passed after a 
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debate on the motion that: 
conference deplores the failure by successive British governments 
to recognise the real nature of the Northern Irish problem and 
calls on the British and Irish governments to agree to and promote 
a joint Anglo-Irish process of political, social and economic 
development within which the representatives of the two traditions 
in Northern Ireland would work in partnership towards the creation 
of peace, stability and lasting unity within Ireland. 
The S.D.L.P. had decided to no longer seek an internal solution 
with the unionists. They initiated the Anglo-Irish process. Fitt 
had been very hopeful about the prospects of power-sharing and had 
frequently lamented its failure. He was distressed at the party's 
decision to abandon that aspiration. 
The most controversial motion at the conference was proposed 
from the mid-Ulster branches which suggested that the S.D.L.P. open 
contacts with the leadership of "all political and paramilitary 
organizations who belong to the Irish tradition with a view to 
establishing a common ground for reconciliation with those of the 
British tradition." The motion was rejected, but the fact that it 
was proposed at all would have alarmed Fitt, who had established 
himself as a most implacable opponent of the Provisionals and was 
opposed to any form of dialogue with them. The writing was on the 
wall for the party leader. 119 
Following the S.D.L.P. conference, Humphrey Atkins the new 
Minister of State for Northern Ireland, launched a political 
initiative. At the end of November 1979, the government published a 
document on a proposed conference between the constitutional parties. 
This stated that the constitutional position of Northern Ireland was 
not a topic for discussion and there was no mention of an Irish 
dimension. This did not placate the S.D.L.P. Fitt however, on 
November 20, gave the document a guarded welcome. He remarked: 
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At a quick reading I find some of the proposals are very 
interesting so far as they go out of their way to give protection 
to the minority in Northern Ireland ... I believe the proposals 
are worthy of the deepest consideration and that is certainly.what 
my party will be doing at the earliest opportunity. 120 
Fitt's comments were another example of his impulsive 
individualism since he was not representing the party by them. The 
next evening the party executive and constituency representatives met 
and unanimously decided not to enter into talks unless they included 
discussions on the Irish dimension. Fitt was present but on the 
following day resigned from the S.D.L.P., blaming the party's 
decision not to participate in talks as the main reason for 
quitting. He described the ruling as "completely misguided and 
disastrous" and in an emotional statement added: "I can only say 
that I have a feeling of inutterable sadness to see at this time the 
party which I helped to create with others, turning so violently on 
the concepts on which it was founded." 
He claimed that republicans had gained greater influence in the 
party, "I have noticed that in the absence of a political initiative 
being taken, there is a strong republican element emerging in the 
ranks of the S.D.L.P. " . . . ' and went on to repudiate nationalism: 
Nationalism has been a political concept in Ireland over many, 
many years but I suggest that it has never brought peace to the 
people of the six counties. I for one have never been a 
nationalist to the total exclusion of my socialist 
ideals. 121 
Fitt's declaration is remarkable. Eight months previously he 
had made a crucial abstension in a vote of confidence in the Labour 
government. He knew full well that his decision could bring down a 
socialist government and replace it with an anti-working class 
Conservative administration. This is indeed what happened. He 
subordinated his socialism to nationalism. Now, however, he 
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repudiated nationalism after declaring in the May 1979 general 
election that the vote for his opponents was "a vote for unionism." 
This all suggested that Fitt's political thinking had either become 
confused (reinforcing the suggestion that he had never formulated a 
coherent political ideology), or had come to contain some dualism, or 
both. 
The duality can be explained - the fact that Fitt had come to a 
decision to renounce nationalism indicates that he had changed his 
political opinion. Chapters II, III and IV showed that despite 
non-sectarian socialist rhetoric, and some cross community support, 
Fitt was a nationalist. What changed his mind? The answer lies with 
the power-sharing experiment. Fitt's nationalism became less 
important than an internal Northern Ireland solution. Despite its 
failure, Fitt clung tenaciously to the belief that amity between 
politicians could be established, leading to the formation of a 
devolved form of government with power-sharing. Conversely, an 
important element in the S.D.L.P. drew different conclusions from the 
failure of the Executive and this "green" element would become 
increasingly influential. It likewise became embittered by the 
manner in which power-sharing collapsed but became convinced that a 
more forceful approach by the British government would have ensured 
the new institution's survival. This element lost confidence in the 
British government, (something that Fitt inexplicably did not) 
especially in the light of Mason's attitude, whose disregard for 
political initiatives drove the S.D.L.P. to embark upon a policy 
giving greater significance both to the Irish dimension and the 
withdrawal of British troops. In short, the S.D.L.P. reverted to a 
more nationalist position. The seeds of conflict between the leader 
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and his colleagues were there for all to see. The duality or 
confusion in Fitt's politics can be explained simply by the fact that 
he remained leader. In order to maintain party unity, he endorsed 
s.D.L.P. policy regarding the Irish dimension at party conferences 
and at crucial points (e.g. Devlin's resignation), yet paradoxicaly 
when he resigned no one seemed surprised. It can only be concluded 
that by November 1979, Fitt's nationalist sentiment had become so 
negligible that his position in the S.D.L.P. was no longer tenable. 
The reaction to Fitt's resignation not only re-confirmed (not 
that it needed it) the polarized nature of Northern Irish politics, 
but also showed now how his profile had changed within the respective 
communities. 
The nationalist community, as represented by Sinn Fein, were 
predictably critical. A spokesman claimed that the resignation was 
the "tantrum of a defeated bullyboy who for so long had enjoyed total 
domination over those he purported to lead and represent." 122 
There were not too many tears in the S.D.L.P. either at Fitt's 
departure. There was a general feeling that Fitt spent too much time 
at Westminster and had lost touch with grass-roots sentiment. Mallon 
maintained that he was "not surprised", and Duffy claimed, "Gerry is 
totally and abso 1 ute ly on his own. 11123 Fitt had become 
isolated and no longer represented the nationalist aspirations that 
the S.D.L.P. had come to express. 
Although the Irish News editorial did not deviate from orthodoxy 
in being supportive of Fitt, it did make the following crucial point: 
"Mr. Fitt says there has been a strong republican element in the 
ranks of the party. His strong repudiation of nationalism will 
surprise many who will recall that Mr. Fitt was once known as a 
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socialist Republican. "124 
The main organ of the unionist community the Belfast News 
Letter, suggested in its editorial: 
While the resignation of Mr. Fitt from the leadership of the 
S.D.L.P. comes as no surprise, its significance cannot be ignored, 
not only is it a reflection of internal dissension within the 
party but clear confirmation that the S.D.L.P. is essentially a 
republican organisation dedicated first and above all to a policy 
of Irish unity. 125 
The more moderate Belfast Telegraph editorial contained a 
similar sentiment: 
Mr. Gerry Fitt's resignation from membership, as well as 
leadership, of the S.D.L.P. should come as no real surprise to 
those who have been aware of his increasing disillusion with its 
nationalist grass-roots. A point had been reached when the West 
Belfast pragmatist had to part company with a rural-based party 
which Rut nationalist principle before practical 
politics. 1 6 
William Craig, who had done more than most to bring down the 
power-sharing Executive, commented: 
I'm sorry that it has happened but Mr Fitt is unquestionably right 
in this matter. He would not be a leader worth his salt if he did 
not back up his convictions in this way. It's a sad day for the 
S.D.L.P. but for politics it is very good to see a man who has the 
qualities of leadership. 127 
In the Republic, the Irish Press editorial commented: 
Mr Fitt, a brave, articulate and diligent representative of his 
people now goes into the wilderness, possibly to be a lone 
representative in West Belfast. Whether justly or unjustly his 
eclipse will be seen as that of yet another of the long line of 
Irish representatives at Westminster who succumbed to the fatal 
"tone of the House" and became isolated from their followers in 
Northern I rel and. 128 
This opinion was merely a watered-down version of republican 
sentiment. The headline of the November 25, 1978, edition of 
Republican News simply read, "Fitt - British Apologist. 11129 
Supporters of this view attacked Fitt's home, the worst incident 
being the one aforementioned, which occurred in August 1976. There 
267 
were others, however, which were sufficiently violent to be recorded 
by the press . 130 
West Belfast's chronic social deprivation would have been a 
strong inducement to violence and indeed to the romantic idealism of 
the I.R.A. In December 1976, Belfast housing was declared to be the 
worst in Europe. 131 In January 1978, there was the highest 
jobless total in the city since 1940. 132 In August of that 
same year, the 'Child Poverty Action Group' published a document 
asserting that nearly one third of Northern Irish families were 
living below the poverty line. 133 This is not to say that Fitt 
remained inactive on such issues. He often spoke vigorously at 
Westminster in an attempt to highlight and endeavour to improve the 
situation. 134 The forum at Westminster had however, become 
increasingly immaterial to large sections of his constituency. The 
continued army harassment, the events at Castlereagh, the Diplock 
Courts, combined with the social deprivation, was bound to alienate 
many working-class nationalists. Thatcher's monetaristic and 
anti-working class policies were to make the situation even worse. 
While Fitt remained a committed parliamentarian, Provisional 
Sinn Fein began to develop into a radical political party, involving 
itself in the community, Trade Unions, housing and employment issues, 
as well as demanding British withdrawal, and the abolition of the 
border. Aided by some dramatic events, the political wing of the 
I.R.A. would come to threaten Gerry Fitt's seat. 
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CHAPTER VII 
FROM GERRY FITT TO GERRY ADAMS 
As its title suggests, Chapter VII traces the events which led 
to the loss of Fitt's Westminster seat to Gerry Adams, head of Sinn 
Fein, the political wing of the Provisional Irish Republican Army 
(P.I.R.A.). It also includes an account of Fitt's elevation to the 
House of Lords. 
Whereas the previous chapters have tended to focus exclusively 
on Fitt, Chapter VII examines Fitt's career in relation to the 
evolution of the republican movement. 
developments are inextricably related. 
It shows that the two 
Fitt's politics became 
increasingly unacceptable to a large percentage of nationalist voters 
who consequently discarded him for a politicized Sinn Fein. 
At the end of the 1970s Fitt was very much an isolated figure. 
The Conservative victory in the May election had imperilled his 
relationship with the Labour Party and his resignation from the 
S.D.L.P. left him without political colleagues. He added to this by 
distancing himself from important politicians in the Republic. 
Towards the end of 1979, pressure had built up on the Taoiseach, 
Jack Lynch, from within his own party. Many Fianna Fail people 
argued that he was too acquiescent towards the British. In December, 
Lynch resigned and gave way to Charles Haughey as party leader and 
Taoiseach. In 1970, Haughey had been acquitted of supplying guns to 
the newly formed Provisionals, but many politicians and media 
commentators, as well as citizens of the Republic, felt that he might 
be a hardline republican. Fitt was unhappy about these developments. 
He argued that the forces that were opposing Lynch in Fianna Fail 
were the same that opposed him in the S.D.L.P. Lynch had adopted a 
274 
275 
moderate stance on the problems of Northern Ireland and Fitt 
identified with this attitude. 1 This declaration showed that 
Fitt had further shifted ground. In the past he had argued that the 
Republic's government could have made more effort to end partition. 
In 1979 he had little to fear; Haughey proved no more militant than 
his predecessor. 
Fitt continued in politics under the label "Independent 
Socialist" and would cling to this classification as steadfastly as 
he had done to the power-sharing concept. His socialist arguments at 
Westminster retained their familiar characteristics. Ideology was 
replaced with concrete examples of injustice. 
attacked Thatcherite policy in Northern Ireland: 
In March 1980, he 
I am sure that Ministers will accept that not only in this part of 
the United Kingdom but in Northern Ireland every facet of life has 
been affected by the new Tory government's doctrinaire and 
monetaristic - if there is such a word ... policies. 
There is no doubt that the effects of the doctrinaire approach of 
this government have been an absolute disaster for Northern 
Ireland. Children's school meals, the cost of housing, the 
deterioration in the number of jobs and the diminution of the 
number of home helps - all the things that made life bearable for 
the people of Northern Ireland have been disastrously affected by 
the approach of this government. 
Needless to say, Fitt did not publicize the fact that it was he 
who had helped the Conservatives into office. Although he had 
reverted to socialism at Westminster he was no theorist. When asked 
by a Tory M.P. how increased expenditure was to be funded, he 
simplistically replied, "The way of solving the problem is the issue 
that divides the two sides of this House." 2 While Fitt was 
somewhat rootless, Provisional Sinn Fein was in the process of 
internal re-organization and re-assessment, leading to eventual 
rejuvination. 
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In June 1979, a major shift in republican policy was articulated 
and consequently implemented. At the annual Wolfe Tone commemoration 
ceremony at Bodenstown in County Kildare, Gerry Adams, now Vice 
President of Provisional Sinn Fein, made an important speech on party 
progress and future policy. He praised the "blanket men" for their 
resistance to the criminalization process and al so predictably 
criticised the governments of both Britain and the Irish Republic. 
The innovative aspect of Adams' statement was the denial that the 
severance of the British connection was the organization's only 
goal. Adams was keen for the movement to abandon the simplistic 
notion of how to solve the Irish question. He rejected the idea that 
British withdrawal was the panacea to the problem and promoted a 
socialist programme: 
As republicans we stand with the have-nots against the haves. We 
stand with the under privileged, the young, the unemployed, the 
workers - the people of no property. We are for the ownership of 
Ireland by the people of Ireland and we believe that national 
freedom entails economic and cultural independence and that one 
without the other is useless. 
Adams was directing an appeal to the disadvantaged. In West 
Belfast he was ploughing fertile ground. He was anxious not to 
alienate conservative republicans, his socialist rhetoric being fused 
with traditional republican sentiment to widen the appeal: 
We are opposed to big business, to multi-nationalism, to 
gombeenism, to sectarianism and to the maintenance of a privileged 
class. We stand opposed to all forms and all manifestations of 
imperialism and capitalism. We stand for an Ireland, free, 
united, socialist and gaelic. 
Adams then voiced what he felt was the inadequacy of republican 
strategy: "Our most glaring weakness to date lies in our failure to 
develop revolutionary politics and to build a strong political 
alternative to so-called constitutional politics. "3 The 
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importance of Adams' oration lies in the fact that Provisional Sinn 
Fein had decided that a "Brits Out" policy was no longer enough. 
Ultimate victory would be achieved only if the muscle of the I.R.A. 
was reinforced with a political alternative to the "so-called 
constitutionalists." To facilitate this development, the party 
adopted a left-wing political programme. Fitt and his former 
colleagues in the S.D.L.P. were threatened by this tactic. 
While republicans re-appraised their strategy Fitt became 
increasingly popular with elements in the British establishment, a 
consequence of his continued refusal to be intimidated by the I.R.A. 
However, some of this admiration was unwelcome. In February 1980, he 
turned down an award from the Ross McWhirter Foundation (McWhirter 
was an active right-winger and vigorous opponent of the I.R.A. who 
was shot by the Provisionals on his doorstep in 1974). Fitt 
explained that he declined to accept the award not because he had any 
opposition to commemorating the memory of McWhirther, but because he 
was a socialist. He added: "I have also refused it because the 
foundation appears to have associations with right wing organizations 
which take a different political view from myself." 4 
However, the fact that the award was offered at all was in 
itself significant. The British right wing press had sought to use 
Fitt's abhorrence of the I.R.A. for propaganda purposes for a long 
time. Right wing elements in the McWhirter Foundation were keen to 
reward an Irish politician who had disowned his nationalist past and 
continually attacked the Provisionals. 
John Hume had succeeded Fitt as leader of the S.D.L.P. and 
Seamus Mallon was installed as his deputy. Fitt now speaks with 
bitterness about Hume; "John Hume does not like Protestants. John 
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is an anti-Prod. He is a Derry Catholic. He cannot understand 
them. That is not to say he is malicious. He just cannot understand 
them." 5 Austin Currie maintains that the relationship between 
the two leaders of the S.D.L.P. "was always a difficult one" although 
for long periods they co-operated closely. He suggests that Hume 
increasingly came to articulate S.D.L.P. policy and Fitt consequently 
could not find his own niche. 6 Personal antagonism may well 
have aggravated their political disagreements. Both men are 
certainly different. Fitt has a tendency to think that education 
negates a working-class background. Hume was likely to be frustrated 
that for many years Fitt held the only political forum available. In 
any case it was a demanding relationship. It is surprising that a 
public break did not occur earlier. 
Fitt took no one with him when he left the S.D.L.P. His 
distaste for organization had mitigated against the party evolving a 
strong political network in West Belfast. This lack of structure was 
critical in ensuing years and was in contrast to Provisional Sinn 
Fein's new-found commitment to establish a challenging political 
presence in the area. 
Fitt had thus reverted to his role as "lone operator," content 
to rely on personal charisma and Westminster contacts. In the years 
ahead he not only attacked the Provisionals, but also the S.D.L.P., 
placing himself outside nationalist politics as expressed by its two 
major proponents. He had become something of a political aberration. 
Ironically, the S.D.L.P. reversed its position on the Atkins' 
talks and agreed to attend after some political manoeuvering by the 
Northern Ireland Secretary. Atkins stated that all parties would be 
allowed to submit papers on any topic of their choosing. Hume was 
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not against the idea of talks, but was adamant that the Irish 
dimension should be discussed. The conference was doomed. to 
failure. 
attend. 
The Official Unionists kept to their decision not to 
Atkins had ruled out both Sunningdale-type and 
Stormont-type arrangements. The S.D.L.P. wanted the former, Paisley 
and the D.U.P. wanted the latter. At Westminster Fitt correctly 
described the talks as a "charade." 7 
assessment with an attack on the S.D.L.P. 
Fitt followed his 
He told the Belfast 
Telegraph that his former party had planned to wreck the talks: 
I know with absolute certainty that if the S.D.L.P. had been 
offered a power-sharing arrangement as before - under the 
Sunningdale Executive - they would have said thank you very much 
but we want an institutionalised Irish dimension - a Council of 
Ireland. 8 
He argued that such a disposition effectively precluded any 
unionist from finding an agreement. 
Eddie McGrady, now Chief Whip of the S.D.L.P. countered with a 
valid point: 
The policies of the S.D.L.P. were determined at our last annual 
conference in November, up to which time Gerry was leader and 
presumably was in full support of the party. He certainly didn't 
indicate any contrary opinions at the time. In fact he was the 
main speaker before the constitutional debate at the party 
conference. 9 
McGrady had cleverly ridiculed Fitt's political statements. 
In May, Fitt publicly announced that he would concede the Irish 
dimension for power-sharing: 
What we must do is to go out and find a solution within Northern 
Ireland on the power-sharing issue. After you have done that and 
allowed time to build up trust between the communities, then you 
can begin to think about Irish dimensions. To try to 
institutionalize them both at the same time is self 
defeating. 10 
He had finally revealed (six years after the Sunningdale 
experiment) that he considered power-sharing and the Irish dimension 
-~-~ 
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as mutually exclusive. 
The Irish Times reported Fitt saying: 
There are no more Brian Faulkner's around. There's no unionists 
that I can see in Northern Ireland who would be prepared to talk 
to anyone about an Irish dimension, much less Irish unity ... I 
would not let a demand for an Irish dimension prevent me, or 
prevent the minority, from participating in governmental 
structures created at Stormont. 11 
He was now prepared to say almost anything to assuage Protestant 
fears on the Irish dimension. If there had been any doubts about 
Fitt's political inclination at this juncture, these emphatic 
disclosures ended any hint of ambiguity. The aspiration of a united 
Ireland had been an important component of Fitt's political success. 
Now, however, as a short-term objective, he had unequivocally 
relinquished the goal of a united Ireland. Instead, he continued to 
lament the failure of the Sunningdale experiment12 and accused 
the S.D.L.P. of being merely the Northern wing of the Fianna Fail 
Party . 13 
It could be argued that Fitt had not abandoned his commitment to 
a united Ireland as an ultimate goal but had merely made 
power-sharing his main political aspiration as a sort of "stepping 
stone." 
flexible. 
In other words his tactics rather than his principles were 
There is little evidence to substantiate this. Unlike 
previous years, he never indulged in nationalist rhetoric and if he 
had considered power-sharing a "stepping stone" he would have been 
guilty of trying to dupe the Protestant community. 
Meanwhile the prison protest, which had begun with Kieran 
Nugent's refusal to wear prison clothes, had gradually escalated. As 
a gesture of solidarity with their male colleagues, the women in 
Armagh gaol began their own dirty protest in February 1980. British 
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efforts to break the deadlock had no success. 
In May, Provisional Sinn Fein held a seminar on prisons. Danny 
Morrison, now editor of An Phoblacht/Republican News, articulated the 
party's position in the protest: 
Republican strategy and the way forward on the P.O.W. issue must 
be based on two basic principles. Firstly, to secure political 
status for P.O.Ws in Ireland and comparable conditions and 
repatriation for those seeking it in English prisons. Secondly, 
to articulate, exploit and propagandise on the prison struggle, to 
show how it constitutes an important part of the overall struggle, 
and to show that the prison struggle is not merely a manifestation 
of republican resistance to British policy but also a 
manifestation of the British government's attitude to 
Ireland. 14 
The prison protest had given Provisional Sinn Fein its best 
propaganda vehicles since internment and Bloody Sunday. Morrison was 
aware that the issue could and should be used to build up 
anti-British feeling. This, it was hoped, would be converted into 
support for Provisional Sinn Fein itself, and by extension, the 
Provisional I.R.A. 
On October 10, in a move designed to increase the impetus of the 
protest, republican prisoners announced that they were commencing a 
hunger strike on October 27. On October 23, Atkins had offered 
civilian-type clothing to the prisoners. After some deliberation the 
offer was rejected because it failed to meet their central demand -
i.e. being given political status. Therefore, on October 27, seven 
republican prisoners refused food, vowing that they would fast either 
until their demands were met or until they died of starvation. The 
stakes had been raised considerably. The repercussions of the hunger 
strikes would transform nationalist politics. They were also to have 
a profound impact on the career of Gerry Fitt. 
On November 10, Fitt made his most controversial speech in the 
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House of Commons. Jim Molyneaux, leader of the Official Unionists, 
set the tone of the debate: 
It is important for the world to know and for distinguished 
churchmen to remember that I.R.A. hunger strikers are not 
misguided petty thieves or pick pockets in need of correction on 
spiritual guidance. They are not even men who have been convicted 
of murder in a fit of rage. They are evil men who have planned 
and plotted in cold blood to take innocent lives. They are beasts 
who have gunned down their fellow men and pumped hot lead into 
their twitching bodies. 15 
Fitt then spoke and recalled having successfully pleaded for 
political status in 1972, saying: 
I have to tell the House that I bitterly regret having made those 
representations. At that time there were 80 republican prisoners 
and 40 Loyalist prisoners. I believed that, because of the 
special circumstances at that time, the granting of political 
special category status would end the strife. I was terribly 
wrong. 
He then catalogued numerous incidents when both I.R.A. and 
Loyalist violence had caused death throughout the decade. He did 
not, however, mention any deaths caused by the security forces. 
Fitt pledged himself to support the introduction of humane 
prison reforms, but urged the British government to stand firm 
against the granting of political status: 
The government should make it clear to those engaged in the hunger 
strike that they will not obtain political status. By telling the 
truth, and telling it in such a way that it cannot be 
misunderstood it is possible that the men on hunger strike 
will realise the error of their ways and bring the strike to an 
end. I do not want to see those men dying. I do not want to see 
anyone dying. The government must show their resolution and not 
allow themselves to be blackmailed by people giving support to the 
hunger strike ... 
I ask the Secretary of State to be as humane as possible to every 
prisoner in Northern Ireland, of whatever political or religious 
belief - but not to make the mistake of granting political 
status. That mistake was made in 1972. I believe that it led to 
the taking of many innocent lives in Northern Ireland. 16 
Fitt's views on republican political prisoners had certainly 
changed since 1962 when he considered them "men of principle." He 
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saw the hunger strikes in simplistic terms and while many Catholics 
admired his stand against violence many more felt it quite gratuitous 
to call upon the Thatcher government not to give in. Gerry Adams 
commented on what he perceived was the mood of the nationalist 
community after Fitt's speech: 
I think Fitt's stance was seen precisely for what it was, that 
here was a man who had come from what he alleged was a socialist 
republican position and was now siding with the British government 
against men who were in prison and who were quite clearly in the 
eyes of a large section of the community not criminals and who 
were left with nothing but to go on hunger strike. To oppose 
those demands may have been legitimate enough but to give Thatcher 
succour was seen by many people as perhaps the last straw. 17 
Fitt's rationale for the stance he took as regards the hunger 
strike has changed little: 
When the hunger strike started it was a very emotional thing. It 
was totally tribal. No reason or intellect went into it. When it 
started I was in the position of recalling all the coffins that I 
had carried through graveyards and a lot of them were victims of 
the I.R.A. Some of them were women and children and I was in the 
position of being expected to lend my support to the men who 
actually carried out these murders. There was no way I could do 
that. 18 
Reaction to Fitt's speech at the time was predictably varied and 
further revealed how his profile had altered. The S.D.L.P. had 
stayed aloof from the controversy, intent to await the outcome of a 
Thatcher-Haughey summit in December. Provisional Sinn Fein however, 
were quick to respond, a spokesman claiming, "We believe that Fitt 
has lost touch with the nationalist working class and are confident 
that provided with an alternative choice, our people will positively 
reject Gerry Fitt's unionism." 19 Bernadette Devlin McAliskey 
described the speech as "murderous" and called Fitt, "a shadow of a 
man. n20 
Moderate unionism, as expressed by the editorial of the Belfast 
Telegraph was, on the other hand, impressed, claiming that Fitt had 
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shown "considerable political and moral courage" by disregarding 
"tribal loyalties. "21 
This contrasted sharply with the views of newspapers in the 
Republic. The Irish Press was particularly vicious. An editorial 
reprimanded Fitt for "attacking his own people" and claimed he was 
nothing but a "stage Irishman" duped by the British. 22 
Conversely, whilst the pro-Fianna Fail Irish Press castigated Fitt; 
leading members of the Orange Order praised him. The Reverend Martin 
Smyth, Grand Master of the Orange Order in Ireland, described Fitt's 
speech as "courageous. 1123 
There were calls from nationalist quarters for Fitt to resign 
his Westminster seat and contest a by-election on the hunger strike 
issue. Fitt retorted that he had received over 200 letters from all 
over the country supporting his position and only four dissenting. 
He claimed that most of them came from deprived areas of Belfast, as 
well as from all sections of the community. He also reported having 
received a telegram from 33 employees of the Irish Press applauding 
his stand: "This is the authentic voice of the people, and shows 
that I am on the right path. "24 The future would tell if 
Fitt's views were representative of the views of his constituents. 
The Conservative government was unmoved by the strike. 
Throughout November, the administration insisted that political 
status was a concession that would never be met. Consequently, the 
prisoners decided to intensify their protest still further and on 
December 15, twenty three prisoners joined the original seven. Four 
days later the protest was suddenly called off. 
On December 17, the Northern Ireland office had made a tentative 
bid to resolve the dispute. The prisoners were told that a paper 
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which contained some sort of trade off was being prepared. As it 
turned out, the hunger strike was called off before the details of 
what appeared to be an offer were known. One of the original seven 
fasters had deteriorated more rapidly than the rest. By December 17, 
Sean McKenna, was almost totally blind and lapsing into a coma. The 
other six strikers, and Bobby Sands (leader of the Provisional 
prisoners), were now in a dilemma. They had to decide whether to 
await the British proposal, and thereby allow McKenna to die, or to 
end the strike in the hope that the British proposals would meet 
their demands. They chose the latter. 
The hunger strike ended in confusion, but there was naturally a 
general feeling of relief. Initially, Provisional Sinn Fein claimed 
victory, whereas the British claimed that they had granted nothing 
and had not changed their position since the start of the protest. 
In the event, the prisoners were far from satisfied with what had 
been offered. 25 The termination of the strike did restore some 
calm over the Christmas period, but this was to be shortlived. 
Early in the new year, Fitt argued that 1981 could be as 
significant a turning point as the Battle of the Boyne or the Easter 
rising, if the British and Irish governments acted quickly and 
decisively. His reasoning was prompted by the Thatcher-Haughey 
summit which had taken place ten days prior to the ending of the 
hunger strike. (The post-summit communique pledged that special 
consideration would be given to "the totality of relationships" 
within the islands). Fitt optimistically thought there was some hope 
that the "terrible agony" of Northern Ireland may finally be drawing 
to a close. 
"The Provisional 
He thought that the Provisionals were a spent force: 
I.R.A. staked everything on their trump card, the 
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recent failed hunger strike for political status. By its failure 
they have shown they have nothing else to offer but mindless 
violence." 26 
Fitt was wrong on both counts. Despite all the media hype, the 
communique after the summit represented little more than empty 
jargon. Thatcher and Haughey placed different emphasis on the 
statement, and the Provisionals were far from finished. Mallon 
appealed to them to lay down their arms and go political -
Provisional Sinn Fein responded: 
If Mr Mallon and his colleagues wish to see the creation of a 
society free from the spectre of death and suffering, then it is 
about time they climbed off the fence and set themselves the task 
of unequivocally demanding the withdrawal of that destructive and 
divisive influence. 
Playing politics and cowtowing to the British is what has us in 
the present situation. 
It is time the S.D.L.P. learned that lesson. 27 
Clearly, the Provisionals were not yet ready to enter the 
political arena, but their capacity for violence remained 
undiminished. In January alone, seven people were killed and 
thirteen injured due to I.R.A. operations. 
On January 27, there was violence in the H-blocks over the 
prisoners' refusal to conform to prison regulations and it was 
announced the following day that a second hunger strike would begin 
on March 1. For the second protest, the prisoners changed their 
tactics. Instead of simply demanding "political status," they 
centered their effort on five specific demands: the right to wear 
their own clothing instead of prison uniforms; exemption from all 
forms of penal labour; free association with one another at all 
times; the right to organize their own recreational and educational 
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programmes and full restoration of the time off their sentences to 
which they would be entitled if they conformed with prison 
28 rules. Bobby Sands went on strike first, later to be 
followed by the others at two-weekly intervals. 
Soon after the strike began, Frank Maguire, the Independent M.P. 
for Fermanagh/South Tyrone, died. His death and the resulting 
by-election it caused were to have important ramifications for 
minority politics in Northern Ireland. 
Meanwhile, Fitt continued to criticise the S.D.L.P., again 
arguing that his former colleagues were too close to the Fianna Fail 
Party: 
On leaving the party, I stated that I thought it was becoming too 
closely aligned with Fianna Fail and more particularly with a 
certain militant wing within that party. 
My priorities have always been the safety and welfare, not only of 
my own constituents, but everyone in Northern Ireland and the 
fortunes of political parties in the South are not of the same 
importance to me. 29 
Hume replied that Fitt sounded very much like a "cracked record" 
and the rift between the two former colleagues would widen still 
further. 30 
There was some speculation as regards who would be the 
anti-unionist candidate to contest the Fermanagh/South Tyrone 
by-election. The first to put his name forward was Noel Maguire, 
brother of the dead M.P. It was also suggested that Bernadette 
McAliskey contest the seat, in the belief that she would obtain a 
strong personal vote, having recently been the victim of an 
unsuccessful murder attempt by Loyalist gunmen. In the event she 
stood down, after reaching an agreement with Provisional Sinn Fein 
that Bobby Sands be put forward to highlight the hunger strike and 
British intransigence. 
candidate. 31 
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The S.D.L.P. forwarded Austin Currie as a 
In a constituency with a small nationalist majority, there were 
thus three proposed anti-unionist candidates - Sands, Maguire and 
Currie and one unionist candidate, Harry West. If all stood, the 
unionists would win easily. The decision now facing the S.D.L.P. was 
whether to participate or withdraw, and in the end it was the 
arguments of those against contesting the election which carried the 
day. This again can be construed as a furthering of the nationalist 
sentiment in the party. This decision had far-reaching consequences 
when Maguire withdrew on the day of nominations after a personal 
appeal by the Sands family. 
Fitt predictably criticised the S.D.L.P. resolution. He said 
the party could no longer claim to be a Labour Party, or one of 
reconciliation: "It is a shame, an outrage and a gross betrayal of 
non-unionist voters in this constituency who have been put into a 
position where they have no candidate for which they can vote in 
conformity with their opposition to violence. 1132 In the 1960s 
Fitt's politics were largely based on denigration with the Unionist 
Party being the prey. In the 1980s disparagement was also Fitt's 
main political weapon. However, the S.D.L.P. was now the party that 
was rebuked. There was an element of spite in Fitt's slighting 
language. Nevertheless, his attack in this instance was justified. 
The S.D.L.P. had posed as constitutional nationalists but they had 
bowed to tribal considerations and allowed an I.R.A. man a free run. 
Adams understandably welcomed the two-horse race outcome and was 
confident of the result: "The election of Bobby Sands will serve as 
an acid test for those who reject British attempts to criminalise 
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opposition to their presence in this country. 1133 
As the election drew closer, Fitt claimed that there was serious 
dissension in the ranks of the S.D.L.P. because of its failure to 
contest the seat. 34 His advice to S.D.L.P. voters was to 
11 abstain. 1135 Fitt was correct; there was a degree of conflict 
within the party, but this was patched up when it was agreed to 
contest all elections at the next general election, which included 
West Belfast. Fitt was defiant: 11 I was representing West Belfast 
before the S.D.L.P. was in existence and I will be representing the 
area long after the S.D.L.P. has ceased to be a force in 
Bel fast. 1136 
Sands' election campaign was aided by Provisional Sinn Fein's 
political organization, with Adams and Morrison campaigning 
throughout the area. Sands did not stand as a Sinn Fein 
representative, instead his platform was based on an anti-
H-Block/Political Prisoner stand. This attracted a broad spectrum of 
nationalist support. Frank McManus (former Unity M.P. for the area}, 
Bernadette Devlin McAliskey and Noel Maguire all lent their support 
to the campaign. The nationalist population was asked to vote in 
support of the prisoners' five demands, not for the fact that Sands 
was a republican and believed in the armed struggle. 
Election day was April 9, with a predictably high turnout of 
86.8%. Sands was victorious, polling 30,492 votes to West's 
29,046. 37 The result indicated that all strains of nationalism 
had merged in support of the prisoners. After 41 days on hunger 
strike and after reportedly losing 28 pounds in weight, Bobby Sands 
became a Member of Parliament. 
Danny Morrison commented on the outcome: 
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This result has finally proved through the ballot box, how deep 
the support is for republican prisoners. The people of Fermanagh 
and South Tyrone have spoken on behalf of the Irish nation. He 
(Sands) will not resign the seat. The hunger strike will take its 
course. 38 
Fitt was alarmed, saying that the result was a "mandate for the 
Provisional I.R.A.," and feared the consequences: 
There will certainly be untold repercussions for a long time to 
come, and it will lead to greater polarisation and alienation 
between the two communities, especially in Fermanagh and South 
Tyrone where the Protestant population will believe that their 
Catholic neighbours are giving overt support to the I.R.A. 39 
Fitt overestimated the extent to which vote for Sands was a vote 
for the I.R.A. Many Catholics voted for Sands to highlight the 
H-block campaign and to prevent him from losing his life. Fitt's 
hatred for the Provisionals had induced an obdurate attitude. Adams 
used the result as an opportunity to attack Fitt: 
The result of the by-election had proved many things - not least 
that Mr Gerry Fitt's call to the electorate was totally ignored by 
the nationalist people of the area. Fitt placed his political 
reputation against the lives of the hunger-strikers and suffered 
the consequences of his despicable treachery. 
He challenged Fitt to resign his seat and claimed the people of West 
Belfast would give him the same answer as did the people of Fermanagh 
and South Tyrone. 40 
Sands could no longer simply be regarded as a terrorist - he was 
now a democratically elected M.P. However, the election victory had 
no effect on the British government and Thatcher remained steadfast 
in her refusal to meet the concessions demanded. On May 5, Sands 
died. Two days later, 100,000 people attended his funeral. A week 
after Sands' death, Francis Hughes, the second hunger striker, died, 
and was followed within two weeks by Raymond McCreesh and Patsy 
O'Hara. 
Embassy. 
In Dublin, there was severe rioting outside the British 
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On May 20, the day before McCreesh and O'Hara died, polling took 
place for the local government election. In an extremely tense 
atmosphere, Provisional Sinn Fein persisted with its abstention 
policy. Fitt again contested the election for Belfast area 'G'. He 
did not prepare a manifesto or an election address, but preferred to 
rely on his past record as a public representative. He defined what 
he considered to be the issues involved: 
So far as I am concerned those who are opposed to me in this 
election have made it quite clear that their opposition is based 
on my stand in relation to terrorism and its supporters. 
I therefore fully accept that a vote for me is a vote against the 
gunman, and I leave this decision to the electorate of 
Bel fast. 41 
If Fitt was correct, that a vote for him was a vote against the 
gunmen, the ramifications of the results were grave indeed for 
constitutional ism. Fitt polled only 541 first-preference votes, 
which was only 5.4% of the votes cast and 900 below the quota 
required for election. 
The result showed how polarised the community had become. Sam 
Ashby of the D.U.P. and Fergus O'Hare of the P.O. were both elected 
on the first count. Sammy Millar, a member of the U.D.A, was also 
elected. The Alliance candidate fared badly and for Fitt, the result 
was a disaster, as the S.D.L.P. candidate gained more 
first-preference votes. After twenty three years Fitt's career as a 
Belfast City Councillor was over. After his elimination he claimed, 
II I put in my nomination papers in the full knowledge that I was going 
to be defeated", adding "I hope the electors haven't made as big a 
mistake as I think they have. "42 
Sean MacStiofain, who was Chief of Staff of the P.I.R.A. from 
1970 to 1972, made an observation that can be applied to this 
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election. He claimed: "It has always been a feature of Irish 
attitudes that while backing for the revolutionary movement may ebb 
and flow at different times, people's sympathy for republican 
prisoners and their families is constant."~ Fitt refused to 
believe that despite their deeds the militant members of the 
republican 
community. 44 
movement remain an integral part of their 
This helps explain why the "nationally minded" 
people had abandoned Fitt. O'Hare interpreted his triumph: 
It shows that the people in the area support the prisoners five 
demands, not the programme put forward by any other anti-unionist 
candidate. My vote trebled that of other anti-unionist candidates 
and quadrupled that of Gerry Fitt's. It was a total rejection of 
Mr Fitt's stance in the election and his attacks on the 
prisoners. We call on him to step down from his Westminster seat 
and put his present views to the electorate. 45 
There can be no doubt that Fitt's stance on the hunger strike 
had been rejected by nationalists. A week after the results had been 
declared he spoke with some bitterness: 
I have no intention of leaving my home. However, I certainly do 
not feel as committed to this area as I once did. After last 
week's election in which I lost my City Council seat, it would be 
more than human for me to open my door to people with the same 
enthusiasm I once did. I expect that within two or three weeks 
people who did not vote for me will come back to my advice centre 
at home with their giro, electricity bill, housing executive and 
other problems. 46 
With all four of the initial hunger strikers now dead and their 
replacements in the early stages of their protest, there was a chance 
that interest in the prison issue might diminish. This was not the 
case. On June 11, the Irish Republic went to the polls with nine 
prisoners - four of whom were on hunger strike - nominated as 
candidates for the Dail. The Southern election was markedly affected 
by the strike. Two prisoners were elected - Kieran Docherty in 
Cavan/Monaghan and Patrick Agnew, a blanket man, in Louth. The 
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impetus of the protest was thus retained. Haughey was ousted and 
Fine Gael and the Labour Party formed a Coalition government. Dr 
Garret Fitzgerald took office at the beginning of July. 
In the North, after four deaths, both the prisoners and the 
British government took up entrenched positions. On July 8, Joe 
McDonnell died and on July 13, Martin Hurson became the sixth hunger 
striker to perish. 
Throughout July, further efforts were made to break the 
deadlock. Fitzgerald's government formally appealed to the United 
States to intervene, but President Reagan was disinclined to become 
embroiled in the Irish problem. The deaths continued; at the 
beginning of August both Kevin Lynch of the I.N.L.A. and Kieran 
Docherty T.D. had died. 
Despite the continuing deaths, attention again became focused on 
the political arena. Welsh Nationalist M.P. Daifydd Elis Thomas had 
managed to get the writ for the by-election (caused by Sands' death) 
passed through the House of Commons. Fitt was totally opposed to the 
motion and asked the speaker: 
Have you taken into account, Mr Speaker, that the emaciated dead 
or dying body of an I.R.A. hunger striker is a more lethal weapon 
than an armalite rifle in the arms of the men of violence? 
By accepting the motion now, the House may be condemning hunger 
strikers and others to death. 47 
Despite Fitt's arguments, the date for the Fermanagh/South 
Tyrone by-election was set for August 20. 
After the death of Sands, the House of Commons passed a Bill 
which prevented convicted felons from running for a seat at 
Westminster. This measure was intended to prevent a second hunger 
striker contesting Fermanagh/South Tyrone. As a result, Owen Carron, 
294 
who had acted as Sands' election agent, was selected as a proxy 
political prisoner. 
The by-election again placed the S.D.L.P. in a difficult 
predicament. They were well aware that Carron was a member of Sinn 
Fein, although he was not standing on that platform. Although there 
was division in the party, the decision not to contest was again 
taken. The idea of a split in the nationalist vote that would enable 
a unionist to win, had been the deciding factor. Fitt quickly 
condemned the ruling and accused the party of "political 
cowardice."~ 
During Carron's election campaign, the ninth hunger striker, Tom 
McElwee died. On the actual day of the poll the tenth and as it 
turned out, final hunger striker, Michael Devine, of the I.N.L.A. 
also died. In a return of 88.2% Carron actually managed to increase 
Sands' vote by 786, polling 31,278. The Official Unionist candidate 
and former U.D.R. Major Ken Maginnis, polled 29,048 votes - almost 
exactly the same as West had managed against Sands. 49 The vote 
showed two things. First, it illustrated the nationalist community's 
concern for the plight of the prisoners and their displeasure with 
Britain's stance. Second, it demonstrated yet again the deep 
sectarian division in the constituency. 
The hunger strike finally came to an end in October. Ten 
prisoners had died and the families of those still fasting pledged to 
intervene to prevent further deaths. On October 3, 1981, the six 
remaining hunger strikers ended the protest. 
The election victories of Sands and Carron and of the two T.D's 
in June convinced many in the republican movement of the validity of 
the political approach. They would soon decide to give_ the 
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electorate a further alternative. 
During the hunger strikes, Fitt's home was repeatedly attacked 
with petrol bombs by nationalists angered with his attitude. Crowds 
often gathered and chanted "Fitt the Brit." He was clearly becoming 
identified as an agent of British governmental policy in Northern 
Ireland. This notion was reinforced by the recurrent veneration 
expressed by the British media. For example, the London Times ran an 
article entitled "Fitt - an M.P. under siege," praising him for his 
bravery. 50 To be fair to Fitt, there is no doubt that he 
displayed courage that won admiration from all kinds of people. He 
was a shrewd politician and could have chosen to bend with the wind 
in order to survive. He, however, never modified his view: 
I have done nothing wrong that would have brought harm or 1nJury 
to anyone. I've condemned bloodshed and violence. I condemned 
the hunger strike. It was a tragic loss of life. Since then very 
nastf things have happened but I've learned to live with 
it. 5 
Fitt was now permanently guarded by detectives wherever he went. 
At the Provisional Sinn Fein Ard Fheis in November, 1981, 
republicans officially decided to contest elections in the North. 
Danny Morrison explained the strategy: "Who here really believes we 
can win the war through the ballot box? But will anyone here object 
if, with a ballot paper in this hand, and an armalite in this hand, 
we take power in Ireland?"~ 
In December the party issued the following statement: 
The deaths of our comrades on hunger strike must mark a watershed 
in this struggle. People looking back on this era in 10 years 
time must say, yes, it was the selfless idealism of ten young men 
in 1981 which turned the course of Irish history and led to the 
reunification of this country. 
But events do not just harpen. They are made to happen. It is up 
to us to make them happen. 
296 
Fitt was unimpressed with Provisional Sinn Fein's decision to 
contest elections. He claimed that the I.R.A. were intent to create 
"anarchy" and maintained that the situation at the close of 1981 was 
as tense as the period of the U.W.C. strike in 1974. 54 
The 1980s had thus far been extremely difficult for Fitt. 
Furthermore, prospects for the future looked no brighter. He now had 
a formidable and resurgent republican movement to contend with whose 
ballot box - armalite strategy would threaten his Westminster seat. 
In comparison to 1981, 1982 was less fraught with tension. In 
their New Year message, Provisional Sinn Fein repeated that it would 
be contesting local and Westminster elections in the coming years. A 
statement from Richard McAuley, Vice Chairman of the Ulster Executive 
of the party, suggested that 1982 held many challenges for 
republicanism: 
I have no doubt that, with the experiences gained in 1981 and 
given our political development, we can rise to the occasion and 
provide the nationalist population with the positive leadership 
they demand. The indomitable spirit of Irish resistance to 
British aggression was courageously demonstrated in the principle 
stand taken by our imprisoned comrades and the deaths of our 10 
H-Block marthyrs. 1981 saw Sinn Fein commit itself to challenge 
the electoral monopoly of the bankrupt and collaborationist 
S.D.L.P. and if, in the coming year, such an op~ortunity arises, 
the republican movement will not be found wanting. 5 
While Provisional Sinn Fein advanced into 1982 with some aplomb, 
Fitt's position was somewhat precarious. He was no longer leader, or 
even a member of the S.D.L.P., and had been heavily defeated in local 
government. Many, particularly in nationalist circles, felt that 
Fitt now spoke for no one except himself. This circumstance was 
reflected in newspaper coverage in Northern Ireland - the Irish News 
being the clearest example. In the 1960s and 1970s and indeed up to 
his local government defeat in 1981, the Irish News quoted Fitt's 
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views extensively. However, after the hunger strike period, much 
less attention was devoted to him. Two reasons explain. this 
situation. First, Fitt was perceived as becoming increasingly 
irrelevant, despite still being the M.P. for West Belfast and second, 
it reflected the fact that he no longer expressed a traditional 
nationalist/Catholic attitude. In other words, he did not represent 
the views of his constituents. 
In September 1981, James Prior had replaced Atkins as Northern 
Ireland Secretary of State. In his first statement he said that he 
was prepared to lay his political reputation "on the line" in an 
effort to secure a political settlement. His "rolling devolution" 
plan envisaged a 78 member elected assembly which would initially 
have a consultative role only. However, its powers could later be 
extended to include the devolution of local government departments, 
on the condition that it achieved sufficient cross-community 
support. 56 
The S.D.L.P. and Taoiseach Haughey dismissed the plan as 
unworkable. 57 They still wished to see more progress in the 
Anglo-Irish context, not in an internal solution. Furthermore, even 
the Official Unionist Party was against the plan, considering it no 
more than a revival of power-sharing. At Westminster in April, Fitt 
pointed out that three main elements had expressed opposition and if 
they maintained their attitude and received a mandate, there would be 
no hope in forming an executive. 58 By the end of the month, 
Fitt's realism had been converted to hope: "I believe we have to 
take this chance. We should tell the people of Northern Ireland we 
are now giving you the opportunity to take into your own hands the 
success or failure of your destiny."~ Essentially, Fitt had 
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been reduced to being a mere commentator on political matters rather 
than an influential figure. Previously he had at least had the 
appearance of importance but now his self imposed isolation resulted 
in the loss of even that. 
Paisley's view of the prior plan laid bare the stark realities 
of the situation; "The White Paper must have some good since it has 
raised the hackles of Mr Haughey and the S.D.L.P."M He was 
well aware that a lack of emphasis on the Irish dimension would not 
have pleased the constitutional nationalists. 
While the arguments continued over Prior's proposals, Britain 
and Argentina had gone to war over the Falkland Islands. This 
conflict again indicated a difference of opinion between Fitt and 
nationalist elements. It also showed Fitt further identifying with 
British policy rather than Irish sentiment. 
Haughey was opposed to Britain's Falklands operation, which was 
reflected in his refusal to back British sanctions against the 
Argentinians. Public statements also made it quite apparent where 
his sympathies lay. The cordial relationship between the Taoiseach 
and Thatcher thus cooled considerably. This was a blow to the 
S.D.L.P., as it seemed to end any hope for future Anglo-Irish 
developments. 
Fitt took a very much different view from the Irish Premier. 
His declaration to the Defence Secretary at Westminster in May shows 
how pro-British he had become: "Will he accept that the 
bellicose and belligerent statements emanating from the extremely 
anti-British government in Dublin are not representative of the Irish 
people, who do not see Britain as the aggressor in this 
conflict?" 61 
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Fitt's assertion can only really have been made on the basis of 
intuition. This does seem to suggest that he was increasingly 
looking at Ireland from the distant Westminster perspective. Irish 
people living in England may well have been influenced by the jargon 
of the British press, but it is highly improbable and unlikely that 
Catholic Ireland would have endorsed British action. 
Sinn Fein for its part, castigated the British attitude to the 
Falklands in An Phoblacht/Republican News. 62 The paper quoted 
Thatcher: "You have to be prepared to defend the things in which you 
believe and be prepared to use force if that is the only way to 
secure the future of liberty and self-determination" before 
criticising what they considered outright hypocrisy: 
It has been said before and we repeat: it is no crime and there 
is no moral wrong in lifting a stone, raising the muzzle of a 
rifle or planting a bomb against those who oppress our country, 
against those who terrorise our people. And that is one lesson 
well learnt from the hypocrisy of British guns in the South 
Atlantic.~ 
Ironically, both Fitt and Sinn Fein called for the proposed 
election to Prior's Assembly to be contested. Sinn Fein were ready 
to seek support at the polls for the first time in the North in the 
present round of the troubles, albeit on an abstentionist ticket. 
Fitt recommended that the S.D.L.P. also contest the election: 
I advise the S.D.L.P. to fight the election. I know that it will 
fight, because, if it does not, it will hand the seats over to 
abstainers and to Provisional Sinn Fein. A conglomerate of 
loonies and head cases will win seats in those 
circumstances. 64 
As the prospect of an autumn poll became increasingly likely, 
there were signs of internal dissent within the S.D.L.P. over its 
attitude to such an election. Fitt was well aware of this. At the 
end of July he asked Prior at Westminster: 
300 
Will he take it from me, as a founder member and former leader of 
the S.D.L.P., that not all its members are opposed to fighting 
elections, that a small contingent is taking orders from the 
Taoiseach, whose advice is not to take part in the electioni, and 
that the S.D.L.P. as a party will, unless the moon or the sun 
falls from the sky, be fighting the elections?65 
Adams also argued against a boycott: 
We call for all republican supporters to mobilise behind Sinn 
Fein's campaign to smash the new Stormont and British rule in 
Ireland. 
The S.D.L.P. are intent once again on masquerading as the sole 
representatives of the nationalist people, and on the earliest 
pretext will give Prior the respectability which he needs. We 
have their past record on this. The time has come to confront 
them, to break their monopoly and offer the nationalist people a 
new leadership. 66 
Fitt proved to be correct. The S.D.L.P. did decide to contest 
the election, but like Sinn Fein, on an abstentionist ticket. The 
Official Unionist Party, despite its continued opposition to Prior's 
plan, also decided to contest. 
Despite urging the S.D.L.P. to fight the election, Fitt himself 
did not take part. His reason was that he saw no hope or future for 
the Assembly, as the "desperate" needs of the people had been pushed 
aside by "protagonists in pursuit of total nationalism and unionism." 
He was again critical of the S.D.L.P: "They are all about 
domination, not reconciliation." Fitt must have been fearful of 
losing votes to the S.D.L.P. and Sinn Fein. This must also have 
influenced his decision not to contest. He denied, however, that his 
political career was over: "I believe that I have proved consistent 
in my political ideals on which I fought in my first and my last 
election campaigns. It may be that these policies may no longer be 
acceptable. 
elections. 1167 
murder. "68 
If so, it can only be shown in the next Westminster 
He accused Sinn Fein of seeking a "mandate for 
The Sinn Fein manifesto countered: "For far too 
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long the British government has been able to rely upon politicians 
from the nationalist community going to Stormont Castle, queuing for 
talks and picking up cheques."~ 
The result of the general election, held in the republic in 
February 1982 had been a disappointment to Sinn Fein. They had hoped 
that the anti-British feeling, manifested during the hunger strikes, 
would be retained and converted into political support. But their 
seven candidates only managed to hold half the H-Block vote of June 
1981 and they did not gain any seats. Despite this, they entered the 
Assembly elections with a high degree of confidence. The electorate 
contained a new generation of disillusioned Catholics who had endured 
a decade of social deprivation, violence and political deadlock. The 
hunger strikes had politicized many. 
The results of the election justified Sinn Fein optimism. They 
took five of the 78 seats with more than 10% of the first preference 
votes and showed an advance of 2.5% over the aggregate pro-H-Block 
vote in the 1981 local government elections. This performance was 
even more impressive due to the fact that they only put up candidates 
in seven of the twelve constituencies and managed to top the poll in 
two. Carron in Fermanagh/South Tyrone and ominously for Fitt, Adams 
in West Belfast. 70 Adams called on Fitt to "resign or donate 
his salary to the people living in atrocious conditions in Divis 
flats and Moyard." 71 Joe Hendron, the defeated S.D.L.P. 
candidate, explained why he felt Adams had won: "I think Sinn Fein 
benefited from the votes of young people in the 18 - 25 age group who 
used the party to register a vote against the harassment they have 
suffered from the security forces over the past ten years." 72 
Whatever, a clear result of the Assembly elections was quite simply 
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the fact that Sinn Fein's electoral strategy had been totally 
vindicated. 
In their 1983 New Year's message, Sinn Fein vowed to follow up 
its success at the Assembly elections and renewed its pledge to 
overthrow British rule by promising to expose "weak-kneed nationalist 
parties." 73 An editorial in the Irish News suggested that Sinn 
Fein's claim had some validity: "If the S.D.L.P. are to arrest the 
slide to Sinn Fein they must re-organise and redouble their efforts 
in places like West Belfast where the Sinn Fein star is 
rising. "74 
1983 was also to be a Westminster election year. In February, 
the first clashes took place between the likely candidates, namely 
Fitt, Adams and S.D.L.P. Assemblyman Hendron. During a debate at 
Oxford University, Fitt launched a scathing attack on Sinn Fein and 
the P.I.R.A.: "A vote for Sinn Fein is a vote for the gun in 
politics. All Sinn Fein candidates had been told at their Ard Fheis 
that they had to unanimously support the armed struggle, which means 
the shooting of defenceless people." 75 
Reacting to Fitt's attack, Adams said that it was significant it 
had been issued from England: "Where he feels more at home than in 
the ghettos of Moyard or Divis flats, where Sinn Fein is attempting 
to represent the people in their everyday social and economic 
problems." He accused Fitt of "supporting the British presence in 
Ireland with the inevitable violence which emanates from the barrels 
of British army and R.U.C. guns." 76 Hendron also attacked Fitt 
and described him as "the absentee M.P." He claimed: "This is an 
S.D.L.P. seat. Stand aside and let the seat be won by the S.D.L.P., 
which is opposed to all forms of violence, and is prepared to 
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represent the people of West Belfast." 77 
While Fitt was receiving this criticism from politicians 
representing the nationalist community, the British press continued 
to praise him. The Daily Telegraph, in a leader article said the 
J.R.A. hated Fitt with a unique passion as the man from their 
community who "sees them for what they are."n 
Other British newspapers devoted considerable space regarding 
the continued attacks on Fitt's home. The Daily Express carried a 
full page headlined, "Fitt's Fortress"~ and the Daily Mail an 
article entitled "We shall not be moved." 80 It is little 
wonder that Fitt was increasingly being discredited as a creature of 
the British. 
As the election, set for June 9, drew closer, Fitt renewed his 
attacks on Sinn Fein: "Sinn Fein have said they will take control in 
Ireland with a ballot in one hand and an armalite in the other. Ah 
yes, the ballot for those who are with them - the bullet for those 
who aren't."81 
He also continued to castigate the S.D.L.P.: 
Some people may have been mesmerised by the Assembly Election 
results last year. Let me remind them that Sinn Fein owes such 
success as it had last time to the decisions of a cowardly 
S.D.L.P. policy, which twice gave the Provisionals a free run in 
Fermanagh/South Tyrone. 82 
The Sinn Fein manifesto insisted that they would campaign 
vigorously for a united Ireland, a democrataic socialist republic, 
free from foreign occupation and sectarian rule. The manifesto 
entitled "The Voice of Principled Leadership" stated that Sinn Fein 
welcomed the opportunity to again demonstrate the: "Growing support 
for our principled stand against the British government and Loyalism, 
and our unapologetic stand in support of national reunification and 
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in defence of the right of Irish people to resist British 
occupation."~ 
Fitt argued that the electorate had a stark choice: "They must 
choose between the fascist tactics of the Provisionals and the 
democratic standards I have sought to cherish and uphold for 
decades." 84 By May 30, he demonstrated some confidence: "A 
week ago I would have said that Adams was going to win. I'd be 
second and Joe Hendron third. Now I'm saying that Adams and I are 
going to fight like hells gates and Hendron will still come third." 
When further pressed about his chances, he replied: 
If I lost this election I wouldn't feel bitter with myself, but 
I'd feel the people of West Belfast were voting for violence, and 
I wouldn't want to live in a constituency or a country where 
people were deliberately casting their votes for a continuation of 
the tragedy we have had down all those years. 85 
To Hendron, Fitt was "only splitting the moderate vote." 86 
Fitt, Adams and Hendron were not the only Catholic candidates 
contesting West Belfast. The Workers Party put forward Mary McMahon, 
whose only realistic goal was to increase her party's share of the 
vote. 
The Irish News claimed that in 1983 there were approximately 
16,000 unionist voters in the West Belfast constituency. 87 The 
impact of that vote was reduced by the failure of the Official 
Unionists and the D.U.P. to agree on a "unity" candidate. As a 
result, Tommy Passmore represented the Official Unionists and George 
Haffey the D.U.P. There was considerable speculation that unionists 
would cast their vote for Fitt in an attempt to defeat Adams. The 
Orange Standard, in an article entitled "Fitt The Brit's Great Grit," 
gives this suggestion validity: 
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Today West Belfast is a very different place, politically. With 
the very extensive movement of population in the past 12 years, 
the Official Unionist position has been seriously undermined, and 
the battle is no longer between unionism and nationalism, but 
between Gerry Fitt's independent stance and republicanism of the 
most extreme form, and, of course, the S.D.L.P. 
It may well be that if the Unionist Parties discover that the 
balance of probability is that the West Belfast seat is not 
winnnable by them, then they will be faced with the option of 
making a choice between Mr Fitt and those who oppose him. 
Should this prove to be the case, then wouldn't it be a 
magnanimous gesture for the anti-republican, anti-nationalist and 
anti-S.D.L.P. sectors of the electorate in that constituency to 
throw their weight behind the present occupant, who, one is given 
to understand, already receives the support of individual 
unionists. 88 
Fitt's politics had been so transformed that he was now deemed 
to be sufficiently anti-nationalist to allow unionists to vote for 
him. 
Hendron considered himself to be the main threat to Adams: 
"Gerry Fitt is a total rank outsider, he just does not count. Any 
vote for him is ensuring a victory for Sinn Fein. I am the only one 
who can beat Gerry Adams. 1189 
On June 7, Fitt took out a full page advertisement in the Irish 
News listing his achievements during the previous sixteen 
years. 90 In a conversation with a journalist just prior to the 
election, he talked of what he considered were the trials of being 
"outside a tribe": "There is a great deal of comfort and security to 
belong to one tribe or another in Northern Ireland. If you don't 
belong to one of those tribes you are regarded as something of an 
eccentric, a bit of a looney or a traitor." He pictured the scenario 
if Sinn Fein polled a substantial vote: 
If any significant section of the Northern Irish Catholic people 
votes for Sinn Fein candidates, whether they win seats or not, it 
points a very dark scenario. Because it will be seen then by the 
Protestants that the Catholics are voting for violence. 
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My seat is nothing compared to what the outcome of that could be. 
It would be bad, very bad, it would be frightening. All the 
Catholic population would be maligned. Maybe it is fortuitous 
that the Catholic population is being given this choice at this 
time, before the situation gets really out of hand. It may be 
hopeful that they are being given this chance to reject violent 
men and their violent gospels. If this rejection of violence 
comes from the ballot box - people will start to breathe. 91 
Fitt's hopes were dashed - Sinn Fein achieved a 13.4% poll, 
which was 3% up on the Assembly election. Furthermore, Adams was 
elected M.P. for West Belfast, with Fitt coming third behind Hendron. 
Fitt's defeat on June 9, 1983 marked an end of an era, about 
which he commented: 
It is a victory which will appear, and which will certainly be 
interpreted by the outside world, that the Catholic population are 
endorsing candidates who are openly associated with, and political 
apologists for the men of violence. I think that holds a very 
dark future for Northern Ireland and the whole of Ireland. 92 
Adams' victory was on a minority vote, while Fitt's vote 
represented a considerable improvement from the 1981 Local government 
election when he only managed to poll 541 as against 3,006 in 1977. 
Passmore and Haffey only achieved a combined total of 4,834, so Fitt 
claimed that he had secured Protestant support: 
Half my votes come from Protestant working class in the Shankill 
Road and half came from working class in the Falls Road. I have 
striven all my political life to unite the Catholic and Protestant 
working classes in this tragically divided city, and that is what 
I did yesterday. 93 
He told the Belfast News Letter, "It made me feel like a nigger 
in Alabama who had been voted in by the Ku Klux Kl an. "94 
Republicans did not deny that Protestants had voted for Fitt but they 
forwarded a different reason: 
In view of his unpopularity amongst nationalists, it is clear that 
a large section of Fitt's 10,326 votes came from Loyalists. 
Contrary to his claim that he had succeeded in uniting the 
Protestant and Catholic working class, the vote merely 
demonstrates that even a Catholic can win Loyalist support if he 
is sufficiently pro-British. 95 
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The 1981 Local government election showed that many voters had 
come to see Fitt as something of a political parasite. However, 
Fitt did make a considerable comeback in the 1983 Westminster 
election. Evidence does indeed suggest that there was some tactical 
voting against Sinn Fein by Protestant voters. The Ulster 
acknowledged that "in the absence of a candidate of stature who would 
swing the vote away from the I.R.A's Sinn Fein, Gerry Fitt secured a 
big percentage of their votes." 96 This tactical voting theory 
is given further substance by the 1987 Westminster election. On the 
basis of the combined Hendron/Fitt vote in 1983, Adams should not 
have won in 1987. However, he did. Although unionists may have felt 
they could have cast their vote in favour of Fitt in 1983 (who after 
all had now renounced the concept of nationalism) they perhaps could 
not bring themselves to vote for Hendron and the S.D.L.P. who had 
endorsed the Anglo Irish Agreement, an agreement so repugnant to the 
vast majority of Protestants. 
Although there are grounds then to suggest that Protestant 
voting in West Belfast in 1983 was influenced by tactical 
considerations, it would be misleading not to acknowledge that many 
Catholics and indeed some Protestants voted for Fitt because of 
sentiment and a sense of loyalty. In terms of traditional 
constituency clientalist effort Fitt worked extremely hard over the 
years. Few could argue that in the limited avenues that were open to 
him he helped or at least tried to help people who sought his 
assistance. Yet over the years the plight of Fitt's constituents had 
become increasingly desperate and Fitt's brand of welfare politics 
no longer sufficed. 97 Many young disgruntled nationalist 
voters demanded radical change and felt Sinn Fein could provide it. 
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Reaction in Britain was summed up by James Prior, who considered 
Fitt's defeat "disastrous" and the British authorities were 
understandably alarmed by Sinn Fein's success. 98 
In the Republic, there was a general lamentation expressed by 
the media over Fitt's defeat. 
prevailing sentiment: 
The Cork Examiner typified the 
Gerry Adams gained their (Sinn Fein) sole seat and this was at the 
expense of the 17 year old career of the former S.D.L.P. leader 
and parliamentarian of great moral courage, Gerry Fitt. This 
outcome, in a constituency in which Mr Fitt could not conduct a 
normal canvass because of violent conditions, will sadden many 
admirers of his steadfastness over the lengthy years of Northern 
strife. 99 
Even the Irish Press, which had been so critical of Fitt during 
the hunger strikes, bemoaned his plight: 
Perhaps the most impressive result of the day - and in some ways 
the saddest - was that of Gerry Fitt whose long parliamentary 
career ended with his defeat in West Belfast. But Mr Fitt, whose 
political courage and social commitment were always beyond 
question, said farewell in the most impressive manner possible 
notching up a very creditable 10,000 votes when his opponents had 
been predicting that he would be lucky to get even a third of that 
vote. West Belfast Protestant and Catholic, ignored the pundits 
and remembered the hard work Mr Fitt had put in on their behalf 
for almost 20 years. 100 
There had been some predictions that Fitt would be elevated to 
the House of Lords and after his election defeat, his wife 
commented: "If Mrs Thatcher knows what this man has done for the 
people of West Belfast, she'll promote him to the House of Lords -
but I doubt if he would accept it." 101 
On June 19, the London Sunday Times reported "Many M.P's of all 
parties also hope to see Gerry Fitt, defeated Independent Socialist 
M.P. for West Belfast, continue his parliamentary service in the 
Upper House." 102 On July 22, 1983 it was announced that Fitt 
had been offered and had accepted a life peerage. He remarked: 
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I do not think I have done anything to be honoured about. What I 
have done in politics I have felt to be right. I took decisions 
which were not supported by everyone 
I have over the past 11 years been under serious attack by 
Provisional I.R.A. supporters and other republican elements. 
Prior to that, I was viciously attacked by Loyalist supporters. I 
have always and always will, make my feelings known against I.R.A. 
violence and Loyalist violence. 1ro 
The announcement was predictably criticised by Adams: 
This peerage exposes absolutely the anti-democratic nature of the 
British system of government when a failed politician who has been 
rejected by the people of North Belfast in a Council election and 
by the people of West Belfast in a Westminster election, is then 
installed in a position of making and influencing foreign law for 
use against these people. 1~ 
Ironically, an Official Unionist spokesman said, "I don't think 
unionists are greatly excited about it. We are not going to 
celebrate the elevation of a republican to the House of 
Lords." 105 The spokesman was presumably aware of the ironic 
content of his statement. 
Just over two weeks prior to the peerage declaration, on July 3, 
Fitt's home had been badly damaged in an arson attack. The 
perpetrators had broken into the house, removed the furniture and 
burned it in the back yard before setting fire to the house itself. 
Fitt was adamant that the Provisionals had carried out the raid and 
admitted defeat, "They have succeeded after 11 years to drive me out 
of this house." 106 
Sinn Fein, for their part, condemned the burning of "Fortress 
Fitt." Joe Austin, Chairman of North Belfast Sinn Fein, declared the 
burning "a wanton and mindless act of destruction." 107 
Fitt now claims that it was that latest attack on his home and 
in particular, the destruction of his wedding photos, which made him 
accept the peerage as a form of retaliation. 108 The adulation 
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by the British media, the continuing favour of the British 
establishment and indeed the violence his family were subjected to 
perhaps made Fitt's decision inevitable. Nevertheless, Fitt's 
political integrity must be questioned. A disciple of James Connolly 
would not become a Peer of the Realm. 
diametrically opposed. 
The two positions are 
Predictably, in Britain, his undertaking to join the Lords was 
welcomed by politicians (both Michael Foot, then leader of the Labour 
Party, and Thatcher had forwarded his name) and the media alike. In 
the Republic there was little, if any, condemnation from the 
press. 109 The Irish Independent editorial claimed: "Fitt was 
selected and rightly so. 11110 This sentiment differed greatly 
from the editorial of the Irish News (which for so many years had an 
almost sycophantic relationship with Fitt): 
Gerry Fitt's acceptance of a peerage from Britain can only be 
regarded by the nationalist population of the North as a sort of 
betrayal. In spite of the carefully orchestrated publicity of the 
past weeks, it had been hoped even to the last moment, that this 
brave, but misguided former idol of the nationalist community, 
would stop short of giving total credibility to institutions that 
are so directly opposed to every principle he once 
represented. 111 
On October 26, Gerry Fitt was ennobled as Baron Fitt of Bells 
Hill, after taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Queen. 112 As 
the Irish News interpreted: "It was a strange day for the one time 
socialist docker." 113 
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r CONCLUSION 
I believe that political opportunists although they may win short 
term successes, generally fail in the long run, because in due 
course people find them out. One cannot forever be a republican 
in Belfast and a socialist in London, a nationalist at Stormont 
and a British subject at Westminster. Nor can one build an 
enduring political career upon a great heap of irresponsible 
criticism and denigration. (Terence O'Neill, Irish News, May 25, 
1968). 
The above quotation has already appeared in the main body of 
this dissertation, but a second adduction is justified as O'Neill's 
statements neatly encapsulate Gerry Fitt's tactical ploys. Fitt 
endeavoured to defy Aesop's dictum that you cannot please all of the 
people all of the time. Particularly in the 1960s, Fitt strove to be 
all things to all men. Therefore, the remarkable volte-face, from 
Republican Socialist to Peer of the Realm is in reality not so 
remarkable as Fitt was neither a republican nor a socialist in the 
true sense. He was, however, a nationalist who became so 
disillusioned with the ideology that he felt able to join the British 
House of Lords. By considering each of Fitt's political labels in 
turn, I shall attempt to show how perceptive O'Neill was. 
In contemporary Irish terms, a republican is someone who 
believes in uniting Ireland by physical force. Fitt was sympathetic 
to this tradition. In 1962 Fitt demanded the release of republican 
political prisoners considering them "men of principle" and 
"political opponents" of unionism. In 1972 he called for the 
granting of political status for republican prisoners. By 1980, 
however, he denounced republicans on hunger strike and asked the 
British government to deny their political demands. His stance would 
suggest that Fitt radically altered his views on republicans and came 
to betray his original ideals. This appraisal, however, is much too 
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simplistic. It does not appreciate that Fitt's republicanism, when 
exhibited, was tactical and furthermore it fails to recognise that he 
operated in shifting historical circumstances. 
Chapter I established that the 1.R.A. campaign of 1956 - 1962 
was nothing more than a series of border incidents impinging little 
on the life of the citizens in either the north or south. It 
demonstrated that the republican movement did not reflect the 
aspirations of nationalists and that the policy of physical force was 
no longer viable. Fitt's apparent republicanism in the 1960s must be 
placed in this context. He was cunning enough to discern that 
republican laurels would be helpful, if not absolutely necessary, to 
a budding Catholic politician. Fitt was nothing if not versatile in 
this period. He was supportive of the republican prisoners and made 
sure he was seen at the annual Easter parades designed to show 
deference to the republican dead. In essence, in the early 1960s, 
Fitt's republicanism was tactical and opportunistic. 
Likewise, when Fitt and Harry Diamond joined forces in 1964, the 
"Republican Labour Party" was a mere label based on tactical 
considerations. In time, Fitt was able to jettison this republican 
tag with no difficulty. Furthermore, in his maiden speech at 
Westminster, he freely acknowledged that he was not a republican in 
the true sense and posed as a working-class British subject with 
working class grievances. Although he appeared to have republican 
sympathies in Belfast, he showed no such inclination in London. 
Although Fitt, occasionally flirted with rhetoric that suggested 
"unconstitutional" methods of political agitation, he was, like all 
politicians, totally unprepared for the re-emergence of the I.R.A. 
In the 1970s his previous republican posturing was totally 
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inappropriate and he consistently condemned the I.R.A. Although Fitt 
was never a true republican, he had played the role sufficiently well 
to convince many in Belfast of his sincerity, thus his condemnation 
of the I.R.A. seemed strangely inconsistent in the light of previous 
posturing. This apparent transfiguration left Fitt open to charges 
of gross betrayal with the elevation to the House of Lords the 
belated final insult. Yet, when one considers the nature of Fitt's 
republicanism, his peerage is not so paradoxical. 
Like his republicanism, Fitt's socialism was largely tactical. 
It was also extremely vague and based on intuition rather than on 
political theory as the paucity of his writings illustrate. His 
socialism was based on bread and butter issues, or if you like, 
politics of the welfare state. Nevertheless, it must be stressed 
that Fitt was extremely conscientious in his endeavours for the 
working class, albeit on a clientelist basis. Indeed, it would be 
more appropriate to label Fitt as a "fixer" rather than a socialist, 
his socialism being more akin to populism. 
Early in his career, Fitt had the ability to articulate the 
socialist arguments of James Connolly and bring them into play when 
necessary. This strategy was instrumental in winning election after 
election in the 1960s. Yet Fitt was not in the same tradition as 
Connolly. Fitt sought change through parliamentary means whereas 
Connolly sought it through the militancy of the working class. 
Despite some of his rhetoric Fitt was a moderate reformer; Connolly 
was a Revolutionary Socialist. This was no more evident than when 
the Northern State's existence was threatened and Fitt decided to 
distance 
ideals. 
himself from elements intent on realizing Connolly's 
Fitt's present argument that Connolly made a mistake by his 
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involvement in the 1916 Easter rebellion is an admission that his 
allegiance to Connolly became qualified. In short, Fitt's politics 
had nothing to do with the Connolly tradition of socialism. Indeed, 
if there is an Irish historical figure that can be likened to Fitt, 
it is John Redmond. Like Fitt, Redmond exhibited a tremendous faith 
that the British parliament could right Ireland's wrongs. F.S.L. 
Lyons said of Redmond: "He seems to have found it difficult to hate 
Englishmen and things English." 1 
Fitt. 
The same could be said of 
By the 1970s, Fitt's references to Connolly had virtually 
stopped. He was the leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party 
(S.D.L.P.) which, despite Fitt's early protestations to the contrary, 
was not a socialist party. It became the voice of Catholics opposed 
to the Provisionals' campaign and was mildly reformist in social 
policy. Fitt was adamant that he was a socialist in a socialist 
party but on two crucial issues he demonstrated that this was not the 
case. First, when Paddy Devlin resigned from the S.D.L.P. on 
socialist principles, Fitt did not support him. Second, Fitt was 
instrumental in bringing down the Labour government in Britain in 
1979, an action he does not regret, despite eleven years of 
anti-working class policies orchestrated by Margaret Thatcher. 
Furthermore, Fitt's peerage undoubtedly allows his critics to mock 
his socialist principles. An Irish socialist should not end up in 
the House of Lords. 
In retrospect it is also clear that Fitt did not or could not 
differentiate between revolutionary socialism and the social 
democracy of the Labour Party. A feature of Fitt's career was his 
belief that the social democracy of the Labour Party would solve the 
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problems of Northern Ireland. He was confident that it could deliver 
an end to sectarian injustice and discrimination. However, it became 
obvious that the Labour Party lacked the will to put the necessary 
pressure on the unionist majority. Fitt never grasped the fact that 
British politicians tended to fear Ireland as a political 
graveyard. 2 
In the 1960s the Labour government did not help Fitt address the 
iniquities of unionism. Despite this, in the 1970s he clung to the 
belief that his "socialist colleagues" would make the unionists toe 
the line. They did not. They failed to endorse power-sharing. 
Rees' promise that Sunningdale would be ratified did not 
materialise. Orme's promise to the S.D.L.P. that the Northern 
Ireland Office would act strongly against U.W.C. strikers did not 
happen. Wilson's speech to the Loyalist strikers was 
counter-productive. Rees went on to placate the Provisionals, 
belittling the importance and political credibility of the S.D.L.P. 
When he ended internment it was too late. As for Mason, in Fitt's 
own words, he was "an anti Irish wee get." When Fitt brought down 
the Labour government in 1979 it was as much to do with pique as 
anything else. In short, it can be said that Fitt's socialism did 
not run very deep and his faith in the social democracy of the Labour 
Party was unrewarded. 
Although Fitt's socialist credentials do not stand close 
examination, it cannot be denied that he had a deep affinity with the 
working class. He had a "them and us" type of attitude. 
Furthermore, Fitt secured some Protestant support at elections which 
stemmed, particularly in the 1960s, from his stance as a champion of 
the working class. Considering the sectarian nature of Northern 
321 
Irish society, this was a worthy achievement. In the 196Os 
Protestants as well as Catholics brought their problems to his 
clinic. A growing reputation for hard work as a public 
representative for the working class enabled him to partially cross 
the religious divide in Northern Irish politics. This was reflected 
in his ability to retain the Dock seat which no one had managed to do 
before and was instrumental in his winning the West Belfast seat in 
1966. However, although Fitt may have had some Protestant admirers 
when in the S.D.L.P., the party itself was unable to attract the 
corporate Protestant community. 
In 1983 the question of cross-community support for Fitt was 
re-opened. It would not be unreasonable to conclude that although 
many Protestants voted for Fitt as an anti-I.R.A. move, some cast 
their vote out of a sense of loyalty for past favours. Indeed, some 
Catholics also did so. 
Although it can be argued that the political labels republican 
and socialist cannot be applied to Fitt with total accuracy, there is 
no doubt that in his early career he was a nationalist. 
Chapters II, III and IV established that Fitt was a nationalist 
politician with very strong views on the unification of Ireland. His 
retrospective assertion that he was not interested in nationalism is 
simply an attempt to rewrite history. One only has to look at his 
maiden speech at Stormont in 1962 (when he strongly articulated his 
desire to see a united Ireland) and his public speech after the West 
Belfast triumph of 1966 (when he declared that he would never 
renounce the ideal of national unity) to establish that Fitt was 
indeed a nationalist. 
Of course, Fitt's nationalism was much more pronounced outside 
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Westminster. In the United States, for example, he was openly 
nationalist. Furthermore, he was not adverse to criticising the 
government of the Irish Republic for not doing enough to end 
partition. Clearly, Fitt was a nationalist and there is a 
contradiction between his current anti-nationalist position as a Peer 
of the Realm and the political position on which he built his support 
and which helped him win numerous electoral contests. 
It is clear that Fitt's political antenna shifted at some 
point. The watershed was power-sharing. This local emphasis was far 
removed from the traditional nationalist emphasis on the whole Irish 
nation. Fitt became convinced of the merit of power-sharing. 3 
Fitt's retrospective assertion that he wanted nothing from 
Sunningdale as a cross community Executive had already been agreed, 
negates years of his nationalist rhetoric. After the fall of the 
Executive Fitt spoke of power-sharing as a golden age and made its 
restoration his main political aim. Fitt's position, therefore, had 
changed from wanting to initiate the demise of the Northern state to 
reform of it and then collaboration in its continued existence. It 
would be naive in the extreme to suggest that politicians do not 
change their policies when circumstances suit. Fitt, however, feels 
unable to acknowledge that his politics changed, thus leaving himself 
open to charges of political opportunism. 
The idea that power-sharing was a watershed in Fitt's career is 
not a neat concept. Although he became convinced of power-sharing's 
benefits, he led a party that was not. In contrast, the S.D.L.P. 
became increasingly nationalist orientated. Fitt supported this 
position in public but evidence suggests that in private he did not. 
He played a very duplicitous game that was reflected in two political 
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manoeuvres that were completely contradictory. 
In 1979 he brought down the Labour government on principles of 
nationalism arguing against greater Ulster representation at 
Westminster. This was a complete reversal of his position as 
articulated in his maiden Westminster speech which demanded parity of 
democracy. Eight months later he resigned his leadership of the 
S.D.L.P. because the party had become, in his opinion, too stridently 
nationalist. He had now crossed the political divide and repudiated 
nationalism. His joining of the House of Lords was tantamount to 
giving unconditional support to British policy on Northern Ireland 
and endorsing the continuation of partition. In effect, Fitt had 
become a unionist. 
The question that begs answering is what kind of political 
animal was Fitt that he could entertain various political labels and 
traverse such a strange political course? The answer lies in his 
individuality and his instinct to survive politically. Although the 
political labels of republican, socialist and nationalist had a 
non-adhesive quality, Fitt was always a "survivor." The political 
transference from Dock Irish Labour to Republican Labour to S.D.L.P. 
to Independent to House of Lords were all made with the minimum of 
fuss. It was not really that a one time Republican Socialist entered 
the Upper House but rather a political chameleon who refused to be 
denied a political forum even though he knew it would stretch if not 
ruin his political credibility. To Fitt the political limelight was 
more important than political ideology. Of course, Fitt's stance on 
the hunger strikes does not fit into this pattern of survival. It 
can only be assumed that Fitt took his position on this life and 
death issue on moral grounds. 
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Fitt's survival instincts were complemented by his 
individuality. He never doubted his own political intuition. 
Chapter II demonstrated that Fitt's 1966 election victory was not 
symptomatic of the metamorphosis in Catholic politics that was 
outlined in Chapter I. Although he may have been aided by the 
increased desire for representation and attendance at Westminster he 
was essentially a "lone operator" uninterested in large parties. He 
clung to his individualism and would not accept the Labour whip. 
Nevertheless, although Fitt was not a member of the Northern Irish 
Catholic middle class that emerged in the late 1950s, he became their 
political leader. The incongruity of this is shown by Fitt's severe 
clashes with the middle class National Democratic Party and his 
acceptance of the leadership of the S.D.L.P. which incorporated and 
was greatly influenced by the N.D.P. 
Fitt was correct to hold on to his independence for he was never 
cut out to be a party politician, as his spell with the S.D.L.P. 
proved. No doubt there was considerable pressure on him to join the 
S.D.L.P. yet he was aware that if he failed to join he would lose the 
political limelight. In reality he was only the titular head. The 
publishing magnate, Cecil King, in his diary of January 18, 1974, 
noted Ian Paisley "has no opinion of Fitt, but regards Hume as the 
effective leader of the S.D.L.P." 4 
Fitt's figurehead position in the S.D.L.P. should not detract 
from the fact that he has made a mark in both British and Irish 
history. His maiden speech at Westminster in 1966 stands as a 
landmark in Irish history as does his direct and dramatic involvement 
in the Derry civil rights march in 1968. Both actions ensured that 
he played a major role in destabilizing the Stormont government and, 
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in consequence the Northern state. In addition, he was instrumental 
in bringing British troops to Belfast, with a resultant quagmire of 
political and armed struggle which created a political dilemma for 
him that he could never resolve. It should also be remembered that 
for a day he was acting Chief Minister for Northern Ireland in the 
period of power-sharing. Furthermore, many on the British left will 
also remember him for his part in bringing Margaret Thatcher to 
power. 
How Fitt will be viewed historically can not be so well 
defined. 
assessment. 
In truth, insufficient years have passed to make a balanced 
He is perceived differently by different people. 
Republicans simply see him as an Irish Quisling. On the other hand, 
the tabloid press in Britain praise him as "Lord Courage." 5 
Even the Irish News has put him on the road to rehabilitation only a 
few years after castigating him for his elevation to the peerage. In 
an editorial marking twenty years of the "troubles" the paper states: 
The historical 
will show that 
the Northern 
compromise with 
courage that was 
record for every objective observer and researcher 
Fitt was one of the outstanding public figures of 
Ireland scene who, from the outset, did not 
violence. He revealed a political and moral 
truly remarkable. 6 
One thing is certain about Gerry Fitt, he was one of the most 
colourful figures in Irish politics. When defeated by Adams in June 
1983 admirers and critics alike would have agreed that it was the end 
of an era. 
NOTES 
1. F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland since the Famine (London: Fontanna, 
1985), 261. 
2. An example of British politicians fear of involvement in 
Northern Irish affairs was provided by Tony Benn, who as Minister of 
Technology recorded in his diary on August 19, 1969 a cabinet meeting 
held to discuss the situation in Ulster. He noted: 
Denis (Healey, Minister of Defence) said he thought it 
was better to get Chichester-Clark, or another 
Ulsterman to carry the can ... Jim (Callaghan) said 
he thought Chichester-Clark was anxious to help 
because he was a frightened man. 
Jim then considered the possibility of a broadly based 
government, although it was agreed that this should 
not be done unless it was acceptable. But if all else 
fails what do we do? Denis stressed again. Let's 
keep Chichester-Clark carrying the can. Jim agreed. 
Yes I too want to avoid responsibility. 
Independent (London), 14 December 1987. 
3. Peter Mclachlan who was one of Brian Faulkner's closest 
advisers, particularly during the Sunningdale Conference, recalls the 
aftermath of the first meeting of the Assembly after the 
Power-Sharing Executive took office: 
There was Fitt, myself and three or four others. 
Fitt's coat was across on a stand just on the other 
side of the corridor and Faulkner fetched the coat and 
he held it for Fitt to put on and Fitt's eyes filled 
with tears and he said "this is a moment in history 
with the Unionist Chief Executive holding the coat for 
an S.D.L.P. Deputy Chief Executive, this is a great 
moment." And he was very moved, you could see that he 
was very moved by that symbolic gesture. 
Peter Mclachlan, interview by author, 14 February 1991, 
Belfast. 
4. C. King, Diary 1970 - 1974 (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd., 
1975), 341. 
5. 
6. 
Sunday Mirror Magazine (London), 6 May 1990. 
Irish News (Belfast), 14 August 1989. 
326 
111 
1: 
I ,, 
327 
TABLE ONE 
1958 STORMONT GENERAL ELECTION 
BELFAST - DOCK 
Oliver, W (Unionist) 3,156 
Fitt, G (Dock Irish Labour) 2,900 
Unionist gain : Majority 256 
Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office 
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TABLE TWO 
1958 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTION 
BELFAST - DOCK 
* Elected: * Fitt, G (Dock Irish Labour) 1,862 
* Atcheson, w (Unionist) 1,838 
* O'Kane, J (Dock Irish Labour) 1,828 
Cardwell, J (Unionist) 1,806 
Wil 1 i ams on, D (Unionist) 1,681 
Hawkes, H (Independent Unionist) 403 
Two Dock Irish Labour gains from Unionists 
Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office 
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TABLE THREE 
1961 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTION 
BELFAST - DOCK 
* Elected * Fitt, G (Dock Irish Labour) 1,984 
* Gallagher, J (Dock Irish Labour) 1,947 
* Atcheson, W (Unionist) 1,593 
McNeil, J.A (Unionist) 1,494 
Wi 11 i amson, D (Unionist) 1,332 
No change 
Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office 
TABLE FOUR 
1962 STORMONT GENERAL ELECTION 
Fitt, G 
Oliver, W 
BELFAST - DOCK 
(Dock Irish Labour) 
(Unionist) 
Dock Irish Labour gain Majority 507 
3,288 
2,781 
Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office 
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TABLE FIVE 
1964 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTION 
BELFAST - DOCK 
* Elected: * Fitt, G (Republican Labour) 2,140 
* Fitzpatrick, T (Republican Labour) 2,002 
* McMenamin, J (Republican Labour) 1,916 
McMaster, s (Unionist) 1,401 
McDowell, w (Unionist) 1,337 
Maginnis, C (Unionist) 1,291 
Wilson, P (Labour) 731 
One Republican Labour gain from Unionists 
Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office 
Kilfedder, J 
Diamond, H 
Boyd, W 
McMillan, L 
TABLE SIX 
1964 WESTMINSTER ELECTION 
BELFAST - WEST 
(Unionist) 
(Republican Labour) 
(Northern Ireland Labour Party) 
(Republican) 
No change Unionist Majority 6,659 
21,337 
14,678 
12,571 
3,256 
Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office 
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Fitt, G 
Oliver, W 
TABLE SEVEN 
1965 STORMONT GENERAL ELECTION 
BELFAST - DOCK 
(Republican Labour) 
(Unionist) 
3,326 
2,016 
No change Republican Labour majority 1,310 
Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office 
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TABLE EIGHT 
1966 WESTMINSTER GENERAL ELECTION 
BELFAST - WEST 
Fitt, G (Republican Labour) 26,292 
Kilfedder, J (Unionist) 24,281 
Unionist loss to Republican Labour: Republican Labour majority 2,011 
Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office 
TABLE NINE 
1967 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTION 
Fitt, G 
Millar, F 
Fitzpatrick, 
Kelley, P 
Kennedy, P 
Fenton, R 
Duff, S 
T 
BELFAST - DOCK 
ALDERMAN 
(Republican Labour) 
(Unionist) 
COUNCILLORS 
(Republican Labour) 
(Republican Labour) 
(Republican Labour) 
(Unionist) 
(Unionist) 
2,499 
1,426 
2,405 
2,274 
2,231 
1,407 
1,319 
Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office 
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336 
TABLE TEN 
1969 STORMONT ELECTION 
BELFAST - DOCK 
Fitt, G (Republican Labour) 3,274 
Smith, H (Unionist) 1,936 
Republican Labour majority 1,338 
Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office 
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TABLE ELEVEN 
1970 WESTMINSTER GENERAL ELECTION 
BELFAST - WEST 
Fitt, G (Republican Labour) 30,649 
McRoberts, B (Unionist) 27,451 
No change Republican Labour majority 3,198 
Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office 
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TABLE TWELVE 
1972 LOCAL GOVERNMENT BY-ELECTION 
BELFAST - DOCK 
Fitt, A (Independent) 2,536 
Robb, D (Constitution Party) 288 
Majority 2,248 
Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office 
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TABLE THIRTEEN 
1973 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTION 
BELFAST AREA 'G' 
* Elected 
* Laird, M (Unionist) 3,632 1 
* Ditty, H (Unionist) 3,556 1 
* Fitt, G (Social Democratic & Labour Party) 2,876 1 
* Kidd, H (Unionist) 2,651 1 
* Millar, S (Independent Unionist) 2,291 2 
* McKeown, M (Independent Unionist) 572 15 
McAlea, J (Republican Club) 376 
Boyle, J (Northern Ireland Labour Party) 368 
McGlade, F (Republican Club) 291 
O'Kane, J (Republican Labour) 193 
Pak.enham, T (Northern Ireland Labour Party) 182 
O'Hara, D (Republican Club) 174 
Shark.ley, J (Northern Ireland Labour Party) 132 
Saunders, M (Independent) 52 
Scullion, H (Republican Labour) 19 
Rigby, J (Independent) 13 
Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office 
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TABLE FOURTEEN 
1973 ASSEMBLY ELECTION 
BELFAST NORTH 
1st Pref 
(The Six Elected) 
Fitt, G (Social Democratic & Labour Party) 8,264 1 
McQuade, J (Democratic Unionist Loyalist 
Coal it ion) 5,148 11 
Hall Thompson, L (Official Unionist) 5,694 14 
Morgan W.J (Official Unionist) 5,190 15 
Millar, F (Unionist) 4,187 15 
Ferguson, J (Alliance) 1,958 15 
Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office 
TABLE FIFTEEN 
February 1974 Westminster General Election 
BELFAST - WEST 
Fitt, G (Social Democratic & Labour Party) 
McQuade, J (Democratic Unionist Party - United 
Ulster Unionist Council) 
Price, A (Independent) 
Brady, J (Republican Club) 
Boyd, W.R. (Northern Ireland Labour Party) 
19,554 
17,374 
5,612 
3,088 
1,989 
No change Social Democratic & Labour Party majority 2,180 
Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office 
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TABLE SIXTEEN 
OCTOBER 1974 WESTMINSTER GENERAL ELECTION 
BELFAST - WEST 
Fitt, G (Social Democratic & Labour Party) 21,821 
McQuade, J (Democratic Unionist Party - United 
Ulster Unionist Council) 16,265 
O'Kane, K (Republican Club) 3,547 
Gibson, s (Volunteer Political Party) 2,690 
Kerins, p (Communist) 203 
No change Social Democratic & Labour Party majority 5,556 
Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office 
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TABLE SEVENTEEN 
1975 CONVENTION ELECTION 
BELFAST - NORTH 
1st Pref Count 
Fitt, G (Social Democratic & Labour 
Party) 6,454 1 
Bell, W (Unionist - United Ulster 
Unionist Council) 6,268 1 
Millar, F (Independent - United Ulster 
Unionist Council) 5,687 7 
Morgan, W (Unionist - United Ulster 
Unionist Council) 5,558 8 
Hall-Thompson, L (Unionist Party of Northern 
Ireland) 3,577 10 
Annon, W.T. (Democratic Unionist Party -
United Ulster Unionist Council) 4,132 10 
6 Elected (Quota 6,230) 
Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office 
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TABLE EIGHTEEN 
1977 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTION 
BELFAST 'G' 
First Preference 
* Fitt, G (Social Democratic & Labour Party) 3,006 
* Ashby, F. E. (Democratic Unionist Party) 1,377 
* Ditty, H. (Official Unionist) 1.043 
* Lynch, s. (Republican Club) 1,323 
* Walker, C. (Official Unionist) 779 
Haffney, G.A. (Democratic Unionist Party) 742 
Laird, M. (Official Unionist) 592 
Millar, S. (Official Unionist) 515 
Kidd, H. (Independent Unionist) 387 
* McKeown, M. (Alliance) 320 
* Elected 
Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office 
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TABLE NINETEEN 
1979 WESTMINSTER GENERAL ELECTION 
BELFAST - WEST 
Fitt, G (Social Democratic & Labour Party) 16,480 
Passmore, T (Official Unionist) 8,245 
Dick.son, w (Democratic Unionist Party) 3,716 
Brennan, B (Republican Club) 2,284 
Cousins, J (Alliance) 2,024 
Peters, D (Northern Ireland Labour Party) 540 
(Spoiled votes 2,283) 
No change Social Democratic & Labour Party majority 8,235 
Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office 
TABLE TWENTY 
1981 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTION 
BELFAST - AREA G - 1st PREFERENCE 
Ashby, FE (Democratic Unionist Party) 2,076 
O'Hare, F (Peoples Democracy) 1,953 
Walker, C (Official Unionist) 1,173 
Millar, s (New Ulster Political Research Group) 1,420 
Lynch, S (Workers Party Republican Club) 750 
Feeney, B (Social Democratic & Labour Party) 749 
Ditty, H (Official Unionist) 596 
Fitt, G (Socialist) 541 
Coggle, J A (Democratic Unionist Party) 392 
McGarry, P J (Alliance) 313 
NB: The New Ulster Research Group were the Political Wing of the 
U.D.A. 
Result supplied by the Belfast Public Records Office 
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Adams, G 
Hendron, J 
Passmore, T 
TABLE TWENTY ONE 
1982 ASSEMBLY ELECTION 
BELFAST - WEST 
4 Elected (Quota 6,852) Count 
(Provisional Sinn Fein) 1 
(Social Democratic & Labour Party) 5 
(Official Unionist) 8 
Glendenning, W (Alliance) 8 
347 
1st Pref 
8,740 
5,207 
4,505 
2,733 
Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office 
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TABLE TWENTY TWO 
1983 WESTMINSTER GENERAL ELECTION 
BELFAST - WEST 
Adams, G (Provisional Sinn Fein) 16,379 
Hendron, J (Social Democratic l Labour Party) 10,934 
Fitt, G (Independent) 10,326 
Passmore, T (Official Unionist) 2,435 
Haffey, GA (Democratic Unionist Party) 2,399 
McMahon, Ms M (Workers Party) 1,893 
Provisional Sinn Fein majority 5,445 
Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office 
Adams, G 
Hendron, Dr J 
Millar, F 
McMahon, Ms M 
TABLE TWENTY THREE 
1987 WESTMINSTER ELECTION 
BELFAST - WEST 
(Sinn Fein) 
(Social Democratic & Labour Party) 
(Democratic Unionist Party) 
(Workers Party) 
Sinn Fein majority 2,221 
No change 
Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office 
16,862 
14,641 
7,646 
1,819 
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c.o.u. 
C.S.J. 
O.U.P. 
E.E.C. 
I. I.P. 
I.N.L.A. 
I. R.A. 
I.T.G.W.U. 
M.P. 
N.O.P. 
N. I. 
N. I.C.R.A. 
N.I.L.P. 
N.P.F. 
O.I.R.A. 
P.O. 
P.I.R.A. 
P.R. 
R. T .E. 
R.U.C. 
S.D.L.P. 
T.O. 
U.D.A. 
GLOSSARY 
Campaign for Democracy in Ulster. 
Campaign for Social Justice. 
Democratic Unionist Party. 
European Economic Community. 
Irish Independence Party. 
Irish National Liberation Army. 
Irish Republican Party. 
Irish Transport and General Workers Union. 
Member of Parliament. 
National Democratic Party. 
Northern Ireland. 
Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association. 
Northern Ireland Labour Party. 
National Political Front. 
Official Irish Republican Army. 
Peoples Democracy. 
Provisional Irish Republican Army. 
Proportional Representation. 
Radio Telefis Eireann. 
Royal Ulster Constabulary. 
Social Democratic and Labour Party. 
Member of the Dail. 
Ulster Defence Association. 
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U.D.R. 
U.F.F. 
U.K. 
U.N. 
U.P.A. 
u.u.u.c. 
U.V.F. 
u.w.c. 
V.P.P. 
Ulster Defence Regiment. 
Ulster Freedom Fighters. 
United Kingdom. 
United Nations. 
Ulster Protestant Action. 
United Ulster Unionist Coalition. 
Ulster Volunteer Force. 
Ulster Workers Council. 
Volunteer Political Party. 
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